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# ***JPRS Report***

## **Soviet Union**

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***SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES***

No 2, MARCH-APRIL 1987

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## SOVIET UNION SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES

No 2, MAR-APR 1987

[Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language bimonthly journal SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences.]

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ZASLAVSKAYA ON NEED FOR SOCIOLOGY TRAINING, SOCIAL STATISTICS

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(signed to press 17 Mar 87) pp 3-15

[Article by T. I. Zaslavskaya, based on a speech at a plenum of the Soviet Sociological Association: "The Role of Sociology in Accelerating the Development of Soviet Society," first paragraph is source introduction]

[Text] Tatyana Ivanovna Zaslavskaya is an academician, president of the Soviet Sociological Association, and head of a department in the Economics and Organization of Industrial Production Institute of the Siberian Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences. She is the author of monographs entitled "Rural Population Migration" (1970), "The Development of Rural Settlements" (1977), "Methodology and Methods of Studying the Soviet Village" (1980), and others. Our journal has published her articles "On One Method of Classifying Objects in Sociology" (1974, No 1, co-author), "Toward a Methodology for Systematic Study of the Village" (1975, No 3), "Processes of Migration and Their Regulation in Socialist Society" (1978, No 1, co-author), and "Population Migration Between Town and Village" (1981, No 3, co-author).

The course of accelerating our country's economic and social development, a course which was advanced by the 27th CPSU Congress, is increasingly becoming a reality. The party is carrying out truly titanic work to eliminate phenomena alien to socialism and to overcome various obstructions on the road ahead: the economic management system is being restructured; the rights of enterprises are being expanded; the barriers to individual and family labor activity are opening up; the education system is being modernized; the active struggle against unearned income, drunkenness, and crime is spreading; an open war is being declared against bureaucratism; and there have also been very important changes as regards literature, cinema, theater, and other forms of art. The main point, however, is that the general addiction to half-truths, which are worse than lies in certain respects, is being persistently overcome. We are learning anew to look truth in the face, and this fact alone is perhaps worth all the others.

Not only is the entire system of social relations being restructured in the country, but an enormously intense struggle is developing between the ardent supporters of cardinal shifts and those social groups which are prepared to do everything to ensure that nothing changes. However, this could not be any other way. History shows that not one really serious social transformation

has been carried out without an intense struggle between different social forces. The more the process of restructuring social relations gathers pace, the greater the urgency of this struggle becomes. It seems to me that this attests to the revolutionary nature of the changes which are taking place.

"At the same time," the January (1987) CPSU Central Committee plenum noted, "we see that change for the better is taking place slowly, that the cause of reorganization is more difficult, and that the problems which have accumulated in society are more deep-rooted than we first thought. Under the new conditions each labor collective and each professional group must clarify its position in the restructuring of social relations. This applies to sociologists, too. It is necessary to define the areas of work which are capable of effectively contributing to the restructuring process, to conduct a frank discussion on the situation which has developed in our science, to reveal the factors holding back its development, and to develop a system of measures designed to substantially increase the effectiveness of sociology.

Let us say openly that for a long time social sciences were in the rearguard rather than the vanguard of society. In essence they lagged behind practice, confining themselves to a considerable extent to the repetition, explanation and approval of party decisions which had already been made. Under the new conditions this is impossible. Science must study not only those stretches of the road which have already been traversed, but also those which lie ahead, it must warn society in good time of the difficulties which await it, it must elaborate alternative solutions, and substantiate its choice of the best ones. The scientific activity which is given an orientation in this way not only can become but really is becoming an active motive force and a most important instrument of the restructuring process.

But in order to turn into such an instrument, the social sciences must first restructure themselves in accordance with the new demands. The conference of heads of social science departments pointed out many scientists' timidity of social thought, lack of civic courage, and reluctance to set about studying urgent problems. The party's Central Committee has appealed to scientists for bold scientific daring, for an in-depth search, and for the destruction of former stereotypes and dogma. Even a few years ago it would have been possible only to dream about such a postulation of the matter, and now it has become a reality. But can we say with certainty which requirements of the times sociology is capable of satisfying, and which ones it is incapable of meeting for the moment?

The new tasks of sociology. The increase in sociology's role is connected with the fact that every decision that is made affects the social interests of many interacting social groups, changes their situation, and transforms their behavior. In order to develop a restructuring process it is extremely important for management organs to have full, accurate and correct information about the needs, interests, values, and behavior of social groups under various conditions, as well as about the possible influence of this behavior on social processes.

It is vitally important to further develop problems of the party's social policy, to clearly define its concrete goals, and to define their



interrelationship more precisely. It is necessary to pick out the major stages in the implementation of the social program, to develop a system of practical measures to put it into practice, and to differentiate these measures, taking into account the specific features of various regions in the country and of socio-demographic, professional, branch, and other groups.

Sociology must also play a considerable role in concretizing the party's course toward accelerating economic development. Although the general direction for restructuring economic management was clearly set out by the congress, its practical implementation calls for hundreds and thousands of sociologically interpreted and substantiated decisions of a more individual nature (for example, precisely which management sectors are superfluous; which types of individual labor activity deserve to be supported and developed, and which ones deserve to be restricted; which kind of differentiation of various qualities of work should be considered fair, and which should be considered excessive, and so on). It is necessary to provide a maximally precise definition of the most important groups which interact in the economy, as well as to study the concrete conditions of their activity, the correlation of rights and obligations, the substance and methods of realizing interests, the coordination of group and social interests, and so on. Research into these problems is already producing results which are worthy of attention.

A no less important task of sociology is that of providing reliable feedback for restructuring management. After all, the adoption of the most correct and necessary decision by higher management organs is far from being the last step on the path of transforming reality, but is perhaps even the first step. This decision has to go on to "acquire" many instructions which make it concrete, to be interpreted by departments and local organs, and only then to change real relations locally--either by making them more effective or, on the contrary, by making things worse and causing negative consequences. This makes it necessary to exercise constant sociological control over the execution of decisions and over the course of the restructuring processes in all spheres of social life.

Nor must one forget about such an important function of sociology as the formation of sociological thinking in people. The main condition for the success of the party's transformative activity is the activation of the human factor and the elimination of the social apathy which has arisen among a significant proportion of society in the previous period. We all know how much scientific effort and resources were expended at one point in search of methods of liberating and making peaceful use of atomic energy. The liberation of man's social energy and the channeling of it in a direction necessary to society represent a task on no less a scale and of no less complexity. And this task is addressed primarily to sociologists. We must persistently develop a social awareness oriented toward the collective solution of common problems.

As we can see, the restructuring process makes great and diverse demands on sociology. Are we prepared to carry them out? This serious question calls for an answer that is just as serious, in other words an objective assessment of the contemporary state of sociology in the USSR. In connection with this I shall dwell on the basic achievements and problems of Soviet sociology.

Over the last quarter of a century this country's sociology has achieved certain successes. Its status as an independent science has been more or less consolidated. The Soviet Sociological Association unites about 6,000 individual and 1,200 collective members, while the total number of sociologists in the country comes to 15-20,000. As well as specialized sociological institute (the Sociological Research Institute), there are more than 40 sociological departments in operation within the system of the USSR and union republic Academies of Sciences. Active sociological research collectives have been formed in many social science departments of higher educational establishments. A tendency toward increased practical returns from the research which is conducted has appeared. An increasing role in the provision of information for managerial activity is being played by social institutions (councils and commissions) responsible for sociological studies and attached to rayon, oblast, and republican party committees. Sociological services in industry and other branches of the national economy have 3-4,000 people on their staffs, according to approximate estimates. The journal SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA, into which the Siberian journal IZVESTIYA SIBIRSKOGO OTDELENIYA AKADEMII NAUK SSSR SERIYA 'EKONOMIKA I PRIKLADNAYA SOTSIOLOGIYA' was incorporated 3 years ago, is in its 13th year of publication. The first steps are being made toward creating sociological higher education in the country. About 15 to 20 doctoral and 50 candidates' dissertations in the field of applied sociology are defended every year. The number of publications on sociological subjects is also increasing.

Large scientific collectives of both a "purely" sociological and a socio-economic, socio-demographic, and socio-legal nature, collectives which are distinguished by a high standard of professionalism, have been formed and are functioning successfully. They organize their work on the basis of major research projects, apply the systematic approach widely, utilize reliable mutual verification methods, and take account of the world experience of organizing sociological research. But the most important thing which characterizes these collectives' activity is the balance between the theoretical and empirical directions of research, as well as in-depth and adequate interpretation of data obtained.

I shall cite the research conducted in recent years on the social indicators of the USSR's development, the way of life of the urban and rural populations, the population's demographic behavior (Sociological Research Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences); problems of social development in Siberia's agrarian sector and of the social mechanism of the USSR's economic development (Economics and Organization of Industrial Production Institute of the Siberian Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences); the socioeconomic problems of welfare (the Central Economics and Mathematics Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences); value-based aspects of awareness and behavior in the labor sphere (Odessa University), ethnosocial problems of town and village (the Ethnography of the USSR Academy of Sciences); social problems of economic and state administration (the state and Law Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences). Interesting research has been conducted in the International Workers Movement Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee, the Ufim Aviation Institute, the Perm Polytechnical Institute, and other higher educational institutions.



The results obtained are being actively utilized in the development of a concept of society's social development and of the elements in its structure.

As a whole, Soviet sociology possesses considerable potential. However, its rate of development has been excessively low over the last 10 to 15 years. As a result, sociology in the USSR today is a lot weaker than, say, in Poland, Hungary or the developed capitalist countries. Whereas only one "purely" sociological journal is published in our country, one sociological association alone publishes seven such journals in the United States, while the total number is several dozen. Whereas the first 100 professional sociologists in our country will graduate in 1989, 226 sociological faculties in the United States produce 6,000 specialists every year, while about 90,000 Americans possess the basics of sociological knowledge. Whereas specialized sociological study courses are conducted only in a few higher educational institutions of that type, they are taught in the absolute majority (92 percent) of higher educational institutions in the United States. All this speaks of Soviet sociology's substantial lag behind "world standards."

Under conditions where society's development was slowed down, such a situation did not worry many people. Moreover, sociologists who were constantly seeking out urgent problems caused annoyance rather than approval among some workers in the apparatus. But the situation has changed. Under conditions of restructuring, sociology's lag is becoming a hindrance in the path of our forward movement. In order to actively promote acceleration, sociology must first of all itself develop in an accelerated manner, both quantitatively and especially qualitatively. But how is this to be achieved? In order to answer this question one must clearly gain an understanding of the causes of the situation which has arisen.

First of all, one cannot avoid recognizing that the professional standard of much sociological research is still low. Bare description, oversimplified treatment of issues, poor representation of facts, and en masse preparation of social development plans and accountability reports according to a single pattern are far from rare. In order for sociological research to become an effective instrument for change, it must be significantly deepened and linked to basic theory, and the creative search must be intensified. An important step in this direction is the transfer of sociological collectives from the traditional description of the structure and dynamism of research subjects to the explanation of the social mechanisms of their reproduction. Thus, for example, since 1981 the Economics and Organization of Industrial Production Association Institute of the Siberian Department in the USSR Academy of Sciences has been studying the social mechanism of economic development, a mechanism which consists of two subsystems: planned state management of the economy and the spontaneous behavior of social groups. In studying the interaction of these subsystems the sociologists are striving to establish how groups' behavior changes in response to management activity by the state, on the one hand, and how the economic management mechanism adapts to groups' economic behavior. It seems to me that an understanding of this mechanism makes it possible to increase the effectiveness and concreteness of recommendations by management organs. Other scientists are studying the social mechanisms of relations of distribution and of the reproduction of crime, parasitism,

alcoholism, and so on. Such an approach makes it possible to direct efforts toward the struggle against real ills rather than individual symptoms. For the moment, however, this approach is still poorly developed. We must also admit sociology's part in the formation of a view of our society's problems which is based on half-truths. Many of the sociological studies conducted in the 1970's and at the beginning of the 1980's were unable to avoid glossing over reality. While collecting positive facts, some sociologists turned a blind eye to negative phenomena which had gathered force. In a number of cases, empirical results were concocted on the basis of previously known conclusions. For instance, in a considerable proportion of the research into the social structure of Soviet society, one-sided emphasis was placed on the leveling out of interclass and other social differences, and clearly inadequate attention was paid to the appearance of new bases for differentiation which are connected with shadow-economy incomes and one's position within the system of political and economic management.

We have also devoted too small a proportion of our efforts to the creation of basic sociological theory. There are many reasons for this, but the fact remains. Writers, dramatists, and filmmakers are now putting out works which they prepared in complex years but which did not meet with understanding at that time. These works are now proving very necessary to Soviet society. But are many sociologists able to follow this example? Only a few, at best.

We should perhaps also reproach ourselves for insufficient social activeness in the struggle to institutionalize sociology. Although it cannot be said that there has been no such struggle at all—it has been conducted systematically and fairly persistently, otherwise sociology would not have achieved even that small amount mentioned above—we have, after receiving refusal after refusal, nevertheless reconciled ourselves to the fact that the USSR Ministry of Education does not recognize sociology as a separate science; that the departments which receive our scientific reports and recommendations do not always deign to read them; that the information base of sociology is narrowing, and so on.

Finally, we must admit that we did not display the will or ability to unite in order to solve major problems and to subordinate our personal interests to social ones. Hostility and squabbling between different groups of scientists and an inability to understand or recognize one another have led to the disintegration of a number of promising sociological collectives. Added to this has been a specific cadre policy which has resulted in the best known and qualified sociologists being forced to leave the Sociological Research Institute, and recently also the Social Economic Problems Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and move to other types of institute in which they are now working virtually on the "periphery" of sociology. The result of this policy has been the virtual disappearance of the formerly famous Leningrad sociological school and a grave weakening of the cadre composition of the Sociological Research Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, blocking that institute's successful functioning as an all-union theoretical and methodological sociological research center, which it should in principle carry out.

We therefore have things to reproach ourselves for. But by confining ourselves to this confession we would once again fall prey to the sin of telling half-truths. The whole truth demands that we also examine the social conditions under which sociology has developed in the last 15 to 20 years and which basically exist now. I shall deal with this in more detail.

The status of sociology is a science. It seems to me that the discussion of the subject of Marxist-Leninist sociology, a discussion which has continued over almost 2 decades, should be considered to be at an end. The majority of social scientists are in agreement that sociology is the science of the laws governing the functioning, development, and interaction of various kinds of social community. According to this understanding, the subject of sociology is a civic society characterized by a certain social structure, a specific type of family, and so on. In my view, this definition of the subject makes it possible to fairly clearly delineate sociology's place within the system of social sciences, and in particular to separate it from scientific communism, which is important for the establishment of its status. Sociology's status as an independent science has not yet, however, been recognized in full or by everyone. This is shown by cases which may not seem to be significant but which as a whole clearly hold back the rates of science's real development.

Here are just a few such cases. Contrary to the academic tradition of naming institutes after the corresponding science (for example, institutes of philosophy, history, economics, chemical physics, and so on), the one scientific institute of a sociological type is called the "sociological research" institute (evidently in order not to use the word "sociology"). Instead of being called VOPROSY SOTSIOLOGII [Questions of Sociology], analogous to VOPROSY EKONOMIKI or VOPROSY FILOSOFII, our journal is called SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA (Sociological Studies).

There is not a single sociological faculty within the country's system of higher education, and the departments of sociology can be counted on one's fingers. The absence of a sociology department in the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee is particularly alarming. The specializations which have been introduced at Moscow and Leningrad State Universities are entitled "applied sociology" rather than "sociology." An analogous name is given to specialization for the defense of sociological dissertations, as if the theoretical problems of sociology should not be elaborated at all.

There is no profession of sociologist in the list of specialists assigned to posts by USSR Gosplan. The sociologist's role and status have not been defined.

I think that all this is not a set of annoying coincidences, but a reflection of the fully conscious negation of sociology's claims to the status of an independent science. The statement which Professor V. Ya. Yelmeyev made in the pages of VESTNIK LENINGRADSKOGO GOSUDARSTVENNOGO UNIVERSITETA (No 2, 1986) was typical in this connection. To the question of what sociology is, he replied that it is the generic term for the entire system of social sciences, the best developed of which are historical materialism, political economy, and



scientific communism, but that sociology does not exist as a special discipline. And this is the opinion of the leader of an applied sociology department, one of three such departments in the country. In the documents of the recent conference of social science department heads, sociology was once again discussed as an individual philosophical discipline rather than as an independent science.

It is necessary to consistently institutionalize sociology as a science with an independent and extremely relevant subject, to precisely define its role and place in solving the concrete tasks of acceleration, and to create the conditions for its development. It would be of fundamental importance to rename the Sociological Research Institute as the Sociology Institute, the journal SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA as VOPROSY SOTSIOLOGII, and the higher educational courses in "applied sociology" and "sociology." Moreover, this specialization should be brought out from under the umbrella of philosophical and economic sciences in order to award scientists degrees directly in the sociological sciences. It is necessary to include sociology along with CPSU history, political economy, historical materialism, and scientific communism, among those ideological disciplines for which the teaching load is set at a lower level in connection with the increased volume of educational work.

It is possible and necessary to fundamentally change the attitude toward sociology as a science at the highest party and state level.

Providing sociology with cadres. The situation with cadres is best reflected by the formula "sociology without sociologists." Since there is no sociological education in the country, even our leading specialists are, strictly speaking, self-taught. It is true that the older generation of scientists which has been working for a quarter of a century has accumulated considerable knowledge, and that they should be able to successfully transfer this to successive generations. However, this "transfer" takes place most frequently either within sociological collectives or through postgraduate and short-term trainee courses. In both cases a "piecemeal product" is obtained, but there has not been any mass training of sociologists in the USSR in all these years, and neither is there any now. The applied sociology departments which are opened at Moscow and Leningrad State Universities in 1984 are first of all small, and second of all attract virtually no professional sociologists as lecturers. The quality of cadres trained in this way gives rise to doubt. The teaching of sociological disciplines within the system of institutes for improving qualifications, universities of marxism-Leninism, and faculties of the social professions, is developing slowly and with great difficulty. The sociological cadre "vacuum" is being filled by nonspecialists, which lowers the standard of sociological research and compromises science. In order to overcome the abnormal situation caused by the conservative position of the USSR Ministry of Education, it is necessary to develop, establish, and implement an integrated program for the development of sociological education. This program could include:

1. The creation of sociological faculties and departments at universities in those towns which now have professional sociological collectives capable of

providing teaching of a high enough standard. Such towns include Gorkiy, Kuybyshev, Novosibirsk, Minsk, Odessa, Perm, Sverdlovsk, and some others.

2. The opening of departments specializing in "applied sociology" or "economic sociology" at leading economic VUZ's and in the economic faculties of the major types (that is, technical, agricultural, trade, and other) of VUZ. As teaching cadres are formed, specialized courses in sociology and social psychology aimed at the entire student body should be included within the academic plans of the above VUZ's.

3. The creation of a consistent system for retraining and raising the qualifications of sociologists who have had no sociological training, to be carried out the faculties of social professions, universities of Marxism-Leninism, institutes for raising qualifications, and other forms, in order to ensure not only existing but also future cadre requirements of social development services.

4. Expansion of the system of sociological training for functionaries in the party, soviet, and economic organs, for the leaders and chief specialists of enterprises, and for the aktiv of social organizations, to be carried out through the higher trade union schools, special faculties, municipal sociological seminars, and so on.

5. An increase in the output of academic, methodological, and popular sociological literature oriented toward various forms of education and self-education as well as toward various categories of students.

The state of social statistics. Research in which various theoretical hypotheses are verified presents only a small proportion of information on society's social life. The main role here belongs to the state social statistical service, which is expected to systematically fix the flow of demographic, economic, and social processes. The existence of a developed social statistical service, including public opinion surveys, gives scientists an opportunity to concentrate on the solution of more complex issues. They can in turn render active methodological assistance to the development of social statistics themselves.

Social statistics form a firm basis for sociological research in the majority of developed countries. Data from these statistics is widely published and carries great ideological weight. For instance, the Government of Japan publishes a developed social statistical report "On National Life" in a large edition every year. As well as concrete analysis of the social situation which has formed in the year in question, the report cites dynamic series of indicators for 10 to 15 years, and compares the statistical data in each of its sections with the results of population polls.

Hungary has perhaps the best developed social statistical service of all the socialist countries. Regular social statistical surveys based on nationwide samples and embracing a wide range of problems are supplemented here by almost two dozen "panels" which carry out long-term observation of the fate of various population groups (for example young families, graduates from particular VUZs,

and so on). Once they have processed the data the statistical organs pass it on to the scientists.

The situation is different in the USSR. We hold one of the last places among the developed countries in this respect. I make the proviso that, in my opinion, social statistics should be regarded not as what the archives of the USSR Central Statistical Administration contain, but as those concrete results of data processing which are published in the open press and are available to a wide range of people.

A few years ago some Japanese scientists with a loyal attitude to our country asked me why there were no social statistics in the USSR. Remarking on the fact that Japanese literature contains many false fabrications about the USSR's social development, they complained that they could not find the material necessary to refute the false information. Similar considerations are voiced by sociologists in their countries. But the main point is that social statistics are extremely necessary to us.

After the sad memories of the 1930's, social statistics were never fully revived. In the 1960's and 1970's positive shifts did take shape, but the government of social statistics was soon replaced by their curtailment. Thus, published material on All-Union Population Census became increasingly scanty (almost to the point of completely disappearing!), and more and more sectors of social information "closed down."

We have already become accustomed to the fact that in the USSR no data is published on the prevalence of crime, on the frequency of suicide, on alcohol and narcotic consumption levels, and on the ecological situation in various cities and regions, although all of these phenomena form traditional subjects of statistics in economically developed countries. But how is one to explain the disappearance from print of information on migration between regions, between town and village? What is data about the structure of the population's incidence of disease suppressed? Why is information about the differentiation of the level and structure of the population's income and welfare so meager? Even if negative trends have appeared in these spheres, would it not be more correct to draw public attention to them and to discuss together methods of solving the problems? The course of restructuring the system of social relations which was advanced by the 27th CPSU Congress presupposes just such an approach.

For the sake of objectivity it must be said that the collection and analysis of social information has markedly expanded in recent years. However, it has become more difficult than before for scientific organizations to obtain data from the Central Statistical Administration, primarily because of a multitude of refined bureaucratic obstacles. To be specific, Siberian scientists often have to simply "abandon positions" and give up any further struggle because it proves impossible to obtain information in the time provided for official trips. The accessibility of social statistical data not only to scientists but also to broad strata of the population is of fundamental importance, and is linked in the most direct manner to openness in public life. If one conceals information about the conditions of people's own lives and activity from them



(for example about the extent of environmental pollution, the level of industrial injuries, the prevalence of crime, and so on), one cannot expect them to become more active in either the production or the political sphere. People's confidence and support can be acquired only as a response to confidence which is placed in them. "Without openness," M. S. Gorbachev has stated, "there is not—and there cannot be—democratism, the political creativity of the masses, and their participation in management. This is, if you like, the guarantee of a state-like attitude toward things, imbued with a sense of responsibility, on the part of tens of millions of workers, collective farmers, and intelligentsia, and the starting point of the psychological reorganization of our cadres." ("Documents of the 27th CPSU Congress," Moscow Politizdat, 1986, p 60)

The lack of social statistics forces sociological collectives to gather not only in-depth but also very simple social-demographic information about the composition of the population, the territorial distribution of elements of the social service infrastructure, the incomes and welfare of various social groups, and so on. Scientific research cannot and must not compete with state statistics in either the representativeness or the scope of the problems being studied, in the regularity of data collection, or in the comparability of results. In addition, the transfer of the Central Statistical Administration's tasks to research collectives restricts the latter's fulfillment of their strictly scientific functions.

I should note that the initial results of renewing the leadership of the USSR Central Statistical Administration have already begun to exert a beneficial influence on its relations with science. As a result of detailed discussion of the question with the Economics Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the Central Statistical Administration adopted a decision which makes it substantially easier for economists to make use of statistical information. First of all, the above decision should be extended to cover sociological collectives which form part of the Philosophy and Law Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and second--and most importantly--there should be accelerated development of full social statistics in the country, which will be an important condition for the growth of Soviet people's social activeness.

The connection with practice and the introduction of research results. Since one of the functions of sociology is the supply of science to management, most scientific research is oriented toward "assisting practice." However, the real participation of sociologists in management activity is not great. To be quite honest, it is difficult to name a major management decision which concerns the basic interests of many social strata and groups and which is based on reliable and representative preliminary sociological research. In contrast, there is no need to search for examples of the opposite. I shall cite at least the unjustified policy of phasing out personal plots at the beginning of the 1960's; the en masse transformation of kolkhozes into sovkhozes, which undermined economic accountability [khozrashchet] in agriculture; the division of rural population centers into promising and unpromising ones, leading to the degeneration of the network of settlements in many of the country's rural regions. the mass construction of multistory buildings, the

inhabitants of which long to return to their own houses, in rural areas; the elimination of small rural schools, which accelerated the population exodus to the towns, and so on.

The state's examination of large projects (for example the redirection of part of the current of Siberian and northern rivers to the country's southern regions, and the development of the zone around the Baykal-Amur Main Railroad) is, as a rule, carried out either without the participation of sociologists or with minimal participation by them. Sociologists are clearly not involved enough in drafting, setting up, monitoring, and generalizing the results of socioeconomic experiments. This is connected above all with the undeveloped nature of management's need for sociological validation of decisions, with the unpreparedness of most of those who receive sociological information to accept it, and with the predominance of a technocratic social awareness over the social one. It is no accident that some sociological recommendations which were validated 10 or 20 years ago are only now starting to be used.

To the above one must add that instead of dialogue with management organs, sociology is often forced to make do with a monologue. We frequently receive no reply to reports which we send to state organizations, and do not learn how the material which has been supplied has been evaluated and utilized, whether our recommendations have been adopted, what issues should be studied further, and so on.

The absence of an organized dialogue between sociology and management practice is harmful to both. Sociology involuntarily moves away from practice, does not develop the skills of solving social problems, and becomes speculative, if not scholastic. This reduces its prestige even more in the eyes of management cadres, decreases the demand for its services, and in the final analysis frequently leads to socially unsubstantiated management.

It seems to me that the situation must be put right from both directions at the same time. On the one hand, sociologists should make efforts to increase the effectiveness, reliability, and real management of recommendations in order that these should contain answers to the questions not only of what needs to be done, but also of who must do it, how it must be done, and what the probable consequences of the proposed social solutions will be.

On the other hand, managerial functionaries should make greater use of sociology, without which it is essentially impossible to solve a single serious social problem today. It is necessary to clearly define sociology's legal status in its relations with management, to ensure that sociologists are adequately represented in USSR Gosplan and union republic state planning committees, and to intensify their participation in socioeconomic experimentation.

The potential for actively involving sociology in the practical process of restructuring society also seems to me to be limited by the inadequate specialization of sociological collectives and by the poor division of labor among them. Thus, academic science, which plays the role of the "shaft-horse" in the sociological team, must solve theoretical methodological and methodical problems at the same time, while science in higher education has to train

specialist cadres. For both of these spheres, management-oriented research represents just one aspect of scientific activity. This means that it is necessary to rapidly develop those areas of sociology which specialize directly in social control over the implementation of management decisions. Such areas can be established only within the management organs themselves. We are talking about applied sociology services attached to party, soviet, and Komsomol organs, to branch departments, production associations, and enterprises. I shall dwell on this in more detail.

The development of applied sociology. Although the formation of applied sociology services was initiated more than 10 years ago, their level of development is low for the moment. There are about 1,000 such services in the country. The overwhelming majority of them are concentrated in industry, there are considerably fewer in the construction industry, and only isolated units within the system of party, Komsomol, and soviet administration, or attached to territorial administrative organs and cultural institutions. At an approximate count, less than 2 percent of industrial enterprises have such services. Moreover, in a third of these the service consists of one person, in another third of them there are two or three workers, 20 percent have between four and seven, and only 13 or 14 percent have eight or more workers.

It is possible to identify the following principal reasons for the slowdown in applied sociology's development. First of all, there is the weak role of social indexes within the system of assessing the activity of enterprises and their leaders, and also the lack of enterprises' real answerability to state, party, and trade union organs for the solution of social matters. Furthermore, there is the low standard of professional training of applied sociologists, only one in 20 of whom has undergone even minimal sociological training, including at universities of Marxism-Leninism. And finally, there is the undeveloped methodology of applied sociological work, the centerpoint of which should be not so much research work as analytic, drafting, and introduction work; the poor methodological and technical equipment of applied sociology services is the cause of the prevalence of so-called "questionnaire mania." With cadres being poorly qualified, more than 70 percent of methodology is developed by each service on its own.

As is known, in April 1986 the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems, the USSR Academy of Sciences, and the AUCCTU adopted a resolution "On Improving the Organizations of Sociological Work in Branches of the National Economy," which is aimed at a cardinal improvement in the work of applied sociology services. (SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA, No 3, 1986, pp 88-95) This document confirms the model thesis of social development service for the enterprise (organization, ministry). As far as assistance rendered to the above services by the Soviet Sociological Association is concerned, I would name the following as urgent steps.

First, an increase in the attention paid to the methodological support of sociology; the development of a general plan for such support, and the creation of a complex of standardized methods in all areas of the applied sociology services' activity.



Second, the collection, generalization, processing, and circulation by the Soviet Sociological Association of methodology and other material which highlights the progressive experience of the applied sociology services' work. To this end, it would be useful to hold an all-union competitive review of their work in the next year or two. One should also think about creating an economically accountable [khozraschetnyy] Applied Sociology Center within the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems or the Soviet Sociological Association, with informative, methodological, and teaching functions and a developed base for document duplication.

Third, the certification of cadres on the staff of applied sociology services, with uniform certificates of qualification being issued; and in the future the obligatory attendance of a (yet to be created) centralized system for raising qualifications by workers in these services, and the organization of training courses at the country's leading sociological organizations for these workers. These and other ways of accelerating applied sociology call for collective discussion and practical implementation.

The restricted nature of subjects for sociological research and of the opportunities to publish its results. I have already spoken above about the major political role played by open discussion of the most urgent social problems. These problems frequently take on the nature of stable "syndromes," which gives rise to a need to go deep into the roots of the relevant phenomena, and to subject them to serious theoretical interpretation and explanation. This last is impossible without free and objective discussion of complicated, nontraditional issues. It is precisely toward this that the party's Central Committee directs us. The exceptional harm done by the existence of zones and groups "beyond criticism" was stated more than once both at the congress and after it. The continued existence of any zones and groups "beyond sociological research" would seem to be no less harmful.

Society is an integral system, and therefore a "sore point" in one part of it has often been caused by processes taking place in completely different parts. In order to provide the correct cure one has to know how the organism functions. Meanwhile, sociologists who have been raising truly urgent issues in their research and who have attempted to solve complex problems have all too often come up against a sign saying "no entry to unauthorized persons," and frequently still do so.

I have personally met with restrictions both in terms of the people whom I have planned to interview and of the content of problems being studied. There have been periods when it has perhaps been simpler to list that which was allowed to be discussed in scientific literature rather than that which was banned. I can say plainly that effective recommendations cannot be seriously expected from science if such restrictions are upheld. In order to demand the fullest amount from science it is necessary not only to allow but also to welcome, encourage, and commission research into the most painful and acute problems requiring the swiftest solution. The light of sociological research must penetrate even into the remotest corners of social life, reveal the accumulated litter, and stimulate the rapid imposition of purity in our common home.

As far as the publication of sociological research is concerned, the attitude which central and local publishing houses have taken to it has remained more than cautious for a long time. Moreover, the number of publishing houses which produce sociological literature has been substantially reduced over the last 10 to 15 years. The number of institutions possessing the right to publish sociological works independently has been cut down to an even greater extent. Unlike natural science institutes, social science institutes do not have the right to publish monographs independently. The size of collections of scientific works which may be published is limited to 10 printer's sheets. The number of articles in which an author, including the leader of a collective, can participate is strictly limited, and the size of each article is limited; combination of the functions of author and editor is not allowed. All in all, publication of the results of sociological research is constrained by so many bureaucratic rules that 3 or 4 years often elapses from the moment when a manuscript is ready until the point when it is published. Under the conditions of accelerated development of society, not only empirical data but also scientific facts may become obsolete in this period. In any case, one cannot talk about the rapid enrichment of social awareness with new social facts and ideas.

To the above it must be added that the majority of sociological monographs and collections are published in small editions. This is partly due to the fact that many of them are of a scientific nature, do not discuss problems, are not publicistic, and are uninteresting to the general reader. Instead of providing food for thought, these works dolefully "rejoice" in how well everything is going. Sometimes one hears that they "fulfill a propagandist function." Meanwhile, it is obvious that such "propaganda" today not only does not achieve its goal, but in fact does serious harm. After all, it does not mobilize people to solve problems, but rather forms a dependent mentality in them, an attitude that a rise in the standard of living and an improvement in living conditions are guaranteed by a progressive social system and do not depend on their personal efforts. An embellished description of the state of affairs in some regions, towns, or branches gives rise to increased dissatisfaction among those who see no such "successes" in their own environment. In precisely the same way, optimistic forecasts of the further development of the country (region, town, or enterprise) create unjustified expectations, and ultimately disappointment.

It is necessary to widen the educational influence of sociological literature on a broad strata of the population. Material and conclusions from research which has been conducted must be brought to the working masses through newspapers, popular journals, radio, television, pamphlets of the Society for Knowledge, and through TASS and NOVOSTI material. This, too, is one of the conditions for turning our science into a direct instrument in the restructuring process.

Implementation of the proposed measures for activating and accelerating the development of sociology will require both time and considerable effort. It would be naive to consider that there will be no difficulties here. However, these are not to be compared with the gains which the country will make as a result of sociology rising to a higher standard.

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## OUR YOUNG CONTEMPORARY (ASPECTS OF PHILOSOPHICAL INDOCTRINATION)

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[Article by Igor Mikhaylovich Ilinskiy, doctor of philosophical sciences and director of the Higher Komsomol School Scientific Research Center of the Komsomol Central Committee]

[Text] No serious researcher would dare to attempt a complete description of the philosophical views of contemporary youth in our country. This would not be due to a shortage of knowledge or audacity (although any broad generalization always involves the possibility of error and risk and therefore requires some courage). There is another reason. A complete and profound description of the outlook of youth requires a solid empirical base, and this is precisely what is lacking, or is almost lacking at any rate.

We could not say that sociologists have made no effort to study the outlook of youth. For example, the NITs VKSh [Higher Komsomol School Scientific Research Center] of the Komsomol Central Committee has studied the career plans, atheistic education, political culture, and values of young men and women in recent years. Some aspects of the matter have been studied by the researchers of the ISI [Institute of Sociological Research] of the USSR Academy of Sciences and VUZ laboratories and departments in various cities in our country. The data of these studies, however, are not enough for a complete and thorough description of the outlook of youth. The main reason is that the studies are not always distinguished by sound theories and procedures and are not related to one another even in terms of the most important parameters. Finally, discussions of the current state of the outlook of youth cannot be based on yesterday's empirical data, not to mention the day before yesterday's.

Yesterday we could still say that 80.9 percent of our young women contemplated the purpose of life (from the data of an ISI research project supervised by V.A. Mansurov). Yesterday we were still justified in saying that 84 percent of our young people regarded socialism as the only social order in which the individual actually exercises the most important sociopolitical rights and liberties (data of the NITs VKSh study supervised by Yu.P. Ozhegov). Yesterday when we asked young people whether they personally were willing to wait longer for the enhancement of their own personal well-being for the sake of



stronger national defense, two-thirds of them responded with a quite definite yes and only 6 percent said no. These are eloquent figures, are they not?

It is difficult to say how young people would answer this question and others like it today.

The ideals and convictions of young people have naturally been affected by the protracted signs of stagnation in the economy and delays in the resolution of many sociocultural problems. It was pointed out at the January (1987) CPSU Central Committee Plenum that the unavoidable result of this was "flagging interest in public affairs, signs of callousness and skepticism, and the diminished strength of moral incentives for labor. The result is a substratum of people, including youth, for whom financial prosperity has become the purpose of life and for whom any means are justified if they make money." The many disappointments connected with flagrant violations of socialist laws, bribery, corruption, and nepotism injured the consciousness (especially the morals) of young people.

When young people encounter the problems of the present, they stubbornly look back to the past, to a time when victories were accompanied by tragedies--the cult of personality, subjectivism, voluntarism, and the scandalous discrepancy between words and actions. All of this sometimes confuses the developing consciousness and spirit of young people. They look to science for an answer to problems, and it must explain the past and present and predict the future. Our social scientists, however, often remain "mute" because of their inclination for speculation, time-serving, dogmatism, scholastic theorizing, and inability to face the facts squarely.

The pronounced contradictions of the internal affairs of our society combined with the severe exacerbation of international conflicts, the mounting danger of nuclear war, and the intensified ideological struggle have naturally given rise to acute conflicts in the public consciousness, in which these objective realities are reflected, and to deformities in the spiritual structure of the human personality.

Therefore, we must first take note of the substantial changes in the outlook of our youth and realize that they are natural and unavoidable. How can the society be restructured without changing the views and attitudes of its members? How can restructuring be accomplished unless there is a change in the values, interests, and needs of people and in their beliefs about the present and future of society? The second factor we must acknowledge is the huge and increasing number of conflicts in the young consciousness and the birth of negative developments and tendencies.

Researchers at our center, for example, have recorded a steady trend: The number of young people aware of the need for more extensive political knowledge has increased by almost 30 percent in the last 5-7 years. This has been accompanied by the polarization of the political consciousness of young men and women. Some of the politically active young people have now formed something like a "vanguard"--those who elucidate political issues not because they are instructed to do so, but because they want to do this; those who do

this wherever and whenever they encounter a problem requiring the intervention of a politically informed person who cares about the future of our society. And this is not just a handful of people! They represented around 40 percent of our young respondents. This is a remarkable development we never noticed before!

Negative processes, however, have also been recorded. Young people show very little interest in joining Komsomol political education groups. Almost 48 percent of the young people we surveyed saw no need for class evaluations of works of literature, art, and music or of the consumer mentality. The activities of 6 percent of the informal and unofficial youth groups are asocial, and frequently also apolitical.

V. Kupriyanov's article "The Doubles" (KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 20 January 1985) aroused the indignation of youth. And not only because the "heroes" of this article were excellent students in school and mean and cynical people in their free time. The "double moral standard" of these young men was based on the duality of their political consciousness. In school they were Komsomol activists, but they became obsessed with fascist ideas when they were with other members of their "crowd." Of course, this is an extreme case, but political malignity and apolitical behavior are regrettably not that uncommon. The sociologists at our center noted that young people's critical feelings about the negative features of our life sometimes turn into excessive fault-finding and the denial of socialism's material and spiritual achievements.

There are also conflicting tendencies in young people's attitude toward work.

The improvement of vocational guidance in recent years has eliminated the tendency of young people to look down on the worker professions. Nevertheless, the majority of secondary school graduates hope to enroll in VUZ's. Only 35 percent plan to work in the production sphere, and two-thirds of those who do want to change their profession after the first year of work.

The number of young people performing conscientious work has risen. More than 85 percent fulfill plan assignments and 75 percent produce items of high quality. Nevertheless, one out of every ten cannot keep up with plan assignments, one out of every four produces items of poor quality or defective goods, one out of every five violates conservation rules, one out of every three violates labor discipline and does not have any proprietary sense about the enterprise, and more than half take no part in the management of the labor collective.

Many young men and women have no interest in their work; they have no desire to improve their work skills and are mainly interested in their wages. Approximately one out of every five respondents tries to choose the kind of job requiring little effort but offering many benefits. And this is happening today, now that the manpower shortage is growing more acute, the value of each pair of working hands is rising, the demand for creativity has increased immeasurably, and no kind of advancement whatsoever is possible without knowledge.

The most acute conflicts are probably present in the moral consciousness of youth, which has undergone significant changes in recent years.

In 1984 studies indicated that the absolute majority of young men and women (over 80 percent--data of the ISI and NITs VKSh) agreed completely or almost completely with the moral standards of the Soviet society. The young people placed a high value on creative work, friendship, the family, a clear conscience, respect for the environment, and the spiritual perfection of the individual, and were intolerant of envy, servility, opportunism, individualism, egotism, and idle pastimes. From 67 to 80 percent of the young people surveyed resolutely denounced people who try to live off others.

Negative tendencies, however, are also growing stronger in the moral consciousness and moral guidelines of youth. Moral responsibility is declining. This is reflected in social work, where more people who participate are motivated not by a sense of duty, but by attendant circumstances, particularly selfish considerations. For example, 28 percent of the 1,260 Komsomol committee secretaries at the raykom level who were surveyed reported that some of their colleagues were climbers and were trying to use official contacts and relations for personal gain, striving for positions of higher status without going through the formalities. Around 12 percent of the secretaries felt that their colleagues had frivolous attitudes toward life, the family, and marriage. They said that some Komsomol leaders pay little attention to social standards.

The consumer mentality is one of the most widespread and dangerous phenomena among youth. It is affecting the thinking and behavior of many young people. Over two-thirds of secondary school graduates expect their parents to support them until they have reached a state of total (in their interpretation) well-being. Young people (students, the intelligentsia, and some workers in large cities) have illusions about social mobility based on the possession of a certain group of material goods. The "set" consists of imported clothing and footwear, radio and video equipment, and items made of precious metals. They do much to determine the social status of the young person and automatically make him a member of some informal groups. The majority of respondents made excuses for the speculators in our society because they help youth acquire the latest styles in clothing.

The majority of respondents condemn conspicuous consumption as a lifestyle and those who try to take more from the society while giving it less. Engineering and technical personnel, rural youth, and young artists are particularly intolerant of the obsession with material goods and parasitical habits. Why? This requires thorough analysis. For instance, is the reason their low wages, which make it impossible for them to acquire these things?

The consumer "philosophy" diminishes the creative and social activity of the individual and engenders spiritual weakness, excessive self-interest, envy, deception, unprincipled behavior and, finally, crime, including bribery and theft. It can eventually undermine the common political morals of society.

This is happening at a time of struggle in our country to enhance the Soviet people's well-being, at a time when full economic accountability is being

instituted and a law has been passed on individual labor. If all of these new developments are not understood and if the important economic undertakings are not reinforced with qualitatively new and more effective indoctrination measures, we can expect the further spread of the consumer mentality among youth.

It is extremely dangerous to think that material interests alone make life worth living and that a better economy will mean a better life. Life has no meaning without a spiritual basis, without a belief in ideals, without high goals, and without such sacrosanct values as the Motherland, Honor, Goodness, Justice, and Duty. We have had some experience living in relatively favorable material circumstances. And what has happened? Conspicuous consumption, an obsession with material goods, individualism, egoism, pragmatism, and parasitism are the results of material comforts unaccompanied by the spiritual elevation of the individual. We will have to do much in the spiritual sphere to prevent the multiplication and intensification of these flaws. The technological revolution must be accompanied by a spiritual and humanitarian revolution. The weaker regulating strength of moral ideals is probably the most dangerous tendency in the younger generation today. There is what might be described as a dual consciousness: One line of reasoning when the person is "by himself" or in a small group, and another when he is with larger groups or at meetings. There is a double moral standard--verbal affirmation of the standards of socialist morality accompanied by the direct opposite in actions and behavior. The duality of thinking and morals is the last threshold of the individual's spiritual degradation and his loss of communist convictions and faith in the possibility of beneficial social change and in the attainability of the objectives set along the difficult and complicated route of our society's advancement toward communist reforms.

Soon after the 27th CPSU Congress our center conducted a survey to learn people's feelings about its main decisions. A follow-up survey was conducted a few months later. The results indicated that the 27th CPSU Congress created an optimistic atmosphere in the society. Around 65 percent of the respondents believed that the public mood had undergone a dramatic change for the better. The absolute majority supported the statements in the Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party Congress and congress decisions, believed they were realistic, and were willing to do everything within their power to implement them. Around 24 percent of the respondents, however, believed that "people are not active, do not want to become involved in public affairs" and "are waiting to see 'what will happen.'" Although respondents applauded the party's intention to increase real per capita income by a factor of 1.6-1.8 in the next 15 years, only 24.3 percent expressed the certainty that the country had sufficient economic potential for this. Only 30 percent believed that the housing problem could be solved by the year 2000 in the ways specified in congress decisions.

At the end of 1986 researchers in our center analyzed 830 letters KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA had received from its readers in response to the rubric "From the Rostrum of the 20th Komsomol Congress, I Would Say...." Not all of the authors were young. One out of every five was over 30, and more than half of these were labor and war veterans. It is interesting that 12.6 percent of the



letters were pessimistic: They pinpointed problems but could not see any solutions to them. More than 6 percent of the letters contained spiteful criticism of the Komsomol, and 23 percent of the authors took a neutral approach to the problems they discussed. Almost 30 percent of the letters were unsigned.

Of course, these are only studies of public opinion, which is extremely dynamic and unstable. Sweeping conclusions cannot be based on the data of these surveys alone, but they do reflect the mood of youth to some extent.

It is probably in this context that we should also examine the tendency toward weaker atheistic convictions accompanied by changing attitudes toward religious attributes and religion, which some young people consider to be socially and philosophically harmless. These young people have not become religious: The percentage of believers--people belonging to the traditional religions--has virtually stayed the same, but this should not set us at ease. The problem is more complex. More than 30 percent of the young people who do not call themselves religious have taken part in christening rituals and have read religious literature. Around 40 percent have attended church services, mosques, and prayer meetings. The desire to seek truth in religion is particularly strong among young people with a higher education. The percentage of these young men and women who wear crosses and "holy threads" and decorate their homes with religious symbols has doubled in the last 5 years.

Why have so many young people, whose spirits and minds are still not fully developed, been stricken with the desire to seek truth in religion?

There are several reasons, just as there are in any complex phenomenon. It has long been known, for example, that an acute need for communication with others is one of the strongest needs of youth. When this need is not satisfied by the family, the school, or, in short, by society, feelings of loneliness arise and are unbearable for the developing spirit. It is precisely loneliness and a desire for self-expression and for communication with others that drive the young person into informal and sometimes quite dubious groups and into the embraces of religion, which promises to sympathize with the suffering, help the unfortunate, and aid in surmounting the problems of everyday life. This is the sociopsychological aspect of the problem, but there is more to it than this.

Today, just as in all other times, people are seeking not God, but faith. The issue of faith as an element of communist conviction, which is built on knowledge but also requires faith, warrants special discussion. It, just as knowledge, is of an active nature, should not be disparaged, and must not be feared. Feelings and emotions sometimes have a much stronger effect on the mind than knowledge, and they can be motives for action. A lack of faith engenders passivity and inhibits social development. And we are concerned not simply with the development of society, but with its stepped-up development.

The restoration of faith wherever it has been undermined or lost and its intensification and reinforcement in the soul of each worker--this is the

most important objective of the present day and it must be attained through political, economic, propaganda, and organizational measures.

It is important to realize that many of the objectives of restructuring and acceleration will be incomprehensible to millions of people until they have been explained in precise and reasonable terms. We must also realize that the complex, obscure, and contradictory problems of the present day are oversimplified in the public mind and are solved on the basis of emotions and desires. At this important turning point in history, too much is still only a presentiment, prediction, or vision, and seems to be a dream. But it is already time to take action, quickly and more vigorously than in the past. We cannot wait until the idea of acceleration comes to fruition because this can only happen after the realities of our present life have changed. The vicious circle can only be broken by action, and not by contemplation. And this must be action based on faith in political decisions.

Before people can begin taking action energetically and enthusiastically, they must be convinced that current objectives are in their interest. Mass conviction as a result of persuasion is the main condition for the attainment of current goals. The more complex and sweeping these goals are, the higher the level of conviction must be. There is a certain point at which conviction is engendered, and it is during this initial stage that faith in the wisdom of science and political leaders, in past experience, and in real changes in the present is of tremendous importance along with the knowledge of the laws and tendencies of social development. Faith in scientific knowledge as the basis of conviction must also be reinforced.

The conviction of youth, therefore, must be reinforced from the objective standpoint (knowledge) and the subjective standpoint (faith). The more solid the theoretical foundation of the individual consciousness, the more confident the person will be, and the more closely his feelings, will, and desires will merge with the rational element of his consciousness.

Today there are not enough inspired, passionate, and confident people in the society who are able to inspire enthusiasm and zeal in others. There are not enough leaders and heroes. We know that a revolution in the human spirit cannot be accomplished through coercion. It is obvious that the external freedom of people cannot exceed their inner freedom. We can restructure our social relations to the degree that each individual personality is restructured.

It would be pointless to speak of some kind of common or standard level of communist conviction and faith in our ideals in Soviet youth. The huge groups we call the "Soviet people" and "Soviet youth" are too heterogeneous, multifaceted, diverse, and varied.

The wonders of the technological revolution--television, transistors, video equipment, and computers--exist side by side with appalling ignorance in some places. Sometimes, "a microscope is used to hammer in nails" and a computer is turned into a stand for a samovar.

Defects in the philosophical outlook of young people are largely a result of not only known shortcomings in the development of our society, the social



conditions of life, and the influence of bourgeois ideology and propaganda, but also of errors and omissions in the system for the communist indoctrination of youth. In particular, this applies to the indoctrinational work of the Komsomol. The substantial restructuring of the latter is essential today. A democratic moral and psychological atmosphere must be established in society and in Komsomol youth to encourage a constant search for new and better methods and forms of activity meeting the needs of society and the spirit of the times. Young people must not be regarded only as the objects of influence. The goal of intensification presupposes action by the younger generation primarily as a subject of historical progress and an active constructive force. The encouragement of the self-assertion of the younger generation is an essential requirement of the times. We still have to elucidate the idea of this self-assertion.

Society and the family must not only (and not so much) give children and young adults everything they want, thereby encouraging their parasitical and philistine inclinations, as allow them to do what they want (obviously, in the interest of society) and thereby develop independence, self-education, self-indoctrination, and responsibility for their own behavior and for everything that happens around them. To encourage the initiative and activity of youth and develop a new way of thinking and style of action in youth, many written and unwritten "taboos" must be replaced with "permissive training," tolerance, and trust. Young people need criticism, but they must also be given encouragement and be entrusted with important matters.

Heightened concern about the younger generation will necessitate the elaboration of a new youth policy by the CPSU and Soviet Government. The indoctrination of youth should be much more intensive, richer in content, and more diversified in form and methods. The fundamental aim of the Komsomol is the indoctrination of active and conscious builders of a new society who are devoted to the ideals of communism, are industrious, and are prepared for heroic action and self-sacrifice. This also applies completely to the activities of the Komsomol and to the system of Komsomol propaganda and agitation, which must be made much more efficient and effective. We do not need tedious monologues and moralizing. Pointed dialogues, the "free rostrum," disputes, debates, political quizzes, political contests, and political clubs--in short, truly collective discussions of the vital issues of the day--must become the norm in Komsomol work. What we need is not so much mass forms and measures, calculated for the notorious "scope," as a primarily individual approach; not only well-publicized unionwide campaigns, but painstaking daily work with specific human beings should prevail. The center of indoctrinational and, consequently, of organizational activity should be transferred to the labor collective, the primary organization, and the neighborhood.

In our opinion, Komsomol committees should be given more extensive powers to choose forms and methods of indoctrinational work with a view to the specific objectives of the Komsomol organization and the conditions of its operation. All work should be based on the thorough study of the needs and interests of youth.

The revision of existing forms of indoctrinational work, some of which have become obsolete, will be of special importance. Respect for their "age" and "past services" will interfere with their strict evaluation. This will be essential, because new problems cannot be solved unless they are approached in a new way.

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## POLITICO-IDEOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF YOUTH: EXPERIENCE AND PROBLEMS

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 2, Mar-Apr 87 (signed to press 17 Mar 87) pp 22-33

[Roundtable discussion organized by editors of POLITICHESKOYE SAMOOBRAZOVANIYE and SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA; first three paragraphs are source introduction]

[Text] The January (1987) CPSU Central Committee Plenum underscored the need for positive changes in the spiritual mood of the Soviet society. This will necessitate the resolute elimination of everything that is undermining high moral values--ideological conviction, labor enthusiasm, and patriotism. Which solutions seem the most promising? What should social scientists contribute to the politico-ideological indoctrination of youth? This was the subject of a roundtable discussion organized by POLITICHESKOYE SAMOOBRAZOVANIYE and SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA.

This kind of discussion has proved to be an excellent method of group work and method of elucidating a particular problem, summarizing past experience, and clarifying theoretical positions. Sometimes the discussion reveals ways of solving a pressing problem or suggests the proper approach to its resolution. The roundtable discussion is the traditional method used by our editors for the analysis of scientific problems and current issues of social development. We organized the last discussion jointly with the editors of POLITICHESKOYE SAMOOBRAZOVANIYE. The topic was the development of a Marxist-Leninist outlook in youth. Prominent Soviet social scientists, Komsomol workers, and journalists gathered around the "round table" of the two editorial offices just before the 20th Komsomol Congress: V.G. Alekseyeva, doctor of philosophical sciences and senior research associate at the Philosophy Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences; N.M. Blinov, doctor of philosophical sciences and professor at the CPSU Central Committee Academy of the Social Sciences; L.N. Bogolyubov, doctor of pedagogical sciences; L.P. Buyeva, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor, and department head at the Philosophy Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences; I.M. Ilinskiy, doctor of philosophical sciences and director of the Higher Komsomol School Scientific Research Center of the Komsomol Central Committee (at the request of the editors of SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA, I.M. Ilinskiy wrote an article based on the statements he made at this meeting, and it is published in this issue); I.I. Karpets, doctor of juridical sciences, professor, and director of the

Scientific Research Institute for the Study of the Causes of Crime and the Planning of Crime Prevention Measures; N.Ya. Klepach, editor-in-chief of POLITICHESKOYE SAMOOBRAZOVANIYE; M.V. Konkin, candidate of philosophical sciences and chairman of the Commission for Politico-Ideological Work of the Komsomol Central Committee Council of Young Scientists and Specialists; N.I. Lapin, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor, and director of the Philosophy Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences; A.I. Medvedev, candidate of economic sciences and member of the Commission for International Cooperation of the Komsomol Central Committee Council of Young Scientists and Specialists; V.A. Pechenev, doctor of philosophical sciences and deputy editor-in-chief of POLITICHESKOYE SAMOOBRAZOVANIYE; P.N. Reshetov, doctor of philosophical sciences and professor at the CPSU Central Committee Academy of the Social Sciences; A.G. Kharchev, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor, and editor-in-chief of SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA.

The proceedings of the roundtable discussion are being published in abridged form.

#### Fathers and Sons

N.Ya. Klepach: The CPSU strategy of stepping up the socioeconomic development of the country presupposes revolutionary changes in all areas of social life. And who is better qualified than the young to initiate and encourage everything new and progressive, since they not only inherit the material and spiritual values of previous generations but must also enrich them?

The valuable ideas of K. Marx, F. Engels, and V.I. Lenin occupy a special place in the spiritual culture of socialism and, consequently, in the ideological and moral heritage the young receive and develop. Will the younger generation be able to use these ideas properly as the finest and most precise instrument of analysis and a powerful means of transforming reality? We can definitely say that the answer to this question will do much to decide the fate of the cause served so faithfully by the Communist Party. For this reason, the Marxist-Leninist education of youth must be a matter of constant concern to the party and the entire ideological aktiv.

The Soviet young people of today make up the most highly educated generation in our country's history: 85 percent of the young people from 15 to 20 have a higher, partial higher, or secondary (complete or partial) education. Young men and women participate extensively in economic and cultural construction and they can be relied on to defend the peaceful labor of the Soviet people. In short, our young people deserve a great deal of credit. At the same time, however, the party is naturally concerned about the increasing evidence of philistinism and conspicuous consumption among youth in recent years, signs of civic immaturity, apolitical behavior, and contempt for the public interest. There are frequent cases of amoral and criminal behavior and of ideological and moral "omnivorousness," sometimes bordering on political nearsightedness. All of this makes the philosophical tempering of young people and the development of their ideological and moral values and attitudes a matter of special importance to ideological workers and to all communists.



N.I. Lapin: Nikolay Yakovlevich, you are absolutely right that the philosophical outlook of our young people is a matter of special concern today. As a party worker, what is your personal opinion as to why this is such an urgent matter today? After we answer this question, we can analyze and evaluate the different facets of the Marxist-Leninist outlook of youth.

N.Ya. Klepach: I think that there was an unjustified lack of concern about the outlook of youth and about indoctrination in general for a long time in our country. Part of the reason was that things seemed to be going well. I would even say that a deliberate effort was made to create this impression. We announced from the very highest rostrums that things were going well, even though there were problems, and sometimes we did not analyze them in depth. There were discrepancies between words and actions, between the Marxist-Leninist precepts we taught our young men and women and the way in which these precepts were implemented. Of course, the younger generation saw and sensed these discrepancies. This, in brief, is the main reason the ideological tempering of our young people is such a pressing problem today. Now we must review everything we said in the past and reassess our past efforts to teach Marxism to youth from the standpoint of the party's present objectives, with a view to restructuring.

I.I. Karpets: I have seen the dark side of social practice several times, and the main reason is that we have been lax in the ideological and moral education of youth. Frankly, I am amazed that many ideological workers have suddenly "discovered" negative behavior among youth, as if it came into being just yesterday. This applies, for example, to drug addiction. As a former chief of criminal investigations, I can testify that we were already making a colossal effort to combat this evil a quarter of a century ago. And our press, one of the main social institutions with an educational function, pretended for all those years that drug addiction did not exist.

N.Ya. Klepach: Igor Ivanovich, you encountered this kind of behavior in your work. I can assure you that in the case of party workers, for example, the reports in the press about this problem were a genuine revelation to at least a third of them, and maybe even half. Many comrades still have the idea that these might be isolated incidents or a rare social phenomenon.

I.I. Karpets: Then I do not understand why everyone shut his ears when we attorneys literally yelled about the problem.

Unattributed remark: But everything about our society seemed good.

I.I. Karpets: There was nothing good about drug addiction, and there were alarming statistics. At that time, however, we were operating on the theory denying the existence of social causes of crime in the socialist society. Incidentally, our ideological opponents criticized us Marxists for finding reasons for every development in nature and society while remaining ignorant of the causes of crime in the socialist society. This point of view was first expressed in official documents and did not become a theory until later.

L.P. Buyeva: On the level of the macroenvironment, of the society as a whole, it is true that the existence of causes of crime in the socialist

society was denied in most cases. But this is only one side of the coin. Many researchers were elaborating the alternative point of view, that the microenvironment could be the source of unlawful behavior.

V.A. Pechenev: It does not seem right to add the denial of social causes of crime and other serious negative developments in the thinking and behavior of people in the socialist society to the many real "sins" of social scientists. In any case, several philosophers and sociologists tried to direct attention to these causes in the 1970's and the early 1980's and warned against the tendency to blame our own shortcomings on the notorious "remnants of the past." It is quite a different matter that the acknowledgement of social causes of various defects in public and individual morals in the socialist society was delivered in what might be called a "bashful" or hesitant tone.

The common sociological division of all the social relations in our social order into the macroenvironment and microenvironment, which Lyudmila Panteleyevna just mentioned, also contributed to this acknowledgement. In itself, this division is naturally "useful," especially in the explanation of many features of the individual mentality and individual consciousness, which are influenced by the prevailing production relations in a society and by the specific conditions of the individual's life, work, and leisure pursuits. We should also realize, however, that this approach imposed something like a "taboo" on attempts to look for the causes of negative behavior on the level of the macroenvironment or to find reasons in the fundamental socio-economic relations in the society. Nevertheless, many scientists then understood and now know for certain that the negative features of our life, moral flaws, and legal offenses can be the result of, for instance, serious violations of the principles of socialism in the sphere of distribution. And this was only one of the signs of the disruption of a factor as important to socialism as social justice.

In my opinion, this is the main--objective--reason for shortcomings in the moral and philosophical development of the young, and of others too. The discrepancy between words and actions and the political jabbering in propaganda only complicated the situation. This is why the 27th CPSU Congress' objective of restoring and consistently affirming socialism's inherent principle of social justice can and must, it seems to us, play the deciding role in instilling our youth with the high ideals of socialism and communism.

I.I. Karpets: Someone here said that the information about the state of affairs with regard to drug addiction was a revelation to many party workers. I do not think so. It is unlikely that an obkom secretary, especially a first secretary, would not know that Indian hemp or opium poppies are being planted unlawfully on many hectares in the oblast. And we must realize that young people watch carefully to see that our actions agree with our words. This, incidentally, is one of the characteristics of the adolescent's outlook: If he trusts you from the very beginning, he will then take everything on faith. But if we deceive him, we cannot expect any good to come from it.

A.I. Medvedev: In my opinion, this can also be seen in the social sciences in general. Many scientists periodically supported and publicized mutually

exclusive theoretical premises. Consequently, many have had to rebuild their authority in the scientific community.

N.I. Lapin: Igor Ivanovich, if the obkom secretary does not know what is going on in his oblast, he is not doing his job. This is obvious. But after all, it might have been that he was required to submit reports of a specific nature.

I.I. Karpets: Judicial personnel have also felt this influence indirectly. Many good reports have come into being as a result of this line of reasoning: You are responsible for the state of affairs with regard to the crime rate and you consequently must lower this rate according to plan. If it is not lowered, you have not done your work well. The fact that many processes, by virtue of their objective nature, are influenced only by a combination of economic, sociocultural, indoctrinational and other measures and that no one state organ can be responsible for overcoming negative phenomena, much less eliminating them, is frequently not taken into account. The campaign against alcohol, for example, has not always been successful and has sometimes jumped the gun, but its results can nevertheless be seen today, and precisely because it was carried out through the combined efforts of social and government organizations and because it was simultaneously directed against those who were already abusing alcohol and aimed at guarding young people against these influences.

N.Ya. Klepach: The latter is particularly important because we have sometimes ignored the inclination of youth to keep an eye on all of the failures of politico-ideological and indoctrinational work and to consciously or unconsciously emulate adults.

A.G. Kharchev: Young people make up an inquisitive and eternally questioning group. Most of them despise obsequiousness, sycophancy, and time-serving. There was a time when we overdid prohibitions. Now it seems to me that we could be too obliging. This could nurture illusions of infallibility and omnipotence in young minds and diminish respect for the public interest, without which the collectivist outlook turns into a philistine and parasitical mentality. The apologist's arguments can be corrupting. This applies most of all to young people. If they were all good, all exemplary and progressive, we would not be racking our brains to think of better and more effective ways of molding their view of the world. This view is ultimately reflected in behavior. Therefore, we must learn not only to praise and support youth, but also to face young people squarely with pointed and logical criticism when they make the wrong choices. I am not concerned with a return to prohibitions, but the dignity of the generation whose place these young people will take one day.

We have no antagonistic classes and no reason for ideological infighting, but we do have an urgent need for the ideological rejection of parasitism, philistinism, and boorishness, because philosophical indoctrination could degenerate into abstract and impersonal accusations without this kind of rejection.

I.I. Karpets: I am not saying that young people should not be accountable for their actions, especially criminal ones, but let us take a look at ourselves.



We have recently grown used to exclaiming: "Oh, our young people are so bad!" It is true that some of our young people are criminals and spongers and that drug addiction is almost exclusively confined to youth, but who has made them bad? You and I....

N.I. Lapin: It is true that indoctrinational work with youth can only be analyzed correctly within the context of the generation gap. Even in ancient times, as we know, fathers were displeased with their sons and believed that young people were bad. But I am referring to something else: Young people usually choose their values in comparison to their fathers'. The mechanism of comparison works in both directions--either adhering to the "precepts of the fathers" or despising and rejecting them. The existence of this mechanism suggests the presence of cyclical changes in the values of successive generations. If we can discover the constant elements of the cycle, we will be able to exert purposeful influence to direct these processes into the desired channels.

A.G. Kharchev: But there is more to the problem than this. My experience as a researcher and simply as a person who has seen much, gives me the right to say that each person primarily teaches himself. Lessons learned through personal experience last a lifetime.

L.P. Buyeva: First our older generation struck the alarm bell and now we are beating our own breasts. When will we strike out at the guilty? For example, various abuses in trade have recently been reported in the press, but those who indulge the many swindlers have not received the punishment they deserve. Obviously, I am not saying that more people should be put in jail. I am certain that this practice is alien to our time and contrary to the spirit of democratization. It is also wrong, however, to blame all negative developments anonymously on the past. The situation should be clearly defined: The human factor is capable of good and evil. Administrators and bureaucrats should not be above criticism. I have an opinion that will probably not be shared by everyone. In our society as a whole, there is a contradiction between the executive and legislative branches, because the former has gained the upper hand over the latter. It is precisely this that gives rise to such phenomena as excessive bureaucratism, servility, opportunism....

N.M. Blinov: In my opinion, the development of the outlook does not begin with the activity of social institutions, as we have traditionally assumed, but with the environment, which can conditionally be divided into the micro-environment (the courtyard, the lobby, and the informal group) and the macro-environment. The macroenvironment is the state of affairs in the society as a whole and it is the background for the development of the views and moral standards of young people. This background cannot be ignored. For this reason, I agree completely with Igor Ivanovich that we cannot rely solely on the punitive measures of law enforcement agencies in the struggle against negative phenomena, including among youth, because this is a delayed reaction to the emergence of deep-seated contradictions in our society. This also applies to such negative phenomena as, for example, drug addiction.



N.Ya. Klepach: And how would you describe the current state of affairs in the society as a whole--the background for indoctrinational efforts?

N.M. Blinov: We are now encountering signs of economic stagnation in the economy and the covert redistribution of income in what might be called the dark side of the economy. To cite just one example, we are spending almost 2 billion rubles a year on tutoring services!

A.G. Kharchev: This is a high price to pay for tutoring in a "free" educational system....

N.M. Blinov: Yes, a "free" education. Give us some money, and we will give you good instruction and good medical treatment. Soon we will not be able to take a single step without paying 10 rubles for a "free" service. This is precisely what happened during the struggle against alcoholism. This practice is rapidly taking root on the dark side of the economy. In other words, various negative phenomena and criminal offenses are the objective result of the contradiction between rising monetary income and unsatisfied consumer demand, which we estimate at around two-thirds of all retail commodity turnover. This is how negative behavior takes hold. This is why the competition for jobs in trade and for admission to academic institutions connected with the service sphere has increased 15-fold in recent years, whereas there has been virtually no competition for admission to technical VUZ's (1, 2). Furthermore, Mikhaylo Lomonosov himself would not gain admission to the prestigious Moscow State University, Moscow Institute of the National Economy, or Moscow State Institute of International Relations today merely on the basis of his natural abilities. The applicant who arrives with a trainload of fish from the countryside, however, is a different matter....

I.I. Karpets: This is absolutely true, but we are accusing young people of being bad or are seeking biological reasons for criminal offenses.

N.M. Blinov: Given this background, the efforts of indoctrinational establishments often do not work either: We say one thing, but young people see the opposite being done all around them. Even in antiquity philosophers taught that there are three interrelated and inseparable entities in life: the thought, the word, and the deed, but we have reduced all indoctrination to the word. Just recently we did not have a single new thought in our ideology and our social sciences, and even the deed was not always performed properly in our country, but was drowned in words and reports. And what kind of example did we set, for instance, for the Komsomol personnel responsible for the indoctrination of youth? The people who volunteered for Komsomol work and then for party work were not those who felt the need to work with youth or had the desire and the right to assume responsibility for the indoctrination of the younger generation, but those who wanted to get closer to goods in short supply and to foreign travel. This often laid the basis for opportunism.

#### Ends and Means

N.Ya. Klepach: After the April (1985) CPSU Central Committee Plenum and the 27th party congress, the situation in our country began to improve. In other

words, the background of the indoctrination of the younger generation is changing for the better. We can already take credit for several organizational, socioeconomic, legal, and other measures to free our lives of everything contrary to the principles of socialism. Now much will depend on our ability to direct the energy of youth into the necessary channel. We know that a Marxist-Leninist outlook is the most important condition for social activity by young men and women. I think that before we move on to the discussion of the ways and means of developing this outlook today, we should first clarify the term "outlook" and point out the fact that it is not confined to a mere group of ideas, views, and judgments.

V.G. Alekseyeva: It is true that the outlook is not confined to a group of ideas and assumptions, but represents the part of the consciousness that determines and guides individual behavior. In other words, the outlook could be regarded as the ideological nucleus of the consciousness, making the latter an active force, and a guide for action. This kind of purposeful, conscious, and goal-oriented action differs fundamentally from spontaneous, chaotic, and impulsive acts. Consequently, the development of the proper outlook is not merely a method of encouraging activity by youth, but also of organizing this activity in the public interest. This means that we could define it as a system of value judgments, because value judgments represent the consciousness in the stage of transition to action.

A.G. Kharchev: Most of the existing literature on this matter examines the outlook only from the standpoint of the relationship between the whole and its parts; in this case, the main questions are the following: What makes up the term "outlook"? Is it mere philosophy or does it include other ideological elements? Of course, analysis from this vantage point is valid and important, but it is not enough to surmount shortcomings in the development of the outlook or to correct mistakes. But without this, we cannot seriously expect to enhance the effectiveness of the human factor--the main factor of acceleration.

I think that the term "outlook" (or "world view") should not be given a literal interpretation as the view of the outside world (this implies some contemplation), but as the individual's determination and establishment of his own place in the world, a process which only begins with the analysis of the latter. With this approach, the study of the outlook will focus not on its "surface," but on its inner structure, the interaction of its different levels, and the progression from idea to action. What does it mean to have a Marxist-Leninist outlook? Does it simply mean a knowledge of the theory of Marxism-Leninism or also action in accordance with this knowledge?

N.Ya. Klepach: It goes without saying that we judge a person primarily by his actions. For this reason, in our efforts to develop the proper outlook in youth today, we must help each young individual find his place among the people participating in the restructuring of our life. How can the inclusion of youth in the present revolutionary renovation of society be secured ideologically?

L.P. Buyeva: The gap between words and deeds in the recent past was also exhibited in something else, something we have not discussed yet today. In

the past, although we had not realized the socialist ideal and had not solved all of the problems of purely socialist construction, we were already bragging verbally about our realization of the communist ideal. These attempts to carry out tasks of a higher order, before socioeconomic conditions permitted, concerned a personal ideal as well as a social ideal. Everyone knows about the negative effects of these actions. What should we do in this situation? Should we abandon our discussions of the communist ideals of society and the individual and stop using them in our ideological indoctrination of youth? I am certain that we should not do this and that we do not have the right to do this. Consequently, there is now an urgent need for the more thorough discussion and clarification of the relationship between socialist and communist ideals and the determination of the necessary priorities in their popularization.

The second thing that I find quite disturbing is not only the content of the ideals, but also their explanation and transmission. We frequently discuss them in such dry and academic tones that they lose their appeal and, consequently, cannot perform their mobilizing function....

N.I. Lapin: I would like to make two important observations about the ideological basis for the inclusion of young people in the current restructuring of society. First of all, the prestige of innovative activity in each workplace must be enhanced in various ways, including political and economic education. It is understandable, however, that this will not be enough, because the outlook includes the view of the country and of the world in general, especially now that the modern communication media have made the latter completely visible. Consequently, young men and women should be informed of what they can do as citizens of their country.

In discussions of the 1920's and early 1930's, we frequently speak of the great enthusiasm that was characteristic of the Soviet people. Even though it was not equally characteristic of all, it was a feeling common to all citizens. The young people of today, however, frequently do not see, and sometimes do not have, any real way of using their creative energy in their own interest and for the good of the country as a whole.

M.V. Konkin: It is a well-known fact that V.I. Lenin founded the Bolshevik Party at the age of 33 and that many young people were not afraid to take charge of whole combat units or even companies in the civil war before they had even reached 20. A single real action is more instructive and inspiring than a hundred words about the need for indoctrination. We are frequently inclined to refer to an overgrown boy in his forties as a "young specialist" and to baby him....

L.P. Buyeva: The first generations of Soviet schoolchildren and VUZ students participated more actively and extensively in public affairs than their contemporary counterparts. People might argue that even today there are examples, and numerous examples at that, of students performing their civic duty. There are student brigades in agriculture. Students go to work in produce warehouses and on construction sites. The fact is, however, that all of this frequently has a negative effect on the formation of the civic

persona of young people, because they are fully aware that their enthusiasm is used to patch up holes in the national economy in many cases. Besides this, when it comes to real responsibility and jobs worth doing, we often wait until the young person's hair turns gray before entrusting him with it.

In our ideological indoctrination of young people, we are inclined to always think of them as the object of ideological influence.

This dubious, to put it mildly, thesis was implanted in the minds of ideological workers by us, by philosophers. This approach evokes--and cannot fail to evoke!--a reaction that is far removed from real social activity. We have even gone so far as to include the working class among the "objects" of indoctrination! In addition to all of this, we have taken it beyond the bounds of rational criticism, and when we describe it, we speak and write less about real workers and the real working class than about an ideal class model. But some workers, after all, including young ones, are pilferers, or hooligans, or drunks. We close our eyes to this and almost automatically ascribe a fully developed Marxist-Leninist consciousness to each worker. We often bestow this same doubtful benefit upon young people in the belief that the person with a school diploma, not to mention a VUZ degree, in his pocket will certainly also have a Marxist-Leninist outlook.

N.Ya. Klepach: Now we have arrived at one of the main topics of our discussion. It is a fact, after all, that we now frequently encounter members of the younger generation who either do not know how to act in certain situations or know how to act but do not. Both cases are indications of serious flaws or errors in the indoctrination of youth, especially in the development of the proper outlook. For example, can this outlook be developed with slogans, pat phrases, and declarations today?

A.G. Kharchev: The answer to that question is obvious, and this is consequently not a topic for debate. The question was raised for a good reason, however, because our indoctrinational work now emphasizes knowledge. This is the root of the split between knowledge and behavior that has already been discussed at length here today. Knowledge itself suffers from this. Because education in the schools does not focus on practical matters or on the kind of problems each person will certainly encounter outside of the schools, but puts the emphasis on the content of certain "subjects" (which is known to be quite flexible), students are overloaded with information in some subjects while others are usually ignored in school, and these are precisely the ones contributing to the outlook (ethics, aesthetics, social psychology, and ecology). What are the results? They are known to everyone: Technocratic thinking, the impoverishment of the emotional sphere, a lack of aesthetic taste, leaving young people powerless against the onslaught of the "mass culture," moral ignorance, an inability to empathize, dehumanized behavior....

Unattributed remark: This is not true of all members of the younger generation!

A.G. Kharchev: I hear objections. Yes, not all of them are like this yet. But if we continue to educate them with our current methods, it could be all of them. In any case, the taste for genuine, real culture is weaker in each



new generation. This is almost physically palpable. But the roots of our outlook, after all, are in this culture!

B.G. Alekseyeva: It seems to me that we often lose sight of the main thing in our indoctrinational work--the personal level of the outlook. It consists primarily of personal qualities which can become collective qualities only when they are possessed by the people making up the collectives. We cannot imagine an orderly, well-organized, and singleminded collective made up of slovenly workers, idlers, and shirkers. In other words, the individual is just as responsible for the development of the collective as the latter is responsible for the development of the individual. This means that the development of the proper outlook should begin when the individual's character is being formed, his intellect, feelings, will, consciousness, and so forth--that is, everything that should secure the implementation of the group of views making up the ideological "cross-section" (or level) of the outlook, the outlook at the point when it is "still theory."

It seems to me that many of the failures and breakdowns in the philosophical indoctrination of youth occur because we begin it too late and because we isolate it from other aspects of indoctrinational work, from the needs and interests of the developing personality, and from the personal experience the individual has already had time to accumulate. There are reasons for this. One reason is that it is simply easier to use the old, fragmented method of indoctrination and that faceless, spineless, and weak-willed people are simply easier to control. It is easier to talk the weak-willed person into any kind of amoral and antisocial behavior and the acceptance of dubious, false, and even hostile values.

N.Ya. Klepach: Sometimes it seems as though we are building an outlook with one hand while destroying it with the other. How are teenagers affected by, for example, formalism in interpersonal communication, the obsession with percentages, and the overloading of students of general educational schools and vocational and technical institutes with homework?

V.G. Alekseyeva: The effect is always negative. These things stifle will and initiative, encourage time-serving and the purely adaptive approach to the "planning" of one's behavior, and suppress urges for self-indoctrination, because reading something other than textbooks or simply watching television require time and energy, and the school is not at all concerned about saving these.

A.G. Kharchev: Yes, today's students are overloaded because they are still being asked to learn passages from textbooks "by rote," to make huge numbers of maps, and to do other things that are easily forgotten once they have "passed." They are taught literature in accordance with complex outlines of literary history, but the aesthetic experience and good taste are never mentioned even in passing. They are forced to get up half an hour earlier to listen to their classmates paraphrase items from yesterday's newspaper, but they do not have time to watch the news on television. They must search their souls and try to answer "eternal questions," but they can only read something of their own choosing or amuse themselves during vacations.

A strictly regulated childhood is a disservice, to put it mildly, to philosophical indoctrination. Young people must be taught to think, feel, and create, and not merely be "taught." Unfortunately, we must frankly admit that the school reform has run into formalist difficulties.

I.I. Karpets: Incidentally, the educational reform does not always aid in improving the development of the proper outlook in students. In my opinion, some of its basic premises are incompatible with proper philosophical indoctrination. I am referring to the existence of elitist attitudes in the society. All of us acknowledge the need to combat them, but what is actually being done? Let us take a look at the practice of promoting students from the eighth grade to the ninth. Boys and girls know that they will be "pulled along" up to the eighth grade no matter what. Difficult teenagers, and many of them are quite capable, also know for certain that they are doomed to enroll in a vocational and technical institute instead of entering the ninth grade. Look at this set of contradictions: First we teach everyone--competent and incompetent--for 8 years, and then we "push" the difficult teenagers (many of whom are going through an awkward stage and are hard to work with but are not really pedagogically neglected) into vocational and technical institutes. We call all of this the reinforcement of the working class, although we are not ashamed to admit that we send students who will not do well in general educational schools to vocational and technical institutes. By assigning ratings to academic institutions, we are also dividing our young people into first- and second-rate students and are undermining the prestige of all worker professions. Can we really expect this system to instill our young men and women with a group of values and attitudes corresponding to our social order, which was built primarily by the working class?

But this is not all. In some cases we almost force teenagers to transfer to vocational and technical institutes instead of reasoning with them or persuading them to do so. Although they are socially immature, they are nevertheless extremely sensitive to everything that seems unjust to them....

L.N. Bogolyubov: The topic of our discussion requires the mention of another important matter--the level and forms of instruction in the social sciences. I think that public education departments still have not realized that these courses have now been taught for a quarter of a century. This means that this is the third generation we are trying to teach in virtually the same volume and with virtually the same methods as in the first half of the 1960's.

N.Ya. Klepach: In your opinion, what are the characteristics of today's young people that should be borne in mind during the process of developing their outlook?

L.N. Bogolyubov: The term "television generation" has crept into the press, and it has a definite meaning: The tendency to perceive the world as it appears on the television screen and the emphasis on visual aspects create a complex and contradictory situation. On the one hand, the educator has a chance to build on the information presented on television. At the same time, the illusion of knowledge is created in students, and this has an impact on the study of current issues in the theory and practice of socialism. If

instruction in the social sciences stays on the level of brief and oversimplified descriptions of our social order, they will rebound. We have already observed how many words and statements have lost their impact because they have been encountered repeatedly in slogans, on posters, and on the TV screen.

N.Ya. Klepach: What conclusions can we draw from this?

L.N. Bogolyubov: There are several. Above all, active forms of instruction, which are now woefully inadequate, must be used more extensively in teaching the social sciences. Many teachers complain that they simply do not have enough time to talk to students, answer their questions, lead discussions and, in short, seek answers to burning questions together. Incidentally, the lack of time is probably the reason that these burning questions of so much interest to youth only come up in social science courses "by accident." Today's young people are interested in questions of life and death, equality and freedom, distribution and consumption in the socialist society.... Educators now have to "grope their way" through discussions of these issues. It is absolutely no coincidence that many of them have said that they are willing to discuss issues of vital importance to youth but are unable to do so.

I would also like to mention something else. The need to restructure the teaching of social sciences in schools should be discussed, in my opinion, in the party press as well as pedagogical journals. We have so much to say and we argue about how literature should be taught in the schools, but the frank exchange of opinions on the content and forms of the transmission of Marxism-Leninism to the younger generation is equally important. And after all, there is much to consider here....

N.Ya. Klepach: I agree. In particular, I would assign priority to textbooks and teaching aids in the exposition of Marxism to youth. After all, the young person's attitude toward our outlook, the academic subject and, naturally, the theory depends largely on how interesting, appealing, and well-written the first book on Marxism he reads is.

L.N. Bogolyubov: Neither the form nor the content of the present social studies textbook meets the requirements of the important job it is supposed to do. In my opinion, it is simply outdated....

N.I. Lapin: Unfortunately, this is also true of other textbooks on the fundamentals of Marxism. Several sociological studies conducted in various countries have revealed that in each generation, as the subject of social action, there is a change of values every 10 years or so. There is no question that general theoretical premises and basic methodology should be presented in any textbook or teaching aid, especially in books on Marxism-Leninism. But as far as the form in which information is presented is concerned, as well as issues of differing relevance to different generations, we seem to have gone overboard in trying to compile "eternal" textbooks. Furthermore, the number of editions is often regarded as an indicator of the high quality of, for example, the VUZ textbook on Marxist-Leninist philosophy.

N.Ya. Klepach: The numerous reprints of this textbook, and without any significant revisions at that, seem to attest to its stability....



N.I. Lapin: It is more likely an indication that it is hopelessly out of date.

Our academic institutions--both higher and secondary--are still not ready to answer the questions of the greatest interest to young people today, right now. Besides this, VUZ social science cannot even tell today's students what they will have to deal with in 10 or 20 years as young specialists. Of course, the detailed prediction of the future is a utopian practice, but we should have some idea of the values of the younger generation at least up to the year 2000 so that we can influence their development.

#### They and We

N.Ya. Klepach: We have come back to the indisputably important problem of fathers and sons. But we also must not forget that the ideological confrontation with our class adversary also influences the ideological, moral, and political persona of youth. Under these conditions, the development of immunity to the intrigues of our ideological enemies is one of the most important aspects of the philosophical tempering of young people and the development of their political awareness and ability to assess current events from a class position. As we know, this is precisely how this task was worded in the materials of the 27th party congress. The recent positive changes in this field have only highlighted the still inadequate impact of counter-propaganda work with youth in general.

P.N. Reshetov: The last opinion is confirmed by the fact that young people are often unable to defend their views and convictions; they display uncertainty or even avoid arguments, especially if their opponents are foreigners of their own age. Each one of them is able to think, but regrettably few young men and women can draw the necessary conclusions, state them in conversations, and defend them with sound arguments if necessary.

A.I. Medvedev: From many discussions and disputes by my colleagues--young researchers of international affairs and young participants in various gatherings, including informal groups--I sense the profound displeasure of youth with the level and content of the counterpropaganda specially intended for the young. Strictly speaking, it cannot even be called specialized because it is usually impersonal and does not take the age, the profession, or the education of the audience into account.

M.V. Konkin: This is particularly true, in my opinion, of the secondary school, where we want students to, for example, master the most complex philosophical concepts, which they sometimes have difficulty understanding because they lack the necessary level of education and general cultural background. This is what our ideological opponents have made use of in some cases. They take a simpler approach: They do not use logical constructs or concepts in their propaganda for youth, including Soviet youth, but exploit the widely accessible metaphorical forms of presenting information.

A.I. Medvedev: This is what we do in the schools. When we deal with older members of the younger generation, on the other hand, we are more likely to



give them primitive and oversimplified ideas about today's complex and contradictory world. For this reason, counterpropaganda measures intended for indoctrination have the opposite result, because they promote the growth of cynicism in some young people, the spread of a dual moral standard and consciousness in others, and the unthinking imitation of the West in still others.

V.A. Pechenev: We know that success in the development of the communist outlook and the unification of scientific socialism with the daily activity of each new generation is secured not only by the nature and quality of the ideas introduced, not only by what is introduced, but also by how this is done. In this context, I recall an apt remark in V.I. Tolstykh's interesting article in a recent issue of VOPROSY FILOSOFII about the distinctive features of Vl. Vysotskiy's songs--namely, that he addresses the ordinary consciousness. Vysotskiy's best songs are a lively dialogue with real people of our day rather than with the imaginary heroes of books, a conversation about social and other relevant topics in a language accessible to the general public. This is one of the main reasons for his truly nationwide popularity, garnered, incidentally, in spite of the official attitude toward him, which was quite cool, to put it mildly, for many years.

Here is what I wanted to underscore with this example. In counterpropaganda and in our ideological indoctrinational work with youth in general, we focus on the ideological consciousness rather than the ordinary one--that is, we address primarily the part which still has to be developed. And we frequently address it in language that affects the feelings and emotions of, at best, only us ideologists. But after all, the hearts and minds of young people cannot be reached with abstract concepts having nothing to do with their own experience or with bombastic and didactic rhetoric. In short, in our ideological indoctrination and counterpropaganda work we often ignore the actual, heterogeneous structure of the social consciousness, consisting, as it were, of two strata or two "levels": the "upper"--ideological--and the "lower"--sociopsychological. In our efforts to reach the "upper" level as quickly as possible, we "skip" precisely the stratum of consciousness where the behavioral standards of the individual take shape.

N.Ya. Klepach: Of course, this is not a complete list of the problems and "bottlenecks" in counterpropaganda work with youth. But there is also some positive experience....

P.N. Reshetov: As far as secondary school is concerned, I am personally quite impressed by the experience of School No 141 in Moscow. What can I briefly tell you about the team of educators who are working creatively under the supervision of Honored Teacher of the RSFSR N.G. Sinitsina? Above all, I am impressed by the respect the educators have for their pupils: Not one of them addresses the children from the position of the "final authority" on the facts. Addressing their pupils "as equals," not to humor them, but with respect, they accept each one, whether he is a first-grader or tomorrow's graduate, as he is, with all of his doubts, joys, and sorrows.

The great independence the children display in their thinking and actions is also impressive. The R. Zorge museum and a museum honoring their fathers and

grandfathers, including the "Battle of Stalingrad" exhibit, were established and are operating successfully through their efforts. Many good things could also be said about the elective course in "The Ideological Struggle and Youth." In short, trust is born of trust....

Unattributed remark: A synonym for the term "trust" is openness, and it sometimes does not exist.

I.I. Karpets: It exists, but there is not enough of it.

A.G. Kharchev: Including in questions pertaining to crime, especially juvenile delinquency.

I.I. Karpets: You are absolutely right....

A.G. Kharchev: Your answer disappoints me, I was hungry for a debate!

P.N. Reshetov: Young people are also hungry for debates. I must say that the expansion of openness, the process begun by the April (1985) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, is a great help in conducting counterpropaganda work more effectively.

N.Ya. Klepach: Today's discussion and the questions that were raised here reaffirm the vital importance of the development of the proper outlook in young people and of their ideological and moral persona and revealed the contradictory effects of the social environment on youth. Many of the matters we discussed today have quite understandably not been analyzed sufficiently. This is why our two editorial offices plan to continue the discussion of the degree to which various social institutions--the family, the school, the VUZ, the labor collective--aid effectively in the establishment of the ideological and moral persona of our young contemporary.

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## PREVISION OF OPTIMAL AND STANDARD SITUATIONS

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[Article by Igor Vasilyevich Pestuzhev-Lada, doctor of historical sciences, professor, head of the Social Forecasting and Planning Sector of the Institute of Sociological Research, USSR Academy of Sciences, author of several works on the history and theory of social forecasting, including "Okno v budushcheye" [Window to the Future] (1970), "Poiskovoye sotsialnoye prognozirovaniye" [Investigative Social Forecasting] (1984) and others, and permanent contributing author to our journal; passages enclosed in slantlines are printed in italics in source]

[Text] The pantheon of the Sabine people of Italy included Ops, the goddess of fertility and harvests. In ancient Roman mythology she is usually depicted with a cornucopia in one hand and a scale (symbolizing measurement and determination) in the other. The appearance of the word "optimus" (best) in the Latin language is associated with her name. The term was introduced into West European philosophy by G. Leibniz. He used this term to mean "the best of all possibilities." Leibniz tried to distinguish between "the best of all" (the ideal) and "the best of the possible" (the optimal) and to reconcile the obvious incompatibility of social reality with the Christian belief in a wise, omnipotent, and merciful Creator. In his "Theodicee" (1710), he substantiated the thesis that God created the world as the "best of all possible worlds" and, consequently, as the optimal world.

Later, following a pattern encountered frequently in the history of social thought, the idea of "absolute optimism" was taken to its extreme (everything that happens in life happens for the better and must be borne stoically) and began to conquer minds. It was viciously ridiculed by Voltaire in his famous "Candide." But it was too late. The "optimists" had already come into being. These were people with a cheerful and, in spite of adversity, buoyant attitude, in contrast to the "pessimists"--people inclined to expect trouble even from a seemingly favorable turn of events.

Both currents survived to our day and became vigorously involved in contemporary bourgeois futurology, which split into two factions, the "ecological pessimists," who expect the current tendency toward environmental pollution and the current development of science, technology, economics, and culture to

result in global catastrophe, and the "technological optimists," who are relying on almighty science and technology to solve global problems.

The Sabine goddess' next metamorphosis took place in the 1970's, when mathematical methods infiltrated first economics and then other fields of science, and the term "optimization" began to be used in new and unfamiliar ways. The process began with the linear programming theory elaborated in 1939 by L.V. Kantorovich. In the 1950's it evolved into the theory of optimal processes with numerous modifications in various fields of science.

Unfortunately, in the social sciences the scientific and mathematical tools of the theory of optimal processes are usually used only by economists. The level of mathematization is much lower in sociological research than in economic studies, although the sphere for the use of mathematical methods in sociology is being expanded.

In the theory of optimal processes the term "optimization" signifies the process by which the best of all possible options is chosen, a process in which the quantitative aspects of the most desirable property of the object are maximized or those of the least desirable are minimized. Strictly speaking, optimization is the maximization of a certain special function within set limits, the disclosure of the extreme value of the specific function (extremum) by equating the first derivative with zero. This operation is extraordinarily productive in applied mathematics. It is one of the "cornerstones" of the study of operations, decisionmaking theory, game theory and, finally, optimization theory, signifying the improvement of the functioning of the national economy to the point at which the scales and productivity of national production are maximized and outlays (expenditures of energy, means, and resources) are minimized [1]. The result was the "system for the optimal functioning of the economy" (SOFE) [2], which can be regarded as a step toward the better scientific substantiation of the planning and management of social processes in the socialist society. A "theory of the optimal functioning of the sociosphere" can be expected, but this will necessitate the considerable development of the related fields of sociological research, including standard social forecasting.

An important theoretical result of the investigation of problems in the optimization of the national economy was the analysis of the criterion of optimality (the optimum). In general terms, criteria of optimality in the economy were defined as special economic-mathematical models depicting the formalization of economic development goals in the form of an analytical function [3]. Proposals with regard to their content suggested maximum productivity (net product, national income, and profits) or minimum expenditures, or the maximization of public well-being accompanied by the minimization of the amount of time required to reach the state of the complete satisfaction of society's needs, or the degree of satisfaction of public demands, or the degree to which public demands are commensurate with the goals of national socioeconomic development. Studies also underscored the debatable nature of the quantitative determination of the optimality of national economic planning and economic functioning as a specific function in the optimization of plans, and several economists objected to the confusion of optimality with the specific function [4].



The relationship between criteria of optimality and effectiveness is also a controversial topic. Some specialists equate them while others distinguish between them. The only undisputed fact is that there is an extremely close connection between criteria of optimality and effectiveness, and this is important to bear in mind when the implications of plans, programs, designs, and decisions are analyzed. Something else is also clear: The criterion of optimality should be included among the indicators of the forecast, plan, program, or project.

Social effectiveness is still a moot point. The sociologists who regard this as a valid concept are trying to define it more specifically. In particular, the following definition seems acceptable. The /criterion of social effectiveness/ is the point at which urgent social problems can be solved with minimum social expenditures of time and materials. It goes without saying that this definition is debatable. The determination of the criterion of optimality in the social sphere would shed a great deal of light on the criterion of social effectiveness.

An equally important theoretical result of the study of national economic affairs is the investigation of the possible existence of a national economic optimum, the attainment of which is the immediate goal of planning and management (optimal planning and management) in the socialist society [5]. The optimum is defined, in static and dynamic terms, as the best of all existing possibilities with regard to the state of the economy and its functioning and development.

The following statement by Soviet economists is extremely constructive in economics and all the social sciences. Under socialist conditions, the optimum is the point at which the balanced and stable existence of any social (or economic) system is secured and the maximum correspondence of production to the satisfaction of demand is achieved [6]. In this connection, it is interesting to consider the theory that the goal of optimal management is homeostasis (in general terms, this means the ability of the system to maintain its basic parameters within set limits or to retain a certain property during the process of development, in spite of changes in the environment in which the system functions or spontaneous activity by its individual elements [7]). Other conclusions warranting consideration state that, in a certain sense, the optimum is: 1) the limit of quantitative changes with no change in quality; 2) the point at which the limits of simplification and minimization coincide; 3) the transition from one degree of development to another; 4) the maximum possible under given conditions [8].

As we can see, much has been accomplished in the analysis of the concept of optimization and the optimum. It has been established that the national economic optimum, for example, can be attained only through comprehensive calculations, including the optimization of the relationship of accumulation to consumption and of material, labor, and cost proportions, and that the actual value of the optimum cannot be reduced to the extreme value of a single function but represents an intercoordinated system of several such values. In view of the fact that the detailed categorization of criteria of the optimum has also been attempted [7, p 88], the results seem extremely promising.

Of course, there is still a great deal of controversy. Some clearly unacceptable proposals have been made--for example, the suggestion that the term "optimal" be divided into "least optimal," "more optimal," and "most optimal." (This is something like the "second freshness" that Mr. Boland subjected to such devastating criticism.)

In any case, all social processes and phenomena, and not only economic ones, can be optimized in principle. Consequently, the forecasting of optimal situations, as an organic part of the scientific substantiation of the processes of optimization and the determination and achievement of the optimum, should occupy a prominent place in standard social forecasting.

The forecasting of optimal situations is a variety of goal-oriented forecasting and the stage at which the social ideal is clarified with consideration for the limits of the forecasting background. The best is evaluated here not from the standpoint of the social ideal, but within the limits of what is possible under given conditions. This requires the development of the appropriate investigative operations.

First of all, the general and specific features of the optimal situation with regard to the topic of research today and with a view to the near future will have to be determined. The parameters of the ideal situation will serve as reference points, but this must be preceded by an analysis of the factors affecting the forecasting background and the indicators of the initial model. It is procedurally important to distinguish between the goal-setting operations involving the determination of the general and specific characteristics of the optimal situation and the actual forecasting operations, involving the disclosure of possible ways of achieving the given situation.

The main difficulties in social forecasting are the imperfect (in comparison with the science of economics) informational base, the inadequate and unsystematized quantitative data for the forecasting base period, and the extremely inadequate mathematization of sociological research. This makes the determination of the standard indicators of the initial model extremely difficult and confines the process to the disclosure of primarily qualitative features and the heuristic analysis of social processes. This puts all the more emphasis on the operations involved in the initial modeling of the basic set of indicators and the formulation of the qualitative features of the social ideal, on which all subsequent work depends.

It should be borne in mind that if quantitative, not to mention qualitative, errors are committed during the construction of the initial model, the forecasting background, and the social ideal, the optimum could be false, and the corresponding optimal situation could disorient all subsequent work by the researcher. This is why priority is assigned to the procedural premises of standard social forecasting.

Renowned French mathematician P. Fermat established the principle that the speed of change in the function decreases to zero as it approaches the maximum and minimum points. Translated into the language of the social sciences, this means that each of the last stages in the progression toward the socioeconomic

optimum, and especially toward the social ideal, costs society much more in energy and resources than the initial stages; furthermore, each successive stage is much more costly, complex, and difficult. In other words, the social ideal and the socioeconomic optimum should be formulated in such a way that the relationship between required expenditures and anticipated results is carefully considered at each stage of progression, and that no attempt is made to move on to the next stage until all of the possibilities of the previous one have been exhausted.

It would be procedurally inaccurate to base the formulation of the fundamental indicators of the initial model of the forecasted object only on the "tree of goals" corresponding to the ideal situation, without its subsequent clarification with the data of the optimal situation. By the same logic of standard forecasting, it would be wrong to confine the process to this second step, without clarifying the "tree of goals" with the data of the standard situation--that is, without relating the goals and actual state of objects to the corresponding system of social norms and standards.

Social norms permeate literally all spheres of our life. They relieve society of the need to continuously regulate the same acts of individual behavior. It is the function of social norms to regulate the thinking and behavior of people. Of course, this regulation is in accord with the prevailing system of values, requirements, and interests. This makes social norms an immanent instrument of goal-setting, planning, programming, designing, and day-to-day management. By the same token, they are a natural forecasting instrument.

The norm, as one of the most important elements of the social organization of society, is so "all-permeating" that some authors regard the entire system of human social values as an ordered set of norms [9]. A special interdisciplinary field of scientific research, called deontics (from the Greek "deontos"--due), has been proposed in addition to deontology, the existing field of ethics concerned with the problem of duty and obligation.

The derivative norm--the normative or the standard--has been used as an effective instrument of national economic planning for a relatively long time. Normatives are used to establish the general connection between the quantitative and qualitative parameters of various economic processes. A distinction is drawn between /goal-oriented/ normatives--the specific characteristics of goals reflecting ideas about the desired level of the satisfaction of the demands connected with the corresponding goals (within certain limits)--and /ideal/ normatives--disregarding the limits dictated by existing conditions. They are used to determine the degree of progression from actual to reasonable dietary standards, clothing and footwear consumption norms, the supply of public housing, consumer services, durable goods, cultural and consumer goods, etc. In this context, the normative represents a special type of priority or model objective. Normatives are also used to define specific levels of the realization of society's scientific, technical, economic, and other potential in the production sphere.

As far as forecasting methods are concerned, the state of affairs here is fairly well known. Of the several dozen forecasting methods developed in the



West at the height of the "forecasting boom" of the 1960's [10], only a few are used regularly, while the majority are used only sporadically. In scientific and technical forecasting there is a broader variety of methods than in economic forecasting, and the variety is quite small in social forecasting: elementary trend (extrapolation) models, scenarios, and some methods of direct and indirect expert polls--this is probably all. In standard forecasting the trend models play a purely auxiliary role, and this leaves only scenarios and expert polls.

In this connection, we should consider the possibility of using the methods employed successfully in scientific, technical, and economic forecasting for the elaboration of social forecasts, but, obviously, with the appropriate modifications to meet the requirements of studies of the developmental prospects of the sociosphere. This applies above all to context charts, morphological analysis, and matrix, operational, network, game, simulation, and other models. Experience has shown that these methods can serve as the basis for productive forecasting procedures. In any case, "prototypes of the future," balance sheets, and limit procedures could be quite effective.

/"Prototypes of the future"/--this is the advanced group method that has been used for so long and with so much success in psychology and sociology. The validity of this method stems from the obvious fact that some of the social communities (or collectives) and organizations in our social environment have certain features corresponding to our beliefs about the standard, optimal, or even the ideal situation. They can justifiably be described as real "prototypes of the future." They are important as the basis for the thorough study and use of existing experience. It is obvious that the transfer of characteristics from the real to the ideal cannot and must not be a mechanical process. This requires a special set of procedures--that is, theoretical-methodological research including the experimental testing of the effectiveness of each suggested operation and procedure.

There is no question that this approach is heuristic. Incidentally, it is not only in the field of forecasting that it can be used effectively. We already mentioned the possible establishment of an interdisciplinary field of research called social deontics. Social ecology (or human ecology) is another example. Continuing this analogy, we should recall that a special field of biology is concerned with the study of expediency in nature.

The /"limit procedure"/--in forecasting we constantly have to deal with "limits," beyond which the quantitative development of the forecasted object will naturally acquire new features. "Limits" of this kind are also encountered when observed changes in the professional, educational, and even age structure of society, some changes in social organization and control, changes in social time and space (the correlation and content of work and leisure time or the structure of the living environment and natural surroundings), the transition from the traditional rural way of life to the contemporary urban way of life, and others are extrapolated to the future. In our opinion, with the aid of "limits," alternative ways of achieving normative, optimal, and ideal situations could be studied much more effectively than they are today.



/Balance sheets/--the balance method has been used successfully for a long time in planning. Could it not be modified for social forecasting? As for forecasting in general, especially forecasts of scientific and technical progress and its socioeconomic effects on the global and regional levels, there is no question that balance theory has definite forecasting potential and can be used effectively in investigative and standard forecasts.

The process of socioeconomic development can be described in terms of a dynamic system of global, regional, local, and sectorial (or intersectorial) balances--for example, fuel and energy, raw material, industrial-sectorial, housing, food, transportation and communications, demographic, etc. There is also a definite interdependent relationship here, the key or "basic" role of some balances (the energy balance, for instance) in relation to others, and the opposite relationship of "superstructural" balances to the "basic" ones. All of this requires a systemwide approach to the modeling of balances, their coordination, the comparison of their indicators, etc. The system making quantitative evaluations of anticipated or desired changes would also be informative as far as forecasts are concerned.

The extrapolation of dynamic balance rows to the period preceding the forecast period can reveal "threshold" values (or limits) signaling unavoidable changes in the structure and even the very nature of a balance. This is particularly important in forecasts of the technological revolution and its social impact. The logical limits of extrapolation, beyond which all values would be absurd (because the qualitative features of the process would change), must be established in each case, and methods must be found for the fullest possible consideration of the background features contributing to the change of the structure and nature of balances.

At the same time, the standard elaboration of balance rows can provide information for the resolution of theoretical and applied problems in the optimization of the balance. This is extremely important because studies in global modeling have revealed that not one of the balances listed above can remain unchanged over the next few decades, and the overwhelming majority of spontaneous changes would be negative as far as the future of humanity is concerned. The investigation of possible ways of achieving optimal situations will make standard forecasting much more meaningful and productive.

The balance method must not be regarded as an alternative to other forecasting methods. Just as in planning, here it is likely to become one of the elements of comprehensive forecasting methods. It will be particularly important in raising the level of mathematization in forecasting--one of the essential conditions for the enhancement of the effectiveness and quality of forecasting results.

As for forecasting in sociological research, this will require the construction of basic systems of balance analogues (social balances). In some fields of knowledge (socioeconomic, socioecological, and sociodemographic studies), however, this work has already been done and has produced positive results.

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## QUALITY OF MANAGEMENT DECISIONS

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 2, Mar-Apr 87 (signed to press 17 Mar 87) pp 41-48

[Article by Yulo Erikhovich Pyarnits, candidate of economic sciences and director of the Maynor Planning and Design Bureau of Management Systems of the Estonian SSR Ministry of Light Industry, and Alla Nikolayevna Sizykh, candidate of economic sciences and bureau senior engineer. This is their first article for our journal]

[Text] Most of today's economic managers have no special knowledge or ability in the sphere of human relations. But this is only half of the problem. They are not even required to have this kind of professional training. If half of the specialists under the jurisdiction of the chief engineer had a liberal arts education, the situation would be considered absolutely abnormal, but no one is surprised by a personnel staff consisting exclusively of engineers. The fact that any engineer has taken liberal arts courses, has some experience in life, and reads newspapers is considered to be enough. Enough for what? For a knowledge of life? Even if this knowledge is profound, it is no substitute for skill and the actual ability to work with people and manage the collective. Management is one of the professions requiring talent and special training. It was not an easy matter for managers and specialists in Estonian light industry to realize this fact. It was even more difficult to implement the principles of the new personnel policy.

### Choice of Strategy

The results of activity in light industry in the Estonian SSR in the 10th Five-Year Plan were disturbing. Production assignments were not fulfilled. One of the main reasons was the personnel problem. Minister Yu. Kraft resolved to improve personnel work radically, regarding it as the most important strategic area of economic activity. This called for a dramatic change in priorities. The Maynor Planning and Design Bureau of Management Systems was established as the scientific base for this. The bureau had the function of finding and incorporating new management methods. In view of the comprehensive nature of the problem, specialists in various fields were invited to join the organization: economists, sociologists, psychologists, and others. The service now has around 300 people on its staff and is part of the sectorial computer center.

We began with a thorough analysis of the situation in the sector and at individual enterprises. Our research revealed a complex and disturbing situation. 1) According to forecasts, natural population increase in the republic would remain low in the 11th Five-Year Plan, and almost 96 percent of the able-bodied population was already working in national production. The number of new jobs in the non-production sphere was rapidly rising and these positions were mainly being filled by women. They represent the majority (75 percent) of those employed in the sector. 2) The fierce "struggle" for manpower has diminished the competitive potential of the enterprises of the Estonian SSR Ministry of Light Industry. The prestige of professions in light industry is low and there is a high rate of turnover among new employees, especially the young ones. Whereas the indicator for the sector as a whole was 13.2 percent in 1980, it ranged from 25 to 38 percent at some enterprises. 3) Many managers lack the necessary managerial skills, especially in the area of the social problems of production. There is a small reserve of managerial personnel. Promotions are frequently made in error. For example, according to the data of our colleague V. Vallaste, in 15 years 17.6 percent of the directors of associations and enterprises, their assistants, and other high-level production chiefs were dismissed from their jobs within the first 3 years for unsatisfactory performance. 4) A standard system of social management does not exist at most enterprises, and there is no integral theory of management in the sector. Managers with personnel functions are usually scattered throughout the enterprise: The engineer in charge of training is under the command of the chief engineer, the personnel department is under the director's jurisdiction, some managerial functions are performed by social organizations, etc. The level of training and monthly wages of personnel managers is much lower than the level for technical and economic specialists, but 56 percent of the personnel specialists have a technical education.

After assessing the situation, sector managers and specialists concluded that a strong personnel policy was the key to the resolution of technical and socioeconomic problems. Social resource theory became its theoretical basis [1]. Personnel work concentrated on the augmentation and efficient use of this resource. As we saw it, the main elements of the social resource were personnel, their quantity and quality, and the degree of group impact, and its mobilization was to be accomplished by a combination of material, technical, economic, organizational, and informational factors. We also had high hopes for the restructuring of the economic mechanism in light industry.

These were the general features of our strategy. It was then clarified in three sessions of the "directors' school." Participants discussed social resource theory, analyzed the personnel situation, and determined ways of radically improving work in the sector as a whole and at individual enterprises. Special attention was given to the training of managers. We concentrated on two factors--the restructuring of attitudes toward social factors of production and the fundamentals of social management. In fact, we are still conducting this work.



## All Solutions Are Personnel-Related

To reduce personnel turnover, the Maynor specialists elaborated and incorporated a system for the adaptation of new workers. We will not discuss the informational basis of our procedures in detail. It is the standard one for this kind of system and includes surveys of new and departing employees, follow-up talks with them, etc. The most important practical principles are the following: 1) the creation of an atmosphere in which new workers sense that others wish them well and are interested in them, and the psychologically informed and tactful treatment of new personnel by managers; 2) the provision of new personnel with detailed information about the nature and conditions of labor, prospects for advanced training and professional advancement, and leisure opportunities; 3) involvement in enterprise affairs and social work; 4) the transfer of personnel to other jobs if they cannot adapt.

The program had a perceptible impact. For example, the rate of personnel turnover in Tallin's Punane Koyt factory fell from 13.1 percent to 7.3 percent within 2 years; turnover among new employees did not exceed 10 percent at many enterprises.

We gave equal time to vocational guidance and counseling. A system was set up to perform the following functions: to inform the public of enterprises and professions in light industry, working and personal conditions, and prospects for advancement; to develop an interest in light industry professions in specific population groups, to learn the abilities and inclinations of new personnel, and to make recommendations on job placement; to conduct the research needed for the improvement of vocational guidance.

How has all of this worked out? Bureau personnel prepared informational ads, posters, prospectuses, and colored brochures and booklets on light industry enterprises and professions for distribution in schools, vocational counseling centers, and enterprises. Such relatively new forms of advertising as public fashion shows, trade fairs, and special concerts with screenings of advertising films and slide shows are also being used more extensively. Young workers and freshmen in vocational and technical institutes are regularly surveyed to determine the reasons for the choice of specific professions or institutes, the impact of information sources, plans and future ambitions, and shortcomings in vocational guidance. Incidentally, the latter now concentrates on parents and teachers as well as students. After all, they do much to influence the attitudes of youth.

Each year the effectiveness of these measures is more perceptible. The prestige of some professions is rising, the number of young people applying to vocational and technical institutes and directly to enterprises is increasing, and the rate of turnover among young workers is declining.

When there is a great demand for manpower, we cannot wait inside the personnel office for applicants. An aggressive approach is essential. Why does a person go all the way across the city to work when he lives next door to a textile factory which can offer him exactly the same job? We decided that enterprises must have differing competitive potential when it comes to

employment. Proceeding from this hypothesis, the Maynor specialists developed a set of methods to evaluate the appeal of plant and factory labor collectives. This kind of evaluation entails the study of the surroundings of enterprises in our industry and others. The pros and cons of the jobs available at these enterprises and organizations are determined, and measures are then taken to strengthen our advantages and eliminate our shortcomings.

It is interesting that the results of these studies were quite unexpected. For example, the popular opinion that the labor shortage in the textile industry is mainly due to the three-shift work schedule was not corroborated. We also learned that although working and personal conditions are important, competitive potential can be enhanced without investing more money in these spheres. Here is an indicative example. There was an acute shortage of personnel in the fur shop of the Linda factory. Management assumed that the main reasons were the low wages, the difficult and intense labor, and the absence of any real prospects for an apartment or even communal housing. It did not seem possible to change the situation in the near future. The office staff analyzed the situation from the standpoint of competitive potential and learned that reserves here were far from exhausted. The specialists then went to work, and within a year the shop had a stable collective which confidently fulfilled all production assignments. The number of shop personnel was augmented by 52 people (incidentally, management did not expect more than 30). This success was the result of the establishment of working conditions ensuring psychological comfort.

Experience has shown that the appointment of the right enterprise director can increase output by millions of rubles. For this reason, we were particularly interested in the choice of specialists. Under V. Vallaste's supervision, Maynor staffers developed a set of procedures to find individuals with high administrative potential. The program is based on the analysis of the following features: ideological and political maturity, personal qualities, sociopsychological features, professional motivation, and results of past performance. The evaluation entails the analysis of documents, psychological tests, interviews of the candidate and his co-workers, group sessions, and role-playing, including the resolution of various production problems. As a result, we have the following information about each candidate: Does he want a management position? Does he have the necessary ideological, political, and personal qualities for this? In which situations will he perform best? All young specialists who apply for jobs undergo this kind of examination. The use of these procedures permitted bolder and, what is most important, more valid decisions on the promotion of capable employees to managerial positions. For example, using test results as a basis, consultants confidently offered the position of director of the Valga sewing factory to young specialist M. Milder. Although the candidate did not have specialized training in this field (he is a specialist in cybernetics) or sufficient experience (the new director was only 25 and had never worked in industry before), M. Milder has been managing a large collective successfully for 2 years now.

#### The Manager and His Team

It is not enough to simply learn the individual's capabilities. He must be taught to use them. In essence, we view the professional development of

managers as a continuous process, organically combined with daily administrative activity. This work can be performed in two ways: through training courses or through work directly with the manager.

Such methods as the replacement of an absent manager with an apprentice, the purposeful transfer of personnel, and the assignment of specific one-time responsibilities or independent work to members of the managerial reserve under the supervision of an experienced manager have been practiced widely in the industry since the beginning of the 1980's. A great deal of energy was devoted to the restructuring of training. We tried to coordinate it as much as possible with actual production assignments, and we paid special attention to training involving specific situations [2]. After all, new technical and organizational problems arise constantly during the development of the sector, and personnel must be trained quickly to deal with new developments, ranging from the introduction of the brigade form of labor organization to the use of the matrix method to analyze economic performance.

We always pay attention to the social aspects of production. According to our data, around 80 percent of all the problems solved daily by foremen are directly connected with the human factor. Foremen and other managers usually have no special training in this field. We had to teach the heads of production teams the fundamentals of managerial psychology and sociology. Lectures on these topics are extremely popular. Today these courses represent around 50 percent of the curriculum of advanced training for foremen and 30 percent of the training program for shop chiefs.

Nevertheless, without underestimating the importance of training, we must say that the manager is born primarily in the process of administrative activity. For this reason, our strategy presupposes general educational lectures followed by the training of individual personnel and then the training of managerial teams and all managerial personnel.<sup>1</sup> Maynor researchers have tested several sets of methods to develop the skills of the comprehensive analysis of production situations, decisionmaking, psychological testing, video sensitivity training, role-playing and debate programs, relaxation techniques, etc.

We see our main goal as a balanced system of management with all elements of the system coordinated and with the impact of intragroup interaction maximized. In practice, unfortunately, people often forget that management is a group activity. It is extremely important for a new employee to be part of the management group. Here is an indicative example. The managers of a division worked together as friends, and the collective kept up with production assignments. One of the director's assistants resigned. His place was taken by a candidate with the required education and work experience. He had gotten along well with co-workers in his previous place of employment. Nevertheless, as soon as he was appointed, there were serious conflicts in the administrative link of the division, which literally paralyzed its work. The "new addition" ended up costing hundreds of thousands of rubles. Eventually, virtually all division managers had to be replaced. This was not merely a matter of the psychological incompatibility on which these problems are usually blamed. The personal qualities of the new employee and his contribution to the group are equally important.



Personnel offices in the industry now have certain methods of minimizing errors in the placement of junior administrators and middle-level management. Before the appointment is made, specialists analyze the style of interaction in the collective, the values of its members, and the personal characteristics of managers. This information is then compared to the data of psychological studies of the candidate. The decision is then made according to the proverb "Check every measurement seven times."

We also know from experience, however, that even the intensive individual training of managerial personnel is not a 100-percent guarantee of efficiently organized management. Special training courses for management teams and groups are needed to teach their members to work together in making and carrying out decisions. The synergism (or combined effect) of management depends on the manager's outlook, the style of decisionmaking, the informal leader, a sense of collectivism in the group, and the willingness to cooperate. Different interpretations of problems and production situations, psychological incompatibility, and the inability to communicate with co-workers and subordinates all delay the resolution of elementary problems and erect all sorts of "departmental" barriers. The issuance of orders will not improve cooperation. Special training is needed. Here is an example. The managers of one association in our industry took ensemble training courses (they will be discussed later). The aim was the improvement of daily management methods. First a consultant defined the state of this management by analyzing research findings. The participants were then split up into groups and discussed possible ways of solving a problem. At the end of each session the general director requested each group to draft an order to improve daily management practices in the association. The documents had so little in common! And this occurred despite the fact that the group discussion of problems and the setting of common goals had taken an entire day. The problem did not stem from the irresponsible attitude of some participants to their work, but from the absence of a common interpretation of the problem and of possible solutions and the lack of precise common goals.

In this way, methods were developed in the industry to enhance the combined effect of managerial teams. One of the main methods is the ensemble training mentioned above. It covers all managerial personnel and is conducted on three levels: the ministry, the production association, and the division (or factory).

On the level of the ministry, so-called "directors' schools" are organized twice a year [3]. In addition to directors, the administrative personnel of the sector attend these sessions. They discuss various aspects of management. The content of ensemble training courses in the organization depends on its management. It usually includes key aspects of personnel policy, the strategy of technical development, the improvement of product quality, etc. Before the sessions begin, consultants (bureau staffers or specialists from other organizations) determine the enterprise's problems and possible solutions, learn about advanced experience in this field, and then draw up the plan of operations. The work begins with a lecture by the consultant, who discusses the results of an analysis of the state of affairs at the enterprise, elucidates the analytical aspects of a problem, and then describes the solutions



used in leading organizations. Participants then consider possible solutions in groups of 5-7 people, and this is followed by a group discussion of all the options. The group analysis of problems engenders mutual understanding and gives rise to more than just new ideas (which are extremely important in themselves): The participants gain a deeper understanding of their essence and a keener sense of the need for innovation and change.

The Maynor specialists also elaborated the procedures for the "development of management teams" [4]. The purpose of the program was the optimization of interpersonal relations and more effective cooperation by managers. There are two main groups of procedures: 1) the analysis of managerial relations in the organization and the sociopsychological atmosphere in the administrative link; 2) group training sessions for the creation of an atmosphere of frankness, mutual understanding, mutual support, and the constructive resolution of any problems that might arise. The result is not only the improvement of the sociopsychological climate, but also efficient production and a considerable savings in expenditures. The work at one enterprise in the industry was terrible for years and management could do nothing to improve it. Our specialists took on the job and indicators soared within a year. What happened? Whereas management had previously consisted of four cliques, the scientific consultants were able to create a cohesive team of managers without any changes in personnel. The result was an increase of several million rubles in output without the use of any additional financial or technical resources.

#### Organizational Prospects

The work of improving management is still going on. The methods of managerial consulting have been mastered [5] and a set of procedures has been developed for the comprehensive analysis of the enterprise [6]. The introduction of innovations of this kind on a broader scale points up the need to move to a qualitatively new level--to the purposeful structuring of the social organization of enterprises and the industry as a whole. Some steps have already been taken in this direction. Related functional services have been reinforced at enterprises for the more efficient use of the social resource. The position of assistant director in charge of personnel and social affairs has been created in nine associations. Personnel departments are constantly supplemented with employees who have received the required professional training. Today 3 percent of the people in the industry with a higher education have degrees in psychology or sociology and are employed in positions directly connected with the resolution of social problems. We would be happy to do more, but the number of specialists receiving degrees in these fields from VUZ's in our country is regrettably low. This is why we still have to conduct the training ourselves. Classes in personnel policy in the industry have been offered to managers twice a year in the last few years. Besides this, we are developing a system of personnel management in conjunction with enterprise specialists and are training the people who will be directly responsible for these programs as we plan and compile them. Measures are being taken consistently at enterprises to improve working conditions and medical services for personnel, and a fundamentally new "manager's health" program has been instituted [7].

The improvement of social organization is one of the main reasons for significant socioeconomic results in the industry. The rate of personnel turnover fell from 13.2 percent in 1980 to 10.1 percent in 1985. The number of specialists with a higher education increased by 28.1 percent, and the average age of managers decreased; the technical development of the industry has been stepped up. The value of newly installed equipment in the 11th Five-Year plan increased by 180.5 percent in comparison to the 10th, and the rate of equipment renewal was 13.6 percent in 1985. Our industry advanced from the underdeveloped group of sectors to the leading group within 5 years. In recent years it has consistently been one of the winners of socialist competition among the ministries of light industry in our country.

The social resource development program is still a top priority. Now it is a matter of the further improvement of management and social organization. We will not discuss all of our research topics and ideas in detail, but we will list some of the interesting and promising topics.

Methods of enhancing labor motivation are being developed; methods of coordinating the sociospatial characteristics of the production environment with personnel requirements are being tested at several enterprises. We are conducting thorough investigations of workplaces for the purpose of heightened efficiency and the optimal socioprofessional structure of the staff. We are also studying the effects of the manager's lifestyle on his performance in production. An automated system for the certification of managers and specialists has been developed and is being incorporated (at enterprises of other ministries as well as our own). One of the important elements of this project is the automated analysis of the performance of experts and certification commissions and the decisions made by managers on the basis of certification results. A training program, "The Manager as a Creative Individual," is being drawn up.

In short, there is still no end of work to be done.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. The management team is a small group of people working together--for example, the director, his assistants, and the heads of social organizations, or the shop chief, his assistants, and the heads of shop social organizations. The term "administrative personnel" refers to the total group of managers on all levels of a specific organization or enterprise.

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## SETTLEMENT PATTERNS AS A FACTOR INFLUENCING THE MOBILITY OF YOUTH

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[Article by Aksel Voldemarovich Kirkh, candidate of philosophical sciences, senior research associate at the History Institute, Estonian SSR Academy of Sciences, and author of the following articles in our journal: "Experiment in the Measurement of the Intergenerational Mobility of Youth" (1984, No 4) and "Cause and Effect Model of the Mobility of Youth" (1984, No 1, co-authored); Arvidas Algirdovich Matulenis, doctor of philosophical sciences, deputy director of the Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Law, Lithuanian SSR Academy of Sciences, and author of the following articles in our journal: "The Social Orientation of Secondary School Graduates" (1977, No 2, co-authored), "Educational Sociology Is the Topic of Discussion" (1983, No 1), and several reviews; Maret Vellovna Suytslepp, graduate student in the History Institute, Estonian SSR Academy of Sciences. This is her first article for our journal]

[Excerpts] Studies by Lithuanian and Estonian sociologists indicate that the mobility of young people who have just begun working is influenced by the demographic, economic, and social features of a region [2]. For many years the Baltic zone was considered to have a labor shortage. It is true that the standard of living and the social infrastructure here were always superior to those in, for example, the Russian Nonchernozem Zone. The fascination with "imported" manpower (which was not, incidentally, confined to the Baltic zone) had a number of negative results--the aggravation of the housing problem, delays in the retooling of enterprises, etc. The usual explanation for the need to seek manpower outside the region was the low birthrate of the native population of Latvia and Estonia, and also of Lithuania in recent years. Today this approach arouses serious doubts. In the first place, recent studies by local sociologists and demographers reveal a tendency toward a rise in the birthrate. In the second place, now that acceleration is the objective, we need a new approach to the very issue of labor resources. "A closer look," a speaker stressed at the 27th CPSU Congress, "might reveal that there is no manpower shortage. There is, however, a low level of labor productivity, poor labor organization, ineffective labor incentives...and unsubstantiated decisions by planning and economic agencies leading to the creation of unnecessary jobs" [1].

Obviously, a realistic program for the more efficient use of labor resources requires a knowledge of the dynamics of social and territorial mobility in



each successive generation. The data of a long-range study of the graduates of secondary academic institutions served as the empirical basis for our model. It has been conducted since 1982 by several research teams from the Baltic Division of the Soviet Sociological Association under the supervision of Doctor of Philosophical Sciences M.Kh. Titma. In 1983 more than 12,000 people were surveyed with the aid of the "Start of the Journey" questionnaire (for a discussion of methods and preliminary results, see [3]. The authors of this article took part in drawing up the program and conducting the survey in Estonia and Lithuania).

Forecasts of the 1970's predicted that the intensive migration of the rural population to the cities in the 1960's and 1970's would continue. This hypothesis was proved only in Lithuania, and not even in all parts of the republic. Migration by the rural population of this republic to the cities is anticipated in the 12th and 13th five-year plans (the opposite process also exists, but we will discuss it later). The reasons for this are the following: In the first place, the process of urbanization started later here than in Latvia and Estonia and it is now quite intense. In the second place, natural population increase is declining. The indicator fell from 30,400 people to 18,900, or by more than a third, between 1965 and 1984 [4, authors' calculation]. A decrease in the working-age population (especially the native population) has also been recorded in Latvia and Estonia, but other factors compensate for this tendency. In Latvia many migrants from other republics have been working in agriculture in recent years, and in Estonia former city-dwellers have returned to rural areas. In short, settlement patterns in Estonia have been displaying perceptible stabilization since 1980. Furthermore, in 1983 there was a positive balance of migration between urban and rural areas in favor of the latter for the first time in the postwar period. Similar tendencies are now apparent in Lithuania and Latvia. The effect of this process on labor resources will depend largely on the career plans and behavior of the graduates of secondary academic institutions.

Let us examine the role of settlement patterns. According to research data (see table), most school graduates live with their parents and consequently have strong initial motives to begin working in national production locally. This is probably also what their parents want. We must also consider the fact that many young men and women live in private dwellings (for example, one out of every three in Lithuania and one out of every four in Estonia). There is also another important feature. Urban and rural areas have approximately equal numbers of graduates of secondary schools, and this is true of specialized and regular academic institutions.

Only the graduates of vocational and technical institutes and tekhnikums do not fit into this pattern. More than half of them live in communal housing or rented rooms. Besides this, there are many more graduates of these academic institutions in cities than in rural communities, and it is not known whether those who left the communities will return. In short, we must take a look at the career plans of youth. An analysis of the results in, for example, the Estonian SSR indicates that most of the graduates of schools in rural areas and small settlements intend to work in agriculture. This applies mainly to the children of kolkhoz and sovkhos workers. The children of members

of the intelligentsia and of non-specialist employees want a higher education. The graduates of general educational schools from worker families also want to acquire a higher education or to enroll in a tekhnikum; those who have graduated from a vocational and technical institute or tekhnikum, however, plan to begin working.

Housing Conditions of Graduates of Secondary Academic Institutions in Lithuania (I) and Estonia (II), %

Young people residing in:	Voc & tech				General educational schools			
	institutes		Tekhnikums		Regular		Specialized	
	I	II	I	II	I	II	I	II
Communal housing,* from								
Capital	--	2	--	3	--	1	--	1
Cities	10	14	15	15	2	1	2	2
Rural communities	35	30	43	42	4	3	2	6
Parents' apartments, in								
Capital	10	22	7	16	10	24	20	30
Cities	20	18	18	12	35	36	33	32
Rural communities	3	4	2	3	6	10	11	5
Private dwellings owned by parents, in								
Capital	1	1	--	2	1	2	11	3
Cities	7	4	7	3	18	10	15	15
Rural communities	14	5	8	4	24	13	6	6

\* This group includes renters.

Therefore, the type of academic institution and the housing conditions of young people are beginning to play a greater role in the social and territorial mobility of youth along with "traditional" factors (parents' place of residence and social status).

The model of the potential territorial mobility of the graduates of secondary academic institutions is supposed to answer two interrelated questions: Does the potential mobility of students fit into the mainstream of migration by the employed population in the Lithuanian and Estonian SSR's? What are the nature and dynamics of the reproduction of settlement patterns? As we said, socio-economic development and migration processes in the Baltic republics have common dynamics and do not coincide only in terms of speed. This was the reason for our working hypothesis: The migratory behavior of students in Lithuania and Estonia differs only in flow patterns.

The procedural basis of our study was a loglinear analysis. It provides a fairly simple but flexible model. The main thing, however, is that it meets important needs related to our subject matter. After all, we had to analyze, first, the features of a qualitative nature; second, paired and complex multi-factor connections; third, their reflection on the regional level and within separate territorial communities.

First of all, we must say that we found no difference between secondary school graduates in Lithuania and Estonia in terms of potential mobility. Flow patterns coincide in the republics as a whole. Consequently, our initial hypothesis was not proved. This does not mean, however, that there are no differences within republics. On the contrary, the reproduction of groups of graduates of secondary academic institutions does differ. This is primarily due to the location of academic centers. In Estonia most of the vocational and technical institutes are in large cities. In Lithuania they are distributed more evenly, especially in rural areas. On the other hand, specialized courses are taught even in rural areas in Estonia, whereas in Lithuania they are concentrated in Vilnius.

Another important conclusion was that most of the graduates of secondary schools in Lithuania and Estonia intend to study or work in the same place they are living now. In other words, the young people are distinguished by a high level of territorial stability. It is true that there are some differences even here. The level of stability for youth in the capital is more than twice as high as the indicator for citydwellers and almost twice as high as the rural indicator. At the same time, the adaptability of rural youth is much greater than the indicator for urban youth (see figure) [not reproduced]. For example, even when the former plan to migrate in the future, they are usually planning to move to a city, but rarely to the capital. The capital does not appeal to citydwellers either, but they also rarely consider a move to rural areas.

It is interesting that the choice of jobs in rural areas is influenced most in vocational and technical institutes. Most of the rural students here live in communal housing and are therefore eager to go back home after graduation. With a view to the development of the network of these institutes in the republics, we must say that the reproduction of rural personnel is accomplished through the vocational and technical institutes in the Lithuanian SSR, whereas these institutes play a less important role in the Estonian SSR.

Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are distinguished by territorial mobility in many directions (rural-urban, urban-urban, rural-rural, and urban-rural). The intensity of the flows can vary considerably. The migration plans of youth are more uniform. In particular, recent inhabitants of rural areas who have not adapted to city life are expected to return to the countryside in the next decade in Lithuania, just as they did at the beginning of the 1980's in Estonia. Children will move with their parents. Their number will be augmented by the rural youth studying in urban vocational and technical institutes and *tehnikums*.

Let us summarize our findings. The reproduction of the Baltic labor force will be secured by young people from secondary academic institutions in the 1986-1990 period. This fact is of fundamental significance in labor policy and in the socioeconomic development of the region. We must rid ourselves of the stereotype of the Baltic labor shortage and concentrate on creating the necessary conditions for the realization of young people's ambitions and for the more efficient use of manpower. Obviously, this will require a comprehensive approach. A place of prominence, however, should be assigned to socio-cultural measures, specifically those backed up by rich national traditions.

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## 'FREE BOOK EXCHANGE' MARKET IN 1986: ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 2, Mar-Apr 87 (signed to press 17 Mar 87) pp 55-60

[Article by Boris Anatolyevich Kats, candidate of technical sciences, specialist in cybernetics, and sector head in a Leningrad experimental design office, and Sergey Mikhaylovich Makarenkov, expert on books and manager of the Moskniga bookstore]

[Text] "Abu Taglib, a member of the Mosul branch of the Khamdanid Dynasty, bought a copy of the 'Book of Songs' for 10,000 dirhem from a book merchant in Baghdad through a middleman and then said that the merchant had lost money on the transaction because the book was worth much more"--from the preface to the 'Book of Songs' by Abu al-Faraj Ali of Esfahan (10th century).

How much does a book by Bulat Okudzhava cost? There is no single answer to this question because the price depends on many circumstances. All we can be sure of is that anyone who answers with the publication price will be considered naive at best.

In bookstores, where the "list price" is used, the price has virtually no connection with demand, and this is precisely why a book by Okudzhava or other publications of this kind cannot be bought. But they can be gotten. This unscientific but familiar term signifies several alternative forms of action: first, using opportunities connected with official status; second, acquiring the book "from a friend," including in exchange for services; third, buying it from speculators; and, finally, becoming a participant in the "free book exchange" system, which has been operating successfully for several years in Moscow, Leningrad, and some other cities.

We will not make any value judgments with regard to the unofficial book market. It will always exist as long as there is a shortage and as long as the official price is as far removed from actual supply and demand as the ideal is from reality. Our aim is completely instrumental: We want to prove that the "free book exchange" system provides unique sociological information not merely about the demand for books, but also, and mainly, about the social structure of the book culture, within which deep-seated qualitative changes are taking place today but have regrettably escaped the attention of sociologists.

What is the "free book exchange" system? Books are categorized according to demand and can be exchanged within each category. The Leningrad system uses nine categories: 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7. They are established centrally (the categories are updated monthly at a market analysts' conference) and a master card index is kept in Lenkniga. In Moscow the categories are set personally by the market analyst in each second-hand bookstore. On the one hand, this method has obvious advantages: The system is more flexible in adapting to regional market conditions (Arbat is quite different from Orekhovo) and temporary changes in demand and supply. On the other hand, too much depends on the professional level of the market analyst. In any case, there are many arguments in favor of the decentralized system, as long as specialists are competent. The Moscow categories are slightly different from the ones in Leningrad: 1, 1.1, 1.2, A, B, C, 2, and 3. They are completely comparable, however, because, whether we like it or not, the exchange category depends on the price of the book--no, not the "list price," but the difference between the actual and list prices.<sup>1</sup> It is obvious that these are only the books whose value exceeds the list price. Otherwise, they would either not be taken in exchange or would "glut" the market. We will be discussing books for which demand exceeds supply. In Moscow, for example, the situation is the following (Table 1).

Table 1. Approximate Correlation of "Free Book Exchange" Categories (in Moscow) and Difference Between Actual and List Prices

<u>Categories</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>
Difference, in rubles	23-25	20-23	12-15	10-12	7-10	4-5	2-3	under 2

Table 2. Comparison of First Five Categories in Moscow and Leningrad, Number of Titles

<u>Leningrad Category</u>	<u>Moscow</u>						<u>Total</u>
	<u>1</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	
1.1	25	0	0	0	0	0	25
1.2	26	8	1	0	0	0	35
1.3	22	20	12	0	0	0	54
2	12	48	52	18	4	2	136
3	5	12	29	43	17	0	106
Total	90	88	94	61	21	2	356

We will be using the Leningrad card index (centralized and updated monthly) to analyze the book exchange categories. If we compare the lists of books in the first five categories in Moscow and Leningrad (Table 2), we see that the nature of demand in the two cities is similar, but it can differ perceptibly in the case of some publications.

Distribution of Books Among Categories in Leningrad Book Exchange Card Index as of 1 August 1986 (the corresponding categories in Moscow are enclosed in parentheses):

#### Category 1.1

Benois, A., "Reminiscences," in 2 volumes, Moscow, Nauka, 1980 (1+1).  
Kafka, F., "Novel. Novellas. Parables," Moscow, Progress, 1965 (3+1).  
Mann, T., "Joseph and His Brothers," in 2 volumes, Moscow, Khudozh. lit., 1968 (4+1).  
Pikul, V., "Word and Action," in 2 volumes, Leningrad, Lenizdat, 1975 (5+1).  
Pikul, V., "The Favorite," in 2 volumes, Leningrad, Lenizdat, 1984 (1+1).  
Plato, "Works," in 3 volumes, Moscow, Mysl, 1968 (1+1).  
Plutarch, "Lives," in 3 volumes, Moscow, AN SSSR, 1964 (3+1).  
"Sergey Dyagilev and Russian Art," in 2 volumes, Moscow, Izobrz. iskusstvo, 1982 (1+1).  
Semenov, Yu., "The Alternative," in 4 volumes, Moscow, Mosk. rabochiy, 1977 (1+1).  
Tacitus, "Works," in 2 volumes, Leningrad, Nauka, 1969 (1+1).  
Fitzgerald, S., "Selected Works," in 3 volumes, Moscow, Khudozh. lit., 1985 (1+1.2).  
Cherkasov, A.T. and Moskvitina, P.D., "Selected Works," in 3 volumes, Moscow, Sovremennik, 1985 (1+1+A).  
Chukovskiy, K., "Chukkokala. Manuscript Almanac," Moscow, Iskusstvo, 1979 (1+A).  
Erenburg, I.G., "People, Years, Life," in 3 books, Moscow, Sov. pisatel, 1963 (1+1).  
Yazvitskiy, V.I., "Ivan III--Ruler of All Rus," Moscow, Khudozh. lit., 1955 (1+1.2).

#### Category 1.2

Belyy, A., "Poems and Verses," Moscow, Sov. pisatel, 1966 (1).  
Babel, I., "Selected Works," Moscow, Khudozh. lit., 1966 (1.1).  
Bulgakov, M., "Selected Works," Moscow, Khudozh. lit., 1973, 1980, 1983 (1.1).  
Bulgakov, M., "Tragedies and Comedies," Moscow, Iskusstvo, 1962 (1.1).  
Vayner, A. and B., "Works," in 2 volumes, Kishinev, 1986 (1).  
Hauff and Grimm, "Tales," in 2 volumes, Leningrad, Khudozhnik RSFSR, 1979 (1).  
Golon, A. and S., vol 1, "Angelique," vol 2, "Angelique in the New World," Moscow, Progress, 1972 (1.1).  
Dal, V.I., "Dictionary of the Living Language of Great Russia," in 4 volumes, Moscow, Russkiy yazyk, 1978-80, 1982 (1+1.2).  
Dumas, A., "Vicomte de Bragelonne," in 3 volumes, Moscow, Khudozh. lit., 1982 (1+A).  
Dumas, A., "The Count of Monte Cristo," in 2 volumes, Moscow, Khudozh. lit., 1982 (1).  
Dumas, A., "The Two Dianas," Moscow, Det. lit., 1976 (1+1.2).  
"The Foreign Mystery," Moscow, Mol. gvardiya, 1965 (1+1.1).  
"The Foreign Mystery," Moscow, Mol. gvardiya, 1967 (1+1.1).  
McCullough, C., "The Thorn Birds. A Novel," Moscow, Khudozh. lit., 1980 (1+1.2).

Montaigne, M., "Essays," in 3 books, 2d edition, Moscow, Nauka, 1979 (1).  
 Mandelshtam, O.E., "Poems," Leningrad, Sov. pisatel, 1977, 1978 (1+A).  
 Perruchot, H., "The Life of Van Gogh," Moscow, Progress, 1973 (1).  
 Perruchot, H., "The Life of Renoir," Moscow, Progress, 1979 (1).

### Category 1.3

Belyy, A., "Petersburg," Moscow, Khudozh. lit., 1978 (1.2).  
 Balmont, K., "Selected Works," Moscow, Khudozh. lit., 1980 (1.2).  
 "Bestuzhev Memoirs," Moscow-Leningrad, Nauka, 1951 (1.1).  
 Vysotskiy, V., "Nerve," Moscow, Sov. pisatel, 1984 (1).  
 Vyazemskiy, P.A., "Notebooks (1813-1848)," Moscow, Nauka, 1963 (1.1).  
 Golon, A. and S., "Angelique," Dushanbe, 1986 (1.1).  
 Gorbachevskiy, I.I., "Memoirs and Letters," Moscow, Nauka, 1963 (1+1.2).  
 Camus, A., "Selected Works," Moscow, Progress, 1969 (1).  
 Kasvinov, A., "23 Steps Down," Moscow, Mysl, 1981 (1.1).  
 Kipling, R., "Selected Works," Leningrad, Khudozh. lit., 1980 (1.2).  
 Konetskiy, V., "Works," in 2 volumes, Moscow, Sov. pisatel, 1980 (1.1).  
 "Lermontov Encyclopedia," Moscow, Sov. entsiklopediya, 1980 (1.2).  
 Maurois, A., "From Montaigne to Aragon," Moscow, Raduga, 1983 (1.1).  
 Maurois, A., "Paris," Moscow, Iskusstvo, 1970 (1.2).  
 Maugham, S., "Works," in 2 volumes, Moscow, Raduga, 1985 (1.1).  
 Musil, R., "The Man Without Qualities," in 2 volumes, Moscow, Progress, 1984 (1.1).  
 Ovid, "Metamorphoses," Moscow, Khudozh. lit., 1980 (1.2).  
 Ovid, "Elegies," Moscow, Khudozh. lit., 1970 (1.1).  
 Proust, M., "Guermites Way," Moscow, Khudozh. lit., 1980 (1.1).  
 Plautus, "Comedies," Moscow, Khudozh. lit., 1970 (1).  
 Pototskiy, Ya., "The Saragossa Manuscript," Moscow, Nauka, 1968 (1).  
 Remarque, E.M., "Shadows in Paradise," Moscow, Progress, 1972 (1).  
 Remarque, E.M., "Selected Works," in 2 volumes, Kishinev, 1979 (1).  
 "The Contemporary Polish Mystery," Moscow, Progress, 1984 (1.1).  
 "The Contemporary Bulgarian Mystery," Moscow, Progress, 1981 (1).  
 "The Contemporary English Mystery," Moscow, Progress, 1972 (1).  
 Strugatskiy, A. and B., "Beetle in the Ant-Hill," Kishinev, 1983 (1).  
 Sartre, J.P., "Plays," Moscow, Iskusstvo, 1967 (1+1.1).  
 Tarkovskiy, A., "Selected Works," Moscow, Sov. pisatel, 1982 (1).  
 "The Hellenic Poets. An Anthology," Moscow, Khudozh. lit., 1970 (1).

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Note: This list does not include all of the books in high demand. The editors abridged the list to save space. The published version of the list reflects general trends in the development of demand.

### Authors With Books in the High Exchange Categories:

A. Adamov, J. Updike, B. Akhmadulina, A. Akhmatova, I. Babel, I. Badigin,  
 K. Balmont, A. Bezuglov, A. Belyy, M. Bulgakov, K. Bulychev, G. Vasari,  
 J. Verne, V.V. Veresayev, K. Vonnegut, Yu. German, H. Hesse, V. Hugo, Horace,  
 J. Dos Passos, H. James, A. Dumas, Ye. Yevtushenko, N. Zabolotskiy, A. Ivanov,



N. Kashin, R. Kipling, W. Collins, V. Konetskiy, L. Carroll, S. Lamb, O. Mandelshtam, G. Marquez, T. Mann, A. Maurois, S. Maugham, Ovid, B. Okudzhava, B. Pasternak, V. Pikul, Plato, E. Poe, M. Proust, E.M. Remarque, G. Sand, Yu. Semenov, H. Sienkiewicz, G. Simenon, S. Snegov, B. Spock, I. Stone, the Strugatskiy brothers, J. Salinger, J. Tolkien, I. Severyanin, W. Faulkner, A. Hailey, J. Heller, V. Khlebnikov, M. Tsvetayeva, Cicero, A. Cherkasov, S. Chernyy, I. Shaw, and S. Fitzgerald.

In recent years there has been a much higher demand for continuing publications, including series (Table 3). It is possible that we are witnessing a new type of consumer behavior, connected with the "specialization" of home libraries. This is an absolutely new phenomenon, particularly in view of the fact that this "specialization" is unlikely to be connected with the consumer's professional ambitions. Today there is a much more pronounced demand for "antiquity," and the past dominates the structure of the book culture.

The titles of the greatest interest, however, are naturally those which allow us to guess, if not judge, the motivation of book consumption and the social structure of the book culture. We feel that it is quite sufficient to limit the list of publications to the first three categories and to list the authors whose books are always put in categories 2 and 3 in Leningrad and no lower than 1.2 in Moscow.

Table 3. Distribution of Series Publications Among High-Demand Categories (Moscow, August 1986)

<u>Title of series</u>	<u>Total number of books</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>
Library of Ancient Literature	25	6	4	6	2	5	2
Literary Monuments of Ancient Rus	8	0	2	3	2	1	0
Literary Monuments	375	33	21	12	14	21	20
Life in Art	97	3	5	6	3	10	12
Foreign Science Fiction	90	3	3	6	18	40	20

Here are a few isolated observations on these data.

First of all, it is significant that the exchange category is not direct evidence of popularity. It is more likely to indicate the degree of unsatisfied demand.

Let us suppose that a miracle could take place tomorrow and that the poetry of V. Vysotskiy, B. Okudzhava, and B. Akhmadulina would finally be published in mass editions. They might not become more popular, but they certainly would not become less popular, while their exchange categories would decline and the difference between the actual and list prices would consequently be reduced. Half of the names on the list belong to poets. This disproves the common belief in the declining interest in poetry, and it clearly indicates the widely diverging tastes of readers and the State Committee of the USSR for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants and the Book Trade.

As far as Russian literature in general is concerned, most of the books on the list are 20th century works. There are two exceptions: ancient Russian literature and books about Pushkin's era and the Decembrists. Is it possible that the demand for the Russian classics is essentially satisfied?

Just under half of the Russian writers of the 20th century are our contemporaries. There is a clear interest, however, in the literature of the first third of the century.

When we analyze the list, it is impossible not to mention the "record-breaking" authors. The total number of copies of their books exceeds a million, and no end to this demand is in sight. These are Valentin Pikul, the Strugatskiy brothers, and Yulian Semenov. Mikhail Bulgakov could be called the absolute record-breaker in some respects. As a rule, books published in relatively small editions are among the titles in short supply, and this is less a result of real difficulties in printing the books than of subjective biases and thoughts about "where it might lead."

We also have some observations on foreign literature. Here the preference for 20th century authors is less pronounced. There is a great interest in ancient literature and in the cultures of ancient India and China. There are almost no foreign poets on the list, but this does not mean that there is no demand for foreign poetry. A look at the fourth and lower exchange categories makes this clear. For example, there is a steady demand for virtually any publication of Chinese, Japanese, or Indian classical poetry. There is still a high demand for foreign science fiction. Any science fiction anthology is put in the B category or a higher one in Moscow.

It is probable that not everyone would guess that there is an acute shortage of books by Cortazar, Marquez, Musil, Hesse, Proust, Sartre, T. Mann, and Faulkner. Their works are considered to be complex and even elitist, but the readers of today are realizing (before the publishers!) that their works are the classics of the 20th century.

Do the reprinting of books, reports of republication, reviews in respected press organs, and the making of movies based on books affect demand? These factors have almost no effect on books in mass demand. The demand for V. Pikul, Yu. Semenov, A. Adamov, and D. Balashov has not varied. Here is an indicative example: The republication of M. Mitchell's "Gone With the Wind" in an edition of half a million copies did not change its exchange category.

The republication of specialized cultural works, intended for readers with background knowledge in a specific field rather than for the general public, does lead, however, to a significant drop in demand. This has happened to books in the "Literary Monuments," "Philosophical Heritage," and "Life in Art" series. For example, the republication of Lvov's "Durer" (Moscow, Izobraz. iskusstvo, 1986, "Life in Art" series, 100,000 copies) transferred it from category 1.1 to category C; new editions of W. Faulkner's works in 1986 moved the edition in the "Literary Monuments" series from category 1.1 to category A; Plato's "Dialogues" (Moscow, Mysl, 1986, 100,000 copies) ended up in the last category.

Therefore, the number of copies printed affects specialized demand, but not mass demand.

In conclusion, we must say that consumer demand for books, the reading public, and the book culture have become quite differentiated, and it is a waste of time for sociologists to try to determine preferences for certain types and genres of literature [1]. It is impossible to speak of preferences for poetry "in general," historical novels "in general," and even science fiction "in general," and it is impossible to attempt only an overview of this kind of demand. Unimaginably complex and contradictory patterns can be hidden in the structure of the book culture. How can these be deciphered? The present system of classification is inadequate.

The book boom is coming to an end. The situation today can be described in brief as "a shortage combined with a glut." The "free book exchange" system, an experiment dictated by the realities of life, is not accessible to everyone, and prices in the book market clearly reveal the "weak points" of the publishing process. The problem is transcending departmental bounds and cannot be solved by instructions from above, however perfect they might seem to be. We feel that the only solution will consist in the development of market relationships, including the publication and distribution of books, the transfer of publishing houses to full economic accountability, and the setting of flexible contract prices for the more popular editions. Without this, we will be unable to cope with the reader's main enemy--shortages.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. We will not discuss the pricing methods used in the book market, although there are many interesting "nuances" here that could be the topic of a separate article.

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## WHO IS RETURNING TO THE COUNTRYSIDE AND WHY

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 2, Mar-Apr 87 (signed to press 17 Mar 87) pp 61-64

[Article by Natalya Veniaminovna Yevteyeva, graduate student specializing in migration at the Institute of Sociological Research, USSR Academy of Sciences]

[Text] In recent years there has been a stronger tendency in our country toward migration from the city to the countryside. In literature this phenomenon is regarded as an indicator of the stabilization of the rural population [2, p 57; 3, p 4]. Many of those who move are people who could not adapt to city life. Who are these people--failures or successes? Are their motives economic or psychological?

We will try to answer these questions with the data of a study we conducted in Kuybyshev in 1984.<sup>1</sup> The main finding was that one out of every three rural migrants intends to return to the countryside to reside there permanently.

What determines the intensity of migration? The main factors are objective circumstances: the existence of available jobs and territorial differences in living conditions. These affect the behavior of the individual indirectly, however, through the system of personal inclinations stemming from his specific situation and the potential for action in it [4, p 6]. Whereas the decision to move to the city is connected primarily with the desire for socio-professional advancement, the return to the countryside depends on several factors which do not regulate migratory behavior in themselves but are interconnected and interdependent: They include the person's gender and age, his reason for moving to the city, his educational status and future plans for education, his professional skills and labor potential, and his attitude toward behavioral models in the local social environment and the prescribed standards of migratory behavior. These factors have a constant and simultaneous effect, but the strength of their influence differs and depends on time, circumstances, sociodemographic features, etc. The total group of these factors determines the degree of adaptation to urban conditions and gives rise to the decision to stay in the city, move to another community, or go back home.

The study showed that men are more likely than women to want to return to the countryside to reside there permanently. They are more attuned to the rural



way of life and value its calm and unhurried rhythm, the chance to do agricultural work, and the straitforwardness of interpersonal relationships. It is naturally more difficult for them to adapt to the conditions of the city, with its dynamic and intense rhythm and impersonal relationships.

Women were more critical of rural life. They are affected more strongly by shortcomings in the social development of the countryside and flaws in its infrastructure. They regard the need to live without household conveniences as one of the main shortcomings of rural life. Besides this, they believe that it is more difficult to find a good job in rural areas. This is the reason for their higher assessment of their own life after their move to the city.

Age also has a significant effect on the final choice of a place of residence. Among the people under 25 whom we surveyed, the ones who left the countryside when they were older were more likely to want to return. Those who left when they were more mature were less likely to want to return. According to our data, there were no "returnees" at all among the people who had arrived in the city after they were 25. The existence of the age threshold (25) is apparently connected with the following circumstances. Some of the young people who came to the city before they were 25 intended to live there temporarily to continue their education and gain professional training. These young people had not made a final decision on where they would live afterward. This decision is influenced greatly by the age at which they left the countryside and the conditions, urban or rural, in which their basic values took shape, including their preferences with regard to a place of residence. The desire to return to the countryside was not as strong in the respondents who moved to the city before they were 17 as in those who were between the ages of 18 and 21 when they moved. In this group, almost one out of every three wanted to return to the rural community, and among those who had lived in the country until they were 22, 23, or 24, it was one out of every two. Those who decide to move to the city after the age of 25 usually intend to settle there permanently. Their decision to move is more thoroughly considered and more definite and is usually connected with a firm preference for urban life.

The majority of those who expressed a desire to return to the countryside came to the city to enroll in an academic institution, acquire a good profession, or find a suitable job (motives connected with social and professional advancement) or to spend their free time in more interesting ways, see new places, and meet new people (emotional motives). These two groups of motives are characteristic of the younger rural migrants and are age-related factors with a temporary effect. Other reasons, such as a negative attitude toward kolkhoz or sovkhoz work and toward agricultural labor in general, are more permanent and prevent a return to the countryside.

The educational levels of the people intending and not intending to return to rural communities are sufficiently equal and display no significant differences. The absolute majority of "returnees" have a secondary education, and one-third have a secondary specialized or partial higher education. There were more people with a partial secondary and higher education among the respondents who did not intend to return to the countryside, and there was a

higher percentage of people with a secondary technical and specialized education among those wishing to return. Therefore, contrary to assumptions, the people who want to return are not failures. Furthermore, respondents with higher educational ambitions were more likely to express an intention to live in rural areas. Among those who were not students at the time of the survey, the percentage of "returnees" was highest in the group of respondents planning to attend a VUZ or tekhnikum--40 percent; the figure was 37 percent in the group planning to attend night school, take preparatory courses, or enroll in an institute; and the percentage was lowest among those with no plans to study--19 percent. Among those who were students at the time of the survey, one out of every three hoped to settle permanently in a rural community.

The nature of labor and professional skills revealed even more differences in the level of potential returns than education. Among workers the percentage of those intending to return to the countryside is much higher than among employees. It declines as the qualifications of respondents rise. The number of "returnees" was highest among semiskilled workers and lowest among specialist employees, with a 2.7-fold difference between the maximum and minimum.

Reasons for leaving an enterprise, such as work in a field other than the person's profession, excessively heavy physical labor, or excessively simple and boring labor, were most closely connected with the intention to return to the countryside. Almost one out of every two respondents who listed these reasons was preparing to leave the city. Among those who were planning to leave the enterprise in connection with poor housing prospects and unsatisfactory earnings, on the other hand, this intention was expressed by one out of every four and one out of every five respectively. We can assume that migrants from rural areas who work in the city in fields other than their own profession and some of those performing heavy physical labor or excessively simple and boring work are people with an agricultural profession or without a specialty who have worked for a long time in agriculture. Studies indicate that young people who arrive in the city without special training and intend to continue their education usually acquire an industrial profession here and display rapid professional advancement [5, pp 128-130; 2, p 88]. On the other hand, older rural migrants without a specialty or with an agricultural profession which cannot be put to use in a city, have to perform heavy physical and unskilled labor or acquire new skills. It is understandable that they have a stronger desire to return. According to our data, 29 percent of those who acquired a profession after moving to the city want to return, but the figure is 50 percent among those who acquired it in rural areas before they moved.

The stereotypes common to a specific social environment have a strong effect on migratory behavior. The decision to migrate is one of the so-called "strong" decisions--decisions of extreme importance to the individual and the people closest to him [4, p 8]. Before making this decision, the person carefully considers all of the pros and cons with a view to personal and social experience. As a result, people are more likely to leave the communities where migration has become a tradition, and in this case only one out of every four intends to return. In the group of respondents from rural communities where migration to the city has decreased in recent years, one out

of every two is thinking about returning; in the intermediate group with a stable level of migration, one out of every three respondents planned to return to the countryside.

We found a direct connection between the intention to return and the presence of people from the same rural community in the respondent's place of employment. Only 11 percent of those who said that many people from their rural community were working with them at the same enterprise intended to return to the countryside, whereas 37 percent of the respondents who did not have any coworkers from their rural community planned to return. Among the migrants from rural communities where the majority of parents do not want their sons and daughters to move to a city, the intention to settle permanently in rural areas was expressed 2 and 2.8 times more frequently, respectively, than in the group where parents approved of the migration of youth. The intention to return is stronger among those who are less independent in making decisions and are financially dependent on their parents.

The final decision on the place of residence often depends on the person's feelings about living with his parents and on the choice of a marriage partner. Among the respondents who believed it was better to live with parents and who preferred to marry someone from a rural community, the intention to return to the country was respectively two and four times as likely to be expressed.

The factors influencing the decision to return to the countryside are largely non-professional and depend little on the degree to which the respondent realizes his labor potential in the city. At the same time, the objective socioeconomic conditions of rural life and the shortcomings of its infrastructure are often deterrents when the final decision is being made. The level of education and the skills of the potential migrant frequently do not correspond to the nature of the work an agricultural enterprise can offer him at the present time. The comprehensive mechanization and automation of agricultural production and the continued rise of its technical level should expand opportunities for the employment of skilled labor. The materials of the 27th party congress refer precisely to this higher technical level and to the stepped-up development of housing, cultural, and consumer construction in rural areas as "an important step in the attainment of the CPSU policy objective of eliminating significant differences between the city and the countryside" [1, p 260]. Stepped-up social development in rural areas should increase the number of jobs having no connection with agricultural labor, and this will improve conditions for the employment of the female half of the population.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. The author conducted the survey in August and September 1984 in line with the procedures developed in the Department of Sociodemographic Affairs of the Institute of Sociological Research, USSR Academy of Sciences [4]. The respondents were workers and employees who were living in the communal housing of the largest enterprises in the city and who had moved from urban and rural communities. A group questionnaire was filled out in the

presence of the researcher by 504 people, including 321 from rural areas. Over 90 percent of the migrants surveyed were under 30 and they were distributed equally according to gender.

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## CONSUMER BEHAVIOR AT A TIME OF SHORTAGES

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 2, Mar-Apr 87 (signed to press 17 Mar 87) pp 65-68

[Article by Yevgeniy Abramovich Dukarevich, senior research associate in the Leningrad Division of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of the Economics of Trade and Management Systems. This is his first article for our journal]

[Text] "Why are there so many customers in stores who do not buy anything?" An article in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA asked this question [2]. According to the estimate cited in the article, only two-thirds of the customers in Gostinyy Dvor, the Leningrad department store, make purchases. This is a much lower figure than before [ibid.]. A public opinion poll in Leningrad in 1984 indicated that the average footwear purchase is preceded by around 15 unproductive trips to stores [3]. The negative effects of the increase in unreasonable expenditures of time<sup>1</sup> are self-evident. This increase should be regarded as one indication of disparities in economic development and a method of consumer adaptation to market imbalances. Besides this, the structure and content of unreasonable expenditures of time have changed in recent years. Their reduction, as speakers noted at the 27th CPSU Congress, is one of the main objectives of our society's social development [1].

Standing in line and traveling to and from the service establishment are regarded as "overhead" elements of shopping time expenditures. These expenditures are simple to calculate in numerical terms and have been studied for a long time, but the productivity of shopping trips, signifying the attainment of the set goal, is equally important. It is a fact that if a trip to a department store results in the purchase of a toothbrush instead of a winter coat, the expenditure of time cannot be called reasonable. Customers frequently do not buy anything at all or buy goods which do not satisfy their requirements in some significant respect. For this reason, a meaningful analysis of shopping time expenditures requires an indicator of the result of shopping trips--for example, the degree of satisfaction [5].

The rationality of shopping time expenditures can be judged by these indicators--total expenditures of time and their productivity.

A poll of the members of a consumer panel,<sup>2</sup> conducted in May and June 1985 with our participation, and several additional studies of consumer behavior

allowed us to calculate the percentage of leather footwear purchases people were obliged to make in the Leningrad market. According to our data, more than 30 percent of all the customers complained about the footwear they purchased, and the figure for elderly women was 50 percent (Table 1). When customers are obliged to purchase footwear by necessity, they incur financial and moral damages. In the case of children and the elderly, this could have a negative effect on their health. Besides this, the "price" of the obligatory purchases includes additional time expenditures: Many of the customers (around 45 percent according to the data of the panel survey) who make this kind of purchase continue the search for what they originally wanted. This is a result of the lack of balance between the supply of consumer goods and effective demand. "At a time...when supply cannot satisfy demand, actual purchases do not reflect demand, but the compulsory purchase of substitutes" [6, p 116]. In our case, the compulsory substitute is unsuitable footwear.

Table 1. Percentage of Customers With Complaints About Purchased Footwear

<u>Customers</u>	<u>Under 30</u>	<u>30-44</u>	<u>45-59</u>	<u>Over 60</u>	<u>Average</u>
Buyers of men's footwear					
Store survey*	28.2	31.9	45.1	36.7	33.0
Panel survey	33.5	36.1	35.9	37.3	35.7
Buyers of women's footwear					
Store survey*	43.5	52.1	38.8	44.8	44.8
Panel survey	31.9	37.7	49.3	50.5	43.0

\* A survey of 855 customers--53.6 percent women and 46.4 percent men--in three specialized footwear stores and department stores in Leningrad in 1984 and early 1985.

This suggests that the augmentation of production and sales on the basis of actual sales figures, without a discerning analysis, could lead (and often does lead) not to the fuller satisfaction of demand, but to the perpetuation or even the exacerbation of disparities.

The inadequate supply of goods is acquiring the nature of a structural imbalance at a time when delivery volumes could meet or even exceed demand. In an expert poll of over 70 specialists in the wholesale and retail footwear trade in Leningrad, violations of contract assortment terms by suppliers were the main complaint (violations of contracted volumes ranked only fourth). The result is a higher demand for items of specific brands, styles, and manufacturers. This is the reason for the increase in unreasonable shopping time expenditures.

This situation is characteristic of the Leningrad leather footwear market. Just as in many other large cities in our country, in Leningrad there is an enterprise occupying a monopoly position--the Skorokhod Production Association, supplying almost 75 percent of the footwear deliveries to the city (in natural terms). Around 25 percent of the footwear comes from abroad, and shipments

from other parts of the country are negligible. The data of the panel survey attest to the extremely low prestige of Skorokhod products in Leningrad. Here is how consumers answered a question about the association: 43.8 percent said "I try not to buy footwear with a Skorokhod label even if I like the way they look"; 43.8 percent said "Skorokhod produces a few modern styles of footwear with imported raw materials, but I do not like most of its products"; 30.5 percent said "I have not noticed any significant changes in footwear styles, almost all of them are outdated"; 19.9 percent said "There has been considerable improvement in the assortment and quality of association footwear in recent years"; 5.6 percent said "Many styles of footwear produced in Leningrad meet fashion requirements and are not inferior to imported items"; 2.7 percent said "Skorokhod is one of our best enterprises and I prefer Leningrad footwear to the products of other footwear firms in the country"; 9.4 percent chose other replies.

As we can see, only 5.6 percent of the respondents felt that the footwear styles of Leningrad factories were not inferior to imported styles. Around 60 percent of the Leningraders, however, have to buy locally produced footwear.

When we looked for differences in consumer opinions based on sex, age, and social status, we found that women, youth, and employees were more critical of products with the Skorokhod label than men, the elderly, and workers.

It is interesting that two-thirds of the Skorokhod assortment is renewed each year (for example, 46 percent of all the footwear in 1984 was marked "N" for new). Nevertheless, many consumers described association products as outdated and boring: 30.5 percent said that they had not noticed any significant change in footwear styles. The number of responses attesting to the improvement of the assortment was lower by a third.

A group of consumers with a preference for imported footwear was singled out in the study of the motivation of footwear choice. These people represented 37.2 percent of the sample group. An analysis indicated that almost 60 percent of women under 30 prefer to wear imported footwear, while the figure for older women is under 20 percent. It is significant that the number of consumers preferring imported footwear is quite high in all sociodemographic groups. This preference was expressed by almost 50 percent of the employees and students, 25 percent of the workers, and 20 percent of the retired individuals.

There are also definite cultural differences between customers with a preference for imported or domestic footwear. This is specifically attested to by the motives governing the choice of footwear (Table 2).

The most significant differences were revealed by the "conformity with fashion" (27.9 percent) and "manufacturer" (20.9 percent) motives. These motives are more likely to be cited by consumers with a preference for imported footwear; they are much less interested in price and durability.

The search for imported footwear stems from considerations of prestige and from the desire to acquire particularly stylish items. Some of these customers are willing to forgo durability, pay higher prices, and to spend much

of their free time on this search. The fact, however, that a choice has to be made between the reasonable use of free time and stylish footwear (or clothing, etc.) is unacceptable, especially now that some consumers are becoming involved in "shady" commercial transactions [7, pp 21-22]. Our information about "second-hand" footwear purchases (from friends and acquaintances) indicates that winter footwear, for example, is purchased in this way by 17.9 percent of the students and 10.1 percent of the employees. In view of the fact that sales of this kind are frequently not speculative, they are considered to be admissible by part of the population.

Table 2. Consumer Opinions Regarding Motives for Choice of Women's Everyday Footwear

Motives	Consumer groups, % responding		Deviation
	Preferring imported footwear (n = 948)	No preference for imports (n = 1,308)	
External appearance	77.2	64.4	12.8
Conformity with fashion	64.2	36.3	27.9
Acceptable price	47.7	58.5	-10.8
Durability	46.0	50.0	-4.0
Manufacturer	40.8	19.9	20.9

Footwear is also sold in specialized salons: Over 14 percent of the retired women and more than 10 percent of the working women buy their winter footwear there. Only 70-75 percent of the consumers buy winter footwear in stores, and these purchases are usually not made "in season" but whenever this footwear can be found, which presupposes repeated trips to stores. According to our data, this is how purchases are made by two-thirds of the consumers wearing mainly imported footwear. Among the people with a preference for domestic footwear, the percentage buying it in season is 2.5-3.5 times as high (for different types) as in the group preferring imports.

Therefore, seemingly unrelated phenomena--obligatory purchases, elements of the "shadow" economy, and unreasonable expenditures of time--reveal internal connections.

The relative saturation of the consumer goods market in terms of volume and the shortage of stylish, high-quality goods intended for specific groups of consumers engender three basic types of consumer behavior:

I--frequent but unproductive trips to stores ("the customers who do not buy anything");

II--the purchase of goods outside official channels of distribution (from friends, acquaintances, etc.);

III--the acquisition of goods which do not completely satisfy the consumer (the "obligatory purchase"); this kind of purchase can be regarded as an intermediate stage preceding the first and second types of behavior.



This is the current situation. Obviously, it is far removed from the complete attainment of the objectives the party has set for light industry and trade. Under present conditions, ideal consumer behavior consists primarily in surmounting shortages. In addition to everything else, this means that the person comes to a store in the certainty that he will buy what he needs for the amount of money he has.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. A few years ago, V.D. Patrushev concluded that the reduction of the time spent satisfying consumer needs had slowed down, and that these time expenditures had even increased in some cities [4].
2. The family consumer panel consisting of around 6,000 families was set up in 1980 by the Leningrad Division of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of the Economics of Trade and Management Systems. A series of projects were conducted from 1981 to 1985 to study the demand of Leningraders for consumer goods under the supervision of Candidate of Technical Sciences A.V. Kondyreva and Candidate of Economic Sciences A.Ya. Pishchanok. In the 1985 survey, 3,938 questionnaires were processed.

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## OPENNESS AS A CONDITION OF EFFECTIVE LEGAL PROPAGANDA

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 2, Mar-Apr 87 (signed to press 17 Mar 87) pp 71-73

[Article by Viktor Pavlovich Lozbyakov, candidate of juridical sciences, chief of the Political Department of the Moscow Higher Militia School of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, and militia colonel. This is his first article for our journal]

[Text] Who should the target of legal indoctrination, propaganda, and education be? The answer seems obvious--anyone who does not have special legal training, any non-jurist.

I shared this misconception for several years, but today I would like to publicly disagree with it. Even the superprofessionals, the kind of superprofessionals that judges and supervisors of militia investigative subdivisions, for instance, should be, even they need continuous legal indoctrination, and I know this from my own experience. I am not speaking of continuous legal education, the need for which is obvious to everyone, but of indoctrination.

There is no question that each person should be well versed in law, but the legal knowledge of those who enforce the law each day and who deal with laws of exceptional social importance--the legislative acts and statutes pertaining to all of the personal rights and obligations of the citizen--is of special social significance.

To illustrate these common precepts, I will cite some facts. In the present atmosphere of openness these facts should be common knowledge. Here is the first of these facts. In an article in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, our well-known journalist O.G. Chaykovskaya relates an incident which took place in a rayon in Bryansk Oblast. The party raykom buro was discussing the situation resulting from the principled position taken by the local prosecutor. During the discussion the first secretary exclaimed: "Let us approach this from the party standpoint instead of the legal standpoint." This is an extremely indicative remark. It reflects the frame of mind of some party personnel who believe in some kind of higher authority, superior to that prescribed by law. This is a dangerous misconception.

Here is the second fact. The issue of a progressive inheritance tax has recently been the subject of lively discussions in the press. This means that

anyone whom fate has granted considerable material wealth (the son of an academician, for example, or the daughter of a marshal) will give it up to the state. The discussion itself is not objectionable. There are no forbidden subjects. But something else is amazing: Among the names of the authors of these proposals I found the name of a sociologist with a doctoral degree. This seems extremely indicative. When it comes to legal knowledge, a high-ranking sociologist can be as dense as Auntie Dusya with her 2 years of elementary school education. Of course, education cannot be equated with knowledge of the law. Auntie Dusya might be far more aware than some social scientists of the immutable social value of the universality of the law, the fact that it is binding for all state officials and for the smart and the stupid, the "rich" and the "poor," for everyone without exception. From her own experience, from the historical memory of her generation, Auntie Dusya knows that if someone can take a thousand rubles away from someone else today, they might take away her hard-earned hundred rubles tomorrow. No, Auntie Dusya would say to us, let the individual and his property remain inviolable. What do we see here? Is it possible that the legal thinking of an uneducated woman is of a higher level than that of a professional thinker, a doctor of philosophical sciences? It would seem so. It never occurs to the sociologist that when he insists on restricting the heir's rights, he is going against the will of the people, as recorded in the Basic Law: The state must protect citizens from encroachments against their personal property (articles 13, 57). Our colleague is proposing the direct opposite: He is proposing that the state reduce the property of its citizens by half instead of protecting it. Should this be called a knowledge of socialist law?

Every plus starts out as a minus before it is crossed out. Inheritance is not as simple a matter as the respected sociologist thinks. Would the restriction of inheritance rights not discourage people from working hard and passing on a legacy? Can a law which protects the property rights of some and not of others be called just? What are the possible consequences of this kind of selectivity, this subversion of the universal applicability of the law? What will the state gain from this and what will it lose? These questions have not been answered.

Here is the third fact. By law any building plan has to be approved by a state board of experts before the construction can begin. Even the addition of a bath to a summer house is no exception and requires a permit from a local soviet. Alas, Jupiter can do what the bull cannot do. This is what the heads of a union department, the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources, decided. The notorious plan to reroute the northern rivers had not been approved before billions of rubles' worth of construction work had already begun. The ministry even went so far as to violate the sovereignty of an autonomous republic: The government of the Komi ASSR opposed the plan.

Here is the fourth fact. I am looking at some criminal cases which have been dropped. On what grounds? Here they are: "The prospects for a trial are not good," "Any further investigation is unadvisable," "No damages were incurred," "The victim was at fault." The procedures of criminal law list specific grounds for dropping cases, but they do not include any of the reasons listed above. This is a case of legal ignorance on the part of the personnel of investigative subdivisions.

As we can see, there are gaps in the legal knowledge of people outside the groups traditionally regarded as the focus of legal propaganda. The need for legal knowledge is universal. It is needed by party personnel, by ministers, and by doctors of science. Jurists are no exception to this rule.

The inadequate legal knowledge of administrative personnel, the insufficient public awareness of the laws, and the attempts of officials to circumvent legal provisions cost the society too much and could lead to the loss of billions of rubles. The society has a right to maintain respect for the law by any means at its disposal. The main one, in my opinion, is openness. The atmosphere it creates in government and in all establishments and organizations is fundamentally different from the one we are relentlessly striving to eliminate today. In an atmosphere of openness, the individual has a double responsibility--to his superiors and to the public. The merits of openness are innumerable. One of them is particularly valuable: It paves the way to exemplary law and order and the unconditional observance of the laws. It also makes legal propaganda more persistent and effective, and I feel that the extensive discussion of judicial practice is the best form of this propaganda. In this context, the proposed publication of a judicial newspaper seems quite promising. Incidentally, there was a newspaper of this kind in prerevolutionary Russia. The last issue came out in 1906.

In the broader context, I must say that not enough has been done to legally secure openness. Paradoxically, no legal decision has been made on the status of the mass media, but many legal problems have been accumulating in this area. We need a law on the press. A draft law of this kind has been gathering dust in the union Ministry of Justice for more than 10 years. The time seems right to shake the dust off. The press is now a powerful instrument of restructuring and it warrants the attention of the legislator.

We have learned to make good laws and now we must learn to execute them well. This is something everyone should learn, including the legislator. It would be intolerable if constitutional provisions were to be suspended or to be ineffective as a result of the legislator's inaction. I will explain what I mean. This year it will be 10 years since the Basic Law was adopted. Through these 10 years Article 58 has been purely declarative. It says, in particular: "Any action by an official which violates the law, exceeds his authority, or restricts the rights of citizens can be appealed in the courts." But where is the normative act in which this procedure is established? There is no such law. Not yet. And if someone petitions the courts to reason with a high-handed bureaucrat, no action will be taken. There is a constitutional article, but there are no specific court procedures.

In this context, I must say that contradictions of this kind are fairly common. Sound statewide decisions are made, but financial agencies, for example, are still operating according to instructions which no longer meet the requirements of the times but have never been rescinded. I think that slow and inefficient lawmaking is seriously impeding our restructuring efforts. Conflicting legal instruments are doing much to inhibit our progress and are having an adverse effect on the legal indoctrination of the population. It is a bad thing when laws put the cart before the horse, but it is even worse when the law does not keep in step with the times and impedes scientific, technical, and social progress.

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## THE MARRIAGE BOND AND THE FREEDOM BOND

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[Article by Yelena Konstantinovna Tokareva, member of the USSR Union of Journalists, SELSKAYA MOLODEZH special correspondent, and author of the books "Zemlya v nasledstvo" [Inheriting the Land] (1986) and "Epizod iz lichnoy zhizni" [A Personal Experience] (1987). This is her first article for our journal]

[Text] Family studies have traditionally focused either on married or divorced couples. Furthermore, in the latter case specialists have usually concentrated on the time when he and she were still together but the divorce was looming ahead. Besides this, there was another group which always aroused the interest of specialists. This was the group of young men and women who had made a firm decision to unite their futures with the marriage bond. Bachelors rarely aroused the interest of researchers.

This essay on bachelors I have written for the sociologists who read this journal is the result of personal observation and an analysis of the letters I have received in response to my articles in publications for the general reading public.

There is the opinion that single people, in contrast to married people, are wholly devoted to their jobs and that the society benefits greatly from their work. Can work be a substitute for marriage? Should it be a substitute? And should the single person be evaluated only from the standpoint of the public interest? Is it possible that the increasing number of unmarried people is a symptom of almost imperceptible but extremely important social processes?

We will try to answer all of these questions.

Let us consider the example of a man of around 40, an attractive man with a good salary and an apartment of his own, one of the men with no bad habits. He has everything, and he is alone. He cooks for himself, he takes his own clothes to the laundry, he shops for his own shirts and suits. He spends his holidays with married friends, who care about him and have tried to find him a bride from among the single and divorced women they know. But there is no pleasing him. He has liked some of the women and has spent time with them,

but he eventually breaks up with them. He always has the same reason: They would not make good wives. But why not? A bachelor is hard to please. He is hampered by experience, so to speak. Besides this, making choices is agonizing for many people. When a young person falls in love, especially for the first time, it is not a matter of choice. He is led by his emotions. But when the passions of youth die down and opportunities still exist (there are enough single women who want to be married), the person suffers from an embarrassment of choices. Think about it: You place an ad or fill out a questionnaire and you receive 50 letters in response. What do you do? Let us say you meet the first woman and you like her, but you have 49 meetings to go. Why would you stop at the first?

This is the best description of the situation of the average bachelor. It is just that these 50 meetings are spread out over his whole lifetime. So what if the "first meeting" was the best or even the only one? At 45 or at 18, the bachelor thinks that the best meeting is still to come. He feels like a suitor at all times and in all situations. This peculiar state of mind is a strain on the person's emotions and physical energy because he must always be prepared to outshine all the others and to display not his real inner self, but his "best side."

The bachelor is always searching and waiting for a lucky circumstance. He overestimates his own emotional strength and his immunity to the problems of life. Someone once said that marriage is for the weak. The bachelor who believes this thinks he is dealing with life's problems on his own, without relying on additional sources of strength, without any contribution from others and without any sharing of responsibilities. In addition to all of this, the bachelor must do without the warmth and affection of children.

Have you ever heard a confirmed bachelor complain about being alone? No, the bachelor is proud. He will not whine or cry. On the contrary, he will say that he is the envy of his friends who are saddled with families. After all, he does not have to depend on anyone, he can stay out as long as he wants, he has no shortage of women, and he even looks healthier than his married friends. In short, the bachelor is convinced that his way of life is better than the married man's way of life. This is why he is a confirmed bachelor. Almost every bachelor, however, bears a deeply submerged grudge against the female sex. This resentment sometimes comes out in the vulgar terms and accusing tone the bachelor uses in conversations about women.

"It seems to me that the rise in the number of bachelors is directly proportional to the improvement of living conditions. The successful bachelor is a common phenomenon. Sufficiency is leading to cynicism and alienation." N.V. Misheneva (Yalta). "It is interesting that all of the 'old maids' and 'old bachelors' have recently disappeared and have been replaced by 'unattached women' and 'confirmed bachelors.' There are around 15 of these 'unattached' and 'confirmed' people living in our building." N.K. Romanko (Kuybyshev).

"I would like to add the timid voice of an old bachelor to the many voices arguing about demographic issues. I simply cannot understand why a higher birthrate is being encouraged. And I am amazed that it is being encouraged

in Moscow. The only thing we have a surplus of is people. The result is the unbearable overcrowding of public transportation, crowded streets and stores, and interminable lines of people waiting to buy some dill or to borrow a book from the Lenin Library. Why should we add our children to this floundering mob? We should try to correct the stupid mistakes of our predecessors in past centuries and our contemporaries and return people to nature and to themselves. The tens of thousands of thinking Muscovites who have deliberately stayed single would probably agree with me." I.K., 46 years old.

"His majesty the bachelor' is above all a lonely person. The depths of the bachelor's soul should not be judged by his behavior. The contemporary bachelor or his female equivalent, the confirmed spinster without children, is usually a plain-looking person. The handsome gadabout is a different matter. A plain appearance is a serious misfortune, and in combination with the unhealthy views of others with regard to the bachelor's behavior, it does much to explain the state of his mind. It is actually unforgivable for a bachelor to feel depressed. 'You have no family,' other people reason, 'so who could have spoiled your mood?' The bachelor is usually required only to be discreet. Married people are reluctant to invite a bachelor over, especially when the couple cannot get along. Bachelors are passed over at work. The bachelor is a lonely man and deserves as much attention as the married man. One of the signs of public concern about the bachelor is the institution of 'dating services' and of personal columns in advertising bulletins. One problem is that the people performing this important work have low standards. Nothing has been done yet to form the correct public opinion of the 'dating services.' People who apply to them are often ridiculed and insulted by other members of their labor collective." V. Prishchepa (Sverdlovsk).

"People should not marry until they are ready. My son is 25 and a bachelor, but not because he is an egoist. He simply does not feel ready to marry. Where would he live? He and I share a one-room apartment. If he had a child there would be no room for a crib. And it will be a long time before I retire...." V.P. (Kirov).

The documented evidence of public opinion cited above underscores the main point of my discussion. What keeps men from starting a family? On the surface, it might seem that unremarkable features, a low salary, and poor housing conditions are the main reasons, but I think there is no need to quote from other letters which present the opposite point of view and say that a wonderful family came into being and survived on a student grant, in remote areas or in rented rooms. I am sure to hear the rejoinder that love made the difference. The idea that a person cannot start a family unless he is in love is also voiced in many letters, but I feel that bachelors are sly and conceal their main reasons for staying single. A more typical situation is described for us in the letter from the mother of the future "old bachelor" who is now only 25. The mother is afraid that the son will marry and will disrupt her home. This is not the least of the reasons why people stay single and waste the golden years of their youth. Many bachelors are the product of their parents' values and subculture.

Women are more likely to blame their single state not on themselves, but on the circumstances of their life and on other people. This might even be true. Women are more inclined than men to care about the opinions of their relatives and the other people around them. Besides this, it is a well-known fact that the Great Patriotic War disrupted the demographic balance in our country by depriving many women of actual or potential husbands. Today, however, we are concerned with the men and women of the "generation of plenty." We have learned that in our day, now that women supposedly feel equal to men, there is a small but loud and sometimes confused group of spinsters or "suffragettes" who have no wish whatsoever to marry. Their requirements are impossible to meet. The kind of men they are looking for simply do not exist in real life. We can only regard these women as part of the cost of emancipation. Women are still having trouble finding themselves and developing their own style and line of behavior in today's society. This sometimes makes conflicting demands on them. On the one hand, it does not appear that anyone has relieved women of their traditional duties, but on the other, competing with the young at work and in school has aroused women's fighting instincts, and the ambition to achieve professional status equal to that of men has diminished the importance of their previously primary family concerns. Today little girls are often raised not to be the ideal wife, but to gain admission to an institute and find a prestigious job. In many families, if a daughter announces wedding plans in her freshman year, she is encouraged to change her mind: "There will be plenty of time for marriage. Now you had better concentrate on your education!" This divergence in views has sealed the fate of more than one old maid.

Before I continue this discussion of various types of bachelorhood and bachelors, I would like to quote from another letter. It is interesting because it sheds light on some obscure aspects of public thinking and demonstrates one example of female myth-making, the final result of the immature thinking of representatives of mankind's better half.

"It is not a specific person we cannot live without, but a dummy in the 'happy family' showcase, the smiling father in the glossy photograph of 'Sunday breakfast.' Even when we are completely independent in all spheres of life, we somehow cannot conceive of happiness without a humiliating reliance on men. And for some reason, all of the Russian women who curse all men light up with joy and pride when they bear a son. We should bear daughters and teach them to stay afloat in our life of joys and sorrows and not judge their qualities by the presence or absence of 'someone in pants.' Is it possible that there is no other outlet for our feelings of love and tenderness? Do we not have children? And what if we have no one to rely on? The resources of the soul are inexhaustible, and if we discard the myth of the husband as a pillar of strength, the husband as a brick wall, we will find many real values on which we can rely without fear of betrayal or disillusionment. We are being hurt by the common belief that happiness requires a complete family. This is why we knock ourselves out, use various tricks, and humiliate ourselves in our attempts to maintain an image that ceased to be valid long ago." Natalya Khatkina, 30-year-old librarian who lives with her 4-year-old daughter Masha and 8-year-old dog Greta (Donetsk).



What is this? A harbinger of the future woman's attitude toward the family and marriage? Or is this a letter from a woman whose own marriage has failed and who tends to generalize from her own experience? Men usually respond with indignation to letters of this kind. Let us give one of them the floor.

"In real life and on the screen we have seen many 'industrious,' 'energetic' and 'strange' women and we are already used to their aggressive vulgarity. The woman who 'smokes, drinks, and swears' has become just as typical as the legendary one who 'stops the galloping horse and rushes into the burning cottage.' Today's woman demands 'a million red roses' and complete self-denial, but what can she give in return? Fidelity? No, she is 'strange'! A cozy home? No, she is 'industrious' and does not have the time. Tenderness and the ability to empathize? No, after all, she is 'energetic'! Chekhov's 'Dushechka' had a quality that is rare in today's women--she was able to love a man for himself, and not for what he could do for her. She loved the entrepreneur, the veterinarian, and the young gymnast to the point of obsession, self-denial, and distraction, but she loved them! Today's woman will consult a prestigious sex therapist or will discuss the possibility of keeping her marriage alive with a psychologist. Is there a difference? ...Today's women cry just as much as their predecessors did a hundred years ago, but in contrast to them, they know exactly what they want to achieve with their tears. Tears are used as an argument in a family spat, but we 'confirmed' or 'compelled' bachelors have somehow retained the habit of regarding tears as a display of emotion, even as evidence that the woman's heart has been wounded. We are suffering from arrested development, from retardation.... I do not like Alla Pugacheva's songs because I associate the 'lyrical heroine' the singer portrays on the stage with many 'modern' women. Just think of how obscene she made Shakespeare's sonnet sound. Brazenness, coarseness, vulgarity, and simple bad taste were apparent in the performance where she sang 'with a group of trained plumbers' and streams of water flowed from the stage." G.B. Saltun (Petrozavodsk).

The mutual accusations of the sexes, as we can see, are growing harsher and no longer apply only to styles of clothing or behavior. They now touch upon the personality features of today's woman or man. We must say that married people take almost no part in these arguments, and their attitude toward the opposite sex is more indulgent and understanding. I think that this fact deserves special consideration. It is possible that this uncompromising nature, this inability to accept the human personality, especially in the opposite sex, is the main feature of the "phenomenon of the bachelor" of either sex. We have no reason to say that all bachelors are egoists, but we can confidently say that the inability to compromise in interpersonal relations is characteristic of an exceptionally high percentage of bachelors. This is why they relentlessly criticize the opposite sex and demand changes in it. Here is another example in another letter from a man.

"Take a normal man of my age for example; a man without any bad habits, a married man. Why is it that these men are often so frankly envious of my bachelor status? And why am I naturally in no hurry to join this envious army? Let us take it as an obvious fact that a man expects a woman to have precisely the qualities that make her a woman. In other words, he expects

her to be tender, affectionate, gentle, feminine, faithful, loyal, sensitive, even weak, if you will. Alas, it turns out that these are precisely the qualities that are being discarded like useless trash as the woman of today rapidly grows increasingly coarse, a process she refers to as emancipation.

"And here is an interesting fact. Before the strains of Mendelssohn's wedding march seal the relationship, a woman is capable of displaying many, if not all, of the qualities listed above. But as soon as she has a wedding ring on her finger, it is all over! These qualities are no longer needed, and the woman, fully aware that her rights (but not her obligations) are guaranteed by law, that motherhood is sacred, and that divorce, if it comes to that, could cost her husband his career and put a great strain on his nerves, begins to manifest features that are the opposite of those listed above.

"Look into the faces of the modern women of 'marriage age.' You will see impatience expressed there, because they are in a rapacious hurry to get everywhere--to the store for a vest and boots; to the theater for a popular play; to the rink to sign a child up for figure skating lessons; to the tobacco stand for cigarettes; to a health club for some fresh air; to a book store for a drawing for signed copies of books with pretty covers. In short, they are in a hurry to acquire anything they can flaunt. Of course, I deliberately exaggerated, but I did this for the sole purpose of advising women to take a good look at themselves!" Bogushev, Sergey Ivanovich, 28-year-old auditor in a financial planning agency (Kaluga).

Take note of the authority with which this man discusses the premarital and postmarital behavior of women. This example indicates that many respectable youths and young men are frightened of the stereotypes created and perpetuated by more "educated" men. The seeds of this education fall on particularly fertile soil when the person has been taught from birth or infancy to hold himself in the highest esteem. It is significant that not one of the letters sent to the editors by men says anything about the husband's obligations to his wife and family--anything about what might be called appropriate male behavior. Each and every letter, however, contains complaints about the female sex and the female way of life: Women are too coarse, and too energetic--they are leaving us behind.... Complaints like these can also be found in the letter from Sergey Bogushev from Kaluga. Look at his long list of duties and jobs the woman of "marriage age with a rapacious expression" performs. The number of these duties might explain why the wife ceases to be tender "after Mendelssohn." She is smothered under the weight of family obligations which her young husband is in no hurry to share.

In essence, the egotistical position of the bachelor and the hostile manner in which he behaves with prospective brides, affecting the air of an examiner who grits his teeth to keep from falling in love accidentally and sends his intended first into the kitchen so that she can demonstrate, as if she were performing on the "Come On, Girls!" program, the art of the quick preparation of a full-course meal, and then sends her to the sewing machine to see if she can sew him a pair of trousers--this manner provokes the woman to play dishonest games with this kind of suitor. Before the wedding she turns cartwheels in the culinary arts, but after the wedding he rushes to the nearest

restaurant. The hope of finding a partner of "equivalent value" to the suitor with an incredibly high assessment of his own worth often causes a person to stay a suitor forever. This is just as dangerous for men as for women. The single state is not completely harmless because it eventually gives rise to egoism as a result of years of self-accommodation, self-preoccupation, and the tendency to elevate one's own tastes to the status of laws and rules. Here is a letter from Riga, suggesting that I discuss the female bachelor. The letter is entitled "Her Majesty the Spinster."

"I am using the term 'spinster' to refer to women who are far beyond 30, have never been married, and have no children. There are more spinsters than bachelors. I met one at the 'Over 30' club. I cannot say that she was wild about me. Ardent desire can hardly be expected from a woman of her age. After all, she was 38 herself. But she was interested in me: a pleasant-looking man, not a drunk, an engineer by profession. Although it is not a very lucrative profession in comparison to piece-work, it is still prestigious. She had been deeply depressed for several years because her marriage prospects were so dim, even though she was attractive, well-proportioned, and young-looking.

"We spent the first few weeks telling each other about our past experiences and future plans, and then I frankly told her: 'You are 8 years younger than I, and you need a husband and child as soon as possible.' I did not want to have a third child, because I already have two. It is true that they are grown now--18 and 20. I had just been divorced and was in no hurry to marry again because I had still 'not gotten over' my ex-wife. She insisted on dates, and they eventually led to a sexual relationship. I asked her not to get pregnant. She promised she would not. She deceived me from the very beginning by planning a child in advance. When I learned she was pregnant, she refused to have an abortion.

"The child was born. You must not think that I neglected them. I fell in love with the baby. I went to see him in the maternity home and visited her there every day. I was happy to wash his diapers, shirts, and crawlers. I spent all of my spare time and my days off doing housework. Without any help I put new floors in all three rooms of her vacation home. In general, I spent a whole year working hard. Now the child is over a year old. But we are still not registered and, as you will see, never will be. And my little Igor will be a fatherless child, an orphan with a living father, another victim of Her Majesty the Spinster. I get a lump in my throat when I think of the unfortunate child. Four out of every ten babies are fatherless. This has not happened since the first years of the war.

"But let me tell you what happened to us. After playing the role of an obliging individual to perfection during the first months I knew her, my spinster turned out to be the exact opposite. I initiated the divorce from my first wife because of her scandalous behavior. Alas, the spinster is far worse. The tone she usually uses when she addresses me is the tone of a public prosecutor. There is no other way to describe it. And I am not the only one. This is also how she treats her 74-year-old mother, whom she is literally hounding to death. She calls her mother lazy and stupid, and

always at the top of her lungs. I must say that her lazy mother fixes her lunch every day, washes the child's clothes, and takes care of him.

"The hardest thing to deal with, however, is that she will not allow people to have any opinions contrary to her own. The child can only be hurt by this kind of upbringing. Here are some of her child-rearing principles; judge for yourself: No fresh air and no walks for the child; no ventilation of the apartment; no discussions or books about child psychology; no potty training; no putting the child down for a nap in any other way than by rocking him in her arms; the restriction of the child's movements in the apartment, for reasons having to do with sterile conditions. And here are her household commandments: She is the director in the apartment, while we are merely household members and we cannot and must not go against her wishes; we are obligated to serve her, but she has no obligations to us; walks in the fresh air and skiing are for loafers, and it is much better to stay home and read a book; she does not like sports and has not been to the beach for years although she lives in a coastal city.

"The thing she hates the most is advice and suggestions from other people. She is incredibly petty. As soon as I cross the threshold, she tells me that I put my slippers in the wrong place when I left for work, I hung the key in the wrong place, I do not wash properly, my after-shave lotion is too strong, the cakes smell of machine oil, etc. When we go out, however, she hypocritically pretends that we are a 'happy couple.'"

I will not reprint the entire letter because it is a long one. Here is the author's summarization: The majority of spinsters who have a long-awaited child fall into approximately the same pattern in their lifestyles. If they do not have a husband and family by the time they are 35, they are unfit to marry and to raise children. Many men wonder whether it makes sense to become attached to this kind of person even if she does not have children but does have an apartment, a car, a vacation home, a profession, and good looks. My correspondent goes on to inform me that he and this "spinster" are amazingly compatible in their intimate relations and that he is sorry in general to let such a good bride slip through his fingers.

We have known for a long time that public opinion takes shape in strange ways and that even if there are few such women among our sisters, they stand out in the minds of men and cause them to make unflattering generalizations. We recognize the woman described by the author of the letter from Riga as an obligatory, not confirmed, spinster. This is precisely why she finally decided to have a child and is even trying to build something like a family. This is simply a bad-tempered woman with a grudge.

Now I want to give the floor to a woman of the prewar generation. As we know, their plans for their life were made under the influence of a different demographic situation: The male population was decimated by the war; women did not work in those days but were raised to be mothers and wives and to take care of the house. Even the women who grew up right after the war had mothers who taught them to be like the women of earlier generations. Here is a letter (written partially in the form of a story) from a woman who grew up in the 1940's.



"We should not blame the bachelors! Can we say that the catastrophic growth of their numbers has not been promoted by women themselves, who enter into casual and irresponsible relationships 'without a period of courtship,' vigorously strive to get a certain stamp on their identification cards in any way possible, and then make unilateral demands with regard to family obligations? If women could stop patterning their relationships with men on the relationship between the hunter and his game, if they could show self-respect and be capable of giving and loving, they could evoke reciprocal feelings in the hearts of the most inveterate bachelors without even trying, and these bachelors would then give up their hateful freedom and begin doing things for them, getting things for them, taking them places, and meeting their needs happily and voluntarily and would even praise their 'beetless borsch.' Furthermore, after 10 years of married life there would always be fresh flowers in their homes even in the frosts of February. In short, would it not be better, friends, to take the advice you hand out to the bachelors?" Avdeyeva, Lyudmila Yevgenyevna (Moscow).

We will read letters of a different kind later, but now I would like to talk about my visit to the Moscow Gorispolkom, where I spoke to Alla Fedorovna Severina, the head of the family and marriage department, to learn her views on the special personal ad section of the newspaper in Moscow. I also wanted to learn whether official organizations responsible for strengthening the family have their own attitude toward the problem of the single individual. I wanted to know, for example, whether a "marriage newspaper" would be published in the near future and whether it would be worthwhile to establish a network of clubs and cafes where single people could meet and get to know one another in an informal setting. A.F. Severina scornfully dismissed my timid suggestions of ways to help unsettled people settle down and said that questions of this kind are traditional in general for our brother the journalist, that the family and marriage department had enough trouble working with families, especially large ones, and that she personally saw no special problems or dangers in the state of the bachelor. Let him take care of himself because it is probably his own fault that he is single. Of course, there is some truth in what Alla Fedorovna said, but the problem of the bachelor cannot be ignored now that bachelorhood is gradually becoming the norm. The other side of bachelorhood is the increase in partial families--that is, single mothers.

For many years when I studied the bachelor state, I interviewed bachelors to learn their feelings about their single status, about women, and about their possible paternity. I would like to cite some of their responses. For example, there was a 60-year-old divorced man who had lived alone for 15 years. When I asked him how it felt to be single, he replied that he rarely lived alone, because he loved women and they felt the same way about him, but he could not live with one woman for more than a year (on the average); even within a single year he preferred to have relationships with several women because he craved variety. He divided all women into two categories: those who aroused him and whom he wanted as sexual partners, and those he "did not like." He also said that the women who aroused him frequently did not meet his specifications for a wife. The former were usually vulgar women with bad taste, coarse and shameless women. A wife, in his opinion,

would have to be an affectionate, meek, cheerful, and caring woman and a good cook. It would seem that this bachelor's single state was due to the divergence of his sexual and "living" ideals. Where does this divergence come from? This is probably a matter for medical experts and social psychologists to investigate. The personality of the bachelor contains a multitude of secrets to be "deciphered."

In most cases, the bachelor who finally marries is motivated by his desire for children. The weddings of people who marry in their forties usually take place after a child is born or immediately before the birth. The pregnancy of the woman and her desire to give birth are the deciding factor even if they are an indication (at first glance!) of duress. The bachelor is indecisive and he is therefore prone to regard the conception of a child as divine intervention.

Bachelors in their thirties are not as sentimental. The birth of a child "out of wedlock" cannot compel them to marry. They still have hopes for a great and passionate love and they regard the child as an obstacle.

In general, the moral purity of the bachelor is a legend invented by the bachelor. The bachelor does not look for a bride in the library or on the tennis court. He judges the sexual compatibility of all contenders in his own home. And then he concocts the myth of his own innocence.

Readers informed me of another aspect of bachelorhood: The married bachelor reproduces his own psychological portrait in his child.

"My husband has always been suspicious of women, but he has been flattered by their attention and has not alienated them immediately. I got pregnant, but he did not ask me to marry him. When it was almost time for the baby to be born, it did not seem right to not provide the child with a full set of biographical particulars. We went to the registry office and began living together. I did not ask him for anything. I did not take offense at his reluctance to marry me and I prepared myself emotionally to take responsibility for everything, especially the child. I was certain that in our country it would not be a disaster if I were to remain single, as long as I prepared myself to surmount all difficulties. He apparently appreciated this and was not afraid to assume the marriage bond. Actually, it was more that he assumed these obligations in the belief that if things did not work out, he could get a divorce without any trouble--I would not try to hang on to him. And this is how we lived. He minded his own business and I minded my own. When I asked for help around the house, he would sometimes help, but he usually refused and I would immediately retreat. Our relationship was like this: If he did not treat me badly, I did everything for him, especially in our intimate relations. If he was indifferent, I did what I had time to do, without overexerting myself. But in our intimate relations--it was arctic ice combined with submission (I will not go into the details). I did not start any fights or arguments but I did not conceal our relationship from our friends. I stated the facts in concise and humorous terms, as if in passing, but they were caustic remarks. I could see that it annoyed him that his wife did not keep his treatment of her a secret and was not afraid to appear unloved. But

the highest payment for his good treatment was love and trust, and not slavish fawning or 'service.' We lived this way for 20 years. I did not lose his respect over the years, although it was naturally tenuous in the beginning. He had had bad experiences with women in casual relationships and he took it out on me, but what he saw in me was self-sufficiency. He saw that I did not want to lean on his broad shoulders and did not plan to take advantage of his 'noble action.' We had financial difficulties, but we were never hungry, even though he never made any effort to earn extra money or to get us our own apartment (we rented rooms).

"But do you know what eventually happened? I did not have any more children because I had no intention of burdening him any further. What is more, I got used to being a married woman with a single status. Sometimes he tells me that I do not appreciate the family. This is true. He is not a bad father to our son. Of course it is true that they did not need each other until the boy was about 10. Then it became interesting to spend time with him, and now they are great friends. My husband has begun to take care of me. He helps me, he feels sorry for me, he even gets jealous. But I feel almost nothing. Again, I have to say almost, because it would be even worse without a family. I observe life, but I am not living. And my husband sometimes says: 'Well, Mother, these last 20 years have not been bad for us.' And I must honestly say that they seem to have been all right. Our son is honest and upright, but he is an egoist deep down inside and cannot empathize with other people's pain, even though he would never go out of his way to hurt anyone. He is an odd sort of indifferent person. I do not envy my future daughter-in-law and I pity her in advance. I hope God gives her enough sense to settle for peaceful coexistence. You will probably say that this woman has never known love. You are wrong. I was carried away several times, and quite easily. But it was all emotional and it is not reflected in my family. I only regret that my whole life will be taken up by this 'peaceful coexistence.' If you like, please develop the theme of the 'bachelor's wife.'" Yevgeniya Vasilyevna (Volgograd).

This is a typical case of a bachelor getting married "for the sake of the child." In simple and frank terms and with estimable dignity, the author tells of her difficult life with a distrustful and cold man who began to value his wife after many years. She calmly tells how her love died and turned into "peaceful coexistence." She did not want to break up the family because she was afraid that her son would be left fatherless. As a result, she acquired another egoist.

I will go on to state a frankly trivial belief, because nothing is worth more than a "simple truth" learned through great suffering. There is a multitude of reasons why people do not marry, but if we try to look through all of them for the main cause, it will be the same in each case. Each bachelor is fore-ordained and created primarily by a woman, and each spinster is created by a man. If we disregard material conditions, what reasons for the emergence of the phenomenon of the bachelor remain? Stereotypes of male and female behavior remain and reproduce the reluctance to marry. This and only this is mentioned in every single one of the letters cited here at length.

I have saved a letter from Baku, which seems to me to be the apotheosis of bachelorhood, for last. Here it is.

"I am one of the silent ones. I do not like to get involved in discussions and I am fairly skeptical of newspaper debates. I wanted to remain uninvolved in your discussion of bachelors as well, but I could not. The fact is that I am one of those people some readers call the lucky ones. And it is true that on the surface everything might look that way. I wear brand-new clothes, I buy books, and I do not miss any plays. I would not say that I have reached the pinnacle, but I do not get into debt either. Occasionally I have friends over and we listen to music. But this is what might be called the tip of the iceberg. There is also the unseen portion, and this is what I would like to discuss. I am already 50 years old. I live with my mother. She retired long ago, she is ill, she rarely gets out of bed, and her eyesight is very bad. She has not been out of the house for 10 years or so. So I am the one who goes shopping. When I come home from work I have to clean up the room, cook dinner, and take care of my mother. On Sundays I am busy with the laundry. We have a small balcony. I put up a clothesline in the bedroom, open the windows, and dry the clothes inside. I do not want people to see me doing the wash and hanging our sheets, tablecloths, and pillowcases out to dry. I realize that this shame is unfounded, but I am a native of Baku and I am full of pride and of local prejudices. We do not think it is right for a man to do the laundry. There is no reason to pretend that I do not want a woman to help me, but I will say more about this later.

"I am always happy to see my friends, but they also have another life--they are all married, and I do not have this life yet. I am bored. I am tormented by loneliness. Lately I have suffered from feelings of futility and insomnia that are hard to bear alone. I feel claustrophobic. You might ask why I have not married yet. I studied, got a VUZ degree, worked hard and was promoted. It seemed to me that my career was the main thing, but it did not work out. A new manager came to our enterprise, began to assemble his own team, and ignored his predecessor's people. I resigned. Now I work in a research institute and have a salary of 180 rubles. You cannot go wild, as they say, on this kind of salary. A few years ago I decided to concentrate on my personal life. I knew a likeable woman with a higher education who was far over the age of 30. At first we just dated, and then I proposed. She immediately started hounding me. She did not like our furniture anymore. It had to be thrown out. We had to get into debt, refurnish the home, etc. Everything I valued was of no value to her. I reconsidered and decided against this kind of 'happy marriage.'

"This is the kind of lucky person I am! Of course, I might still experience happiness one day, but you cannot appeal to everyone, especially when you are 50."

No matter what kind of ideas the bachelor dreams up to console himself and no matter how he tries to justify his refusal to marry, his objective state is at first simply unenviable, then turns into a big problem, and culminates in a personal tragedy. We have to pay for everything in this world, including the sweet years of existence without family responsibilities.

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## CAREER PLANS OF POLISH YOUTH

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[Article by Mikolay Kozakevich, doctor of philosophy, staff doctor of sociology, staff professor and research group supervisor at the Agricultural and Rural Development Institute of the Polish Academy of Sciences, chairman of the Polish Pedagogical Society, chairman of the Society for the Development of the Family, deputy of the Polish Sejm, and author of the books "The Paradoxes of Youth" (1970), "Each Person Chooses His Own Character" (1975), "The Inclusion of Polish Youth in the School System" (1976), "Youth During the Period of Fundamental Changes" (1985), and others; this is his first article in our journal; article translated from Polish by B.S. Arkhipova]

[Text] There has been a dramatic increase in concern about the problems of youth in Poland in recent years as a result of the stormy events of 1980 and 1981. According to the latest estimates, research in this field was being conducted by 180-200 different organizations in 1985--universities, VUZ's, including pedagogical, technical, and agricultural institutions, establishments of the Polish Academy of Sciences, sectorial and army centers, public opinion research institutes, the research departments of youth organizations and political parties, and many scientific societies. One of the leading research centers is the Research Institute of the Problems of Youth (IIPM), established in 1980 as part of the Bureau of the PPR Council of Ministers. It is under the direct jurisdiction of the minister of youth affairs and coordinates research projects in this field.

In spite of the impressive scales of the work, there are still many pressing scientific-organizational problems. They stem less from a shortage of detailed information than from a surplus. Furthermore, the scientific level of many studies is too low. This causes unavoidable difficulties in the comparison and generalization of results and the substantiation of conclusions. At the same time, we are fully aware that there are still many "blank spaces" on our research map. And all specialists know (this has happened to me repeatedly) how often they have to deal with problems on which there are no reliable data.

One of the main reasons is the lack of effective coordination. Today around 70 percent of the projects being carried out in the country have been authorized or approved by central agencies, while the rest were launched without

this approval to satisfy the interests of ambitions of specific individuals or research groups. Another reason can be found in the sphere of theory. Specialists have not agreed on the criteria for the inclusion of young people in a separate group. They have not decided whether the basic criterion should be age (for example, the 15-34 age group, which is the basis used in IIPM research) or features connected with social status--for instance, the absence of a family of one's own, financial dependence, incomplete education, a lack of professional skills, etc. This is also a matter of great practical importance. For example, the first draft of the "Act on Youth" suggested 29 as the maximum age. This aroused criticism, however, and the law was enacted without any mention of this.

Another matter of controversy is the question of whether youth is only a transition phase from childhood to maturity--that is, the gradual accumulation of mature features (personality features and features connected with status and role) and the simultaneous disappearance of juvenile features--or whether youth is a qualitatively distinctive stage--in other words, whether it is a separate and unique part of the architecture of life (both individual and social), with its own structure, functions, and characteristics of the "human condition" and "social condition" and, finally, with its own type of culture. Of course, there are many more such disagreements and theoretical problems, but I will not abuse the reader's attention and will move on to an analysis of the main fields of research and its results.

The political events of 1980 and 1981 resulted in a perceptible increase in the number of public opinion studies in the last 5 years, and the socioeconomic crisis has redoubled the interest in the living conditions and everyday life of youth. Research into the actual behavior of youth has also been intensified, particularly studies of such matters as the level of social activity and the attitude toward the PZPR and toward youth and other sociopolitical organizations. Finally, more interest is being taken today in various forms of social pathology (alcoholism and drug addiction), informal groups (hippies, punks, rockers, etc.), and other "alternative lifestyles," including those dictated by religious beliefs.

Since 1983 the IIPM has been publishing the "Polish Youth" almanac. It summarizes statistical information and the results of studies conducted by various research centers. For example, the 1985 volume includes the following sections: 1) Youth in the Democratic Structure of Society; 2) Legal Acts Pertaining to Youth; 3) Social Consciousness and Social Activity; 4) The Young Family; 5) Health; 6) Education; 7) Professional Self-Assertion and Working Conditions; 8) Culture, Leisure, Entertainment; 9) Signs of Social Pathology; 10) Results and Conclusions. The studies are distinguished by their close coordination with state policies (social policy, policy on education and indoctrination, etc.). In particular, IIPM projects are supposed to provide scientific substantiation for the legal, political, and economic decisions made with regard to youth and for the sake of youth.

Let us first take a look at the results of macrostatistical studies.<sup>1</sup> They mainly answer questions about youth's position in the social structure and indicate the directions and dynamics of changes occurring here. More than

90 percent of the 300,000 couples who married in 1984 were from 18 to 34 years old, and around 60 percent were from 20 to 24. In addition, 52 percent of the men and 62 percent of the women who divorced were also young. The marriage prospects of rural youth have undergone negative changes in recent years. Here there are 100 young women to every 116 young men. After 1980 the migration of rural youth to the cities decreased as a result of economic difficulties (the figure in 1984 was 17 percent lower than the figure for the previous year) and the number of people returning to rural communities rose. According to data for 1984, young people under the age of 35 accounted for 46 percent of the people who moved out of the country, and 35 percent of those who returned to Poland. In most cases the emigrants plan to make enough money to live in comfort when they return.

These data are not only significant in themselves but also provide reliable points of reference for empirical research.

Even a brief discussion of all the main results of these studies does not seem possible. In particular, I will deliberately refrain from discussing one of the main topics of the present day--the political awareness of the younger generation--because it would necessitate a thorough explanation of current events. Readers interested in this topic should refer to the appropriate literature [1]. Of all the other main fields of research, the issue of values warrants primary consideration.

In the last quarter of a century there has been no shortage of economic and political upheavals in Poland. Young people's attitudes toward various facets of life in the country have changed, but there has been no change in the set of basic values, and this applies to all categories of youth (workers, peasants, the intelligentsia, etc.). The main ones are labor, the profession, marriage, the family, education, and financial security. It is true that there was a substantial shift in priorities at the beginning of the 1980's. Economic difficulties assigned priority to household conveniences and the supply of manufactured goods and food. The always highly appreciated values of the family and marriage began to be assessed within the context of these circumstances (see Table 1). For a clearer understanding of the distinctive features of the system of values, we will compare our data to Soviet statistics. We will use the results of V.G. Alekseyeva's study of young workers as the norm. Here the distribution was the following: labor and professional success--39.9 percent; the respect of co-workers--34.1 percent; the ability to benefit others--32 percent; a good family and the love of children and relatives--31.2 percent; a good education--27.5 percent; interesting friends--16.9 percent; a high standard of living--6.8 percent, and so forth [2]. As we can see, Polish and Soviet young people assign priority to labor, the family, and education. But there are differences. The first attach greater importance than the second to material comforts and a high standard of living--in short, to money. Besides this, Polish young people place a higher value on the family and marriage than on labor, which is the highest priority for Soviet young men and women. In general, it seems to me that the values of Soviet youth are more pro-collectivist and pro-social, whereas individualist values are more characteristic of Polish youth. The Soviet young person's way of life is less dynamic than in Poland (of course, I am basing this


statement not only on the table below, but also on all of the Polish and Soviet studies I have read).

Table 1. Dynamics of Priorities of Polish Youth (Results of Studies from 1961 to 1985, percentage of respondents--respondents were free to choose more than one response)

Study by Z. Bauman (1961)--Warsaw youth, n = 680	<u>Percentage</u>
Labor, profession	40
Family, marriage	34
Material comforts, money	28
Security and stability	26
Freedom	21
Study by W. Adamski (1971)--nationwide sample group, n = 6,561	
Family, marriage	63
Respect and recognition of others	45
Higher education	31
Opportunities to benefit others	29
Knowledge and self-improvement	27
Material comforts, money	24
Study by S. Nowak (1976)--18-year-old students, n = 2,065	
Family, marriage	80
Communication and friendship	53
Interesting work	49
Opportunities to benefit others	35
Knowledge	30
Material comforts, money	22
Study by W. Adamski (1981)--nationwide sample group of youth from 19 to 24, n = 1,895	
Household conveniences and fashionable commodities	41
Marriage, family, food	31
A better job	12
Good wages	10
Knowledge, self-improvement, professional skills	6
Study by Polish Union of Socialist Youth Research Center (1985)-- 15- and 16-year-old graduates of 8-year schools, n = 794	
Profession	27.4
Starting a family	18.9
Education and knowledge	11.4
Interesting work	11.3
Realization of personal ambitions	7.8
A high standard of living	7.7



In line with this, I would like to discuss the interesting results of a study conducted by Z. Kwiecinski, a member of our research team, in 1983. He studied attitudes toward such values as equality, justice, truth, law and order, rationality, discipline, democracy, creativity, dignity, patriotism, and others. He investigated the problem from three standpoints: a) personal significance, b) opinions about the degree to which these values are exercised in the country, and c) possibilities for their realization in the near future. The responses were arranged in the form of diagrams--so-called axionormative profiles. The distance between lines (graphic illustrations of the three indicators) was interpreted as the level of "axionormative tension" (see figure). An analysis revealed an important trend. The value of this parameter rose in line with the move from ordinary schools to prestigious ones, to literally elitist academic institutions with high admission requirements. A study conducted 2 years later indicated that the normalization of conditions in the country had reduced the "axionormative tension." It is true that the rate of decline was different for different groups of youth. There was a substantial decrease among the students of ordinary schools and a less perceptible change in prestigious academic institutions.



Dynamics of Indicators of Axionormative Tension (average on a scale of 7). I--Values of students of general educational lyceums in big cities; II--Values of students of basic vocational schools; A--Level of realization of values; B--Possibilities for realization; C--Personal significance of values.

Polish sociologists are paying close attention to social mobility. The main research project warranting special discussion in this context is the one being conducted under W. Winclawski's supervision. For 12 years researchers have recorded changes in the status of the same 7,000 respondents, ever since they graduated from school. Besides this, Winclawski surveyed all of the 34-year-old inhabitants of Torun twice (in 1977 and 1983) to determine the connection between their initial possibilities (place of birth, financial status of parents, conditions of upbringing and education, and level of education) and their current social status (indicated by their standard of living, level of education, the prestige of their professions, their professional position, etc.). I will cite just the data on the connection between the initial and current positions as an illustration (Table 2).

Table 2. Effects of Living Conditions in Childhood and Youth on Current Socioprofessional Status (results of survey of Torun inhabitants born in 1951, percentages)

Initial possibilities	Current Socioprofessional Status							
	Very low	Low	Below average	Acceptable	Average	Above average	High	Very high
Very poor	11.4	22.8	25.7	17.3	11.4	8.6	2.8	0.0
Poor	8.6	15.0	20.0	18.8	15.0	12.5	3.8	6.3
Satisfactory	2.4	11.6	18.9	26.2	12.8	12.2	7.3	8.6
Near-average	8.3	8.3	21.3	21.3	11.3	15.0	8.7	5.8
Average	5.5	5.5	12.8	20.1	21.1	17.9	8.4	8.7
Good	3.5	2.9	8.3	14.8	26.6	19.5	13.0	11.4
Very good	1.8	7.2	6.3	11.7	18.9	21.6	15.3	17.2
Excellent	0.0	2.4	8.2	11.6	19.2	11.6	21.4	25.6

The main conclusion drawn from all of these studies is that the social status of parents and the conditions of upbringing and education are playing an increasingly important role in intragenerational mobility. They determine the "achievements" of youth and are becoming the deciding factor in the formation of the social structure. I personally believe that it was precisely the reduction of intergenerational mobility, a process which began 20 years ago and which diminished prospects for many young people, that was one of the causes of the crisis.

I will conclude this necessarily superficial survey with a few words about international comparative projects. Cooperation takes three basic forms: 1) studies conducted according to a common program and the same set of research tools; now, for example, young people's attitudes toward education and school are being studied in more than 10 countries (under the auspices of the International Bureau of Education in Geneva); the project is being coordinated by the IIPM; 2) studies based on common hypotheses and programs but using different procedures and research tools; the results and conclusions are usually discussed at international meetings; the seminars organized by the IIPM on "Informal Youth Groups" are one example of this; Bulgarian and Hungarian researchers have been exceptionally active in this field; 3) studies conducted on the basis of a questionnaire drawn up in Poland; experts from different countries fill out the questionnaire with a view to their own empirical research. The author has participated in one such project. It studied young people's attitude toward marriage, the family, and sex in 18 European states. Unfortunately, Polish researchers have been less active in international cooperation since 1980. In the last 2 years, however, work in this field has been conducted on a broader scale in spite of financial difficulties.

As I look back on this brief essay, I can clearly see its incompleteness. I have not discussed many important research projects and many productive researchers, such as Stefan Nowak, Wladislaw Adamski, and Jan Bogusz (Warsaw), and Wieslaw Wisniewski and Richard Diuniszak (Krakow). I have said almost nothing about young but promising sociologists--Grzegorz Nowacki, Janusz

Gensicki, and others. Therefore, if this subject matter should continue to be of interest to Soviet readers, it could be discussed in greater detail in the future.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. This term refers to research based on statistical data--Translator.

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#### INTRODUCTION TO CHAYKOVSKAYA ARTICLE

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 2, Mar-Apr 87 (signed to press 17 Mar 87) pp 119-120

[Editorial introduction]

[Text] The historical significance of various sociopolitical beliefs cannot be correctly understood or, consequently, evaluated solely on the basis of their creators' declared ideals. There have been many times in history when Reason, Goodness, and Justice were nothing more than ephemeral verbal ornaments in practice. It is just as futile to reduce extremely complex developments in the spiritual culture to the alignment of class forces and the struggle of class interests. Although social ideology is comparatively autonomous, it can have a significant effect on objective social processes; it can slow them down or, on the contrary, provide strong momentum for progressive changes.

We felt the need to remind the reader of these elementary Marxist truths because the following article deals with one of the complex and controversial issues of historical sociology--the spread of enlightened ideas in Russia in the second half of the 18th century. The complexity of the issue stems primarily from the extremely heterogeneous and multilayered nature of the Russian Enlightenment. In addition to members of the revolutionary-liberation current (and they have been the subject of quite detailed studies), the ideologists of "enlightened despotism" also preached enlightened views and even tried to implement them. Soviet studies of this current of enlightened thinking are clearly inadequate. It is too simple to call the enlightenment efforts headed by Empress Catherine II an obscene farce, although there seem to be some arguments to support this conclusion. Here the risk of "throwing the baby out with the bath water" is too great--the risk of losing sight of the generally progressive liberal undertakings that coexisted--paradoxically enough!--with serfdom and reaction and later served as fertile soil for the development of the revolutionary awareness of the noble intelligentsia. For this reason, the historian of sociological thinking must unravel the complex and contradictory mixture of words and actions of "enlightened despotism" at the time when monarchs "flirted with liberalism while executing the Radishchevs of their day."

Many great odes were dedicated to Catherine II, and even today bourgeois historians commonly view the "Age of Catherine" as a period when the Russian



state flourished and a time of great economic, social, and spiritual achievements. There is also the opinion, however, that the chance usurper of the throne, Catherine the plotter extraordinaire, was motivated exclusively by base impulses, and that all of her policies were "a system of decorous facades with slovenly backyards."

It is true that the social portrait of the era is distinguished by economic growth, the considerable expansion of state territory, the reinforcement of the legal-administrative system, and the elevation of the country's international prestige. Questions of morality and breeding became matters of central concern to the educated Russian public, and the literature of that time contains an abundance of discussions of "truth," "philanthropy," and "universal contentment." It would seem that the "feelings of the human heart" prevailed over ignorance and brutality, but all of this took place against the background of dramatically exacerbated class conflicts and a stricter autocratic policy on serfdom. "Voltairean" ideals were combined in the strangest way with reaction and political terror: The "freedom of speech" declared by the empress did not keep the "Voltairean" N.I. Novikov from being put in the Shlisselburg Fortress without a trial; when the deputies on the commission for the compilation of a new law code were listening to the words of the monarch's "order" on equality and freedom with tears of joy, rural churchgoers were being read an ukase prohibiting complaints about landowners under the threat of the whip or exile to Nerchinsk for a lifetime of hard labor; another of the monarch's ukases ordered the substitution of the word "subject" for the word "serf," but it was precisely at this time that serfs were made the private property of landowners. There is no need to continue this list of examples. One thing is clear: The multidimensional and highly contradictory phenomena of the Russian Enlightenment--including the socio-pedagogical utopia--cannot be described adequately in the black and white terms that became the convention back in those days, when history had to be depicted as "policy overturned in the past."

When we look into the cultural and historical legacy of the 18th century, we must consider and reconsider Lenin's assessment of the Russian Enlightenment. When V.I. Lenin described the enlightener, the first characteristic he listed was a passionate hatred for "serfdom and everything it engendered in the economic, social, and judicial spheres.... The second feature all Russian enlighteners had in common was the passionate defense of enlightenment, self-government, freedom, the European way of life, and the thorough Europeanization of Russia in general. Finally, the third characteristic of the 'enlightener' was the defense of the interests of the masses, especially peasants (who had still not been completely liberated or were just being liberated in the era of the enlighteners), a sincere belief that the abolition of serfdom and its remnants would lead to universal well-being, and a sincere desire to further this cause."

The activities of the enlighteners and the social results of their attempts to implement the ideas of the French rationalists are of primary importance to the historian of social thought.

The editors are publishing O.G. Chaykovskaya's article in the hope that her opinions will foster debate.

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## MAN IN HISTORY

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 2, Mar-Apr 87 (signed to press 17 Mar 87) p 120

[Introduction by Academician D.S. Likhachev]

[Text] The humanities are concerned mainly with the human being, the individual. This is precisely why they are called the humanities. But it is apparent that history, one of the main social sciences, has moved away from the direct study of individuals. Human history has been dehumanized. Apparently in the fear of exaggerating the role of individuals in history, we have not only taken the personalities out of our historical studies but have also made these studies impersonal and, consequently, uninteresting. I think that we will have to reconstruct the history of the human individual some day.

The second half of the 18th century was an especially remarkable period--it was then that the individual began to grow stronger, discover his own dignity and honor, and seek goals other than the reptilian climb up the 14-rung professional ladder. This era, an exceptionally interesting period which represented a turning point in the history of the human individual, is the subject of O.G. Chaykovskaya's article.

It is not a simple matter to disclose and record the characteristics of the individual of that time. The lives of the inventors of the social utopia, Catherine II and I.I. Betskoy, and the "new breed" of people they tried to raise were extremely contradictory and dramatic. This was the time when the Russian intelligentsia was taking shape, and we must look beyond the common trends of the era if we are to understand these people. The irrevocable table of ranks, like a heavy and cumbersome screen, continues to conceal natural human emotions from us.

O.G. Chaykovskaya, a writer, art expert, and historian, chose a non-traditional approach to her analysis of the Russian Enlightenment. The author's distinctive interpretation of the historical legacy will provide the reader with rich food for thought. The human individual's colossal efforts to take his deserved place in the world date back to the second half of the 18th century.

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THE EDUCATION OF A 'NEW BREED' OF PEOPLE (AN 18TH-CENTURY SOCIAL EXPERIMENT)

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 2, Mar-Apr 87 (signed to press 17 Mar 87) pp 121-134

[Article by Olga Georgiyevna Chaykovskaya, candidate of historical sciences, member of the USSR Union of Writers, and author of the books "Protiv neba na zemle" [Against Heaven on Earth] (1966), "Bolotnyye ogni" [Marsh Fires] (1967), "Zakon i chelovecheskoye serdtse" [The Law and the Human Heart] (1969), and "Nebo Austerlitsa" [The Austerlitz Sky] (1976), journalistic essays and articles, and the article in our journal "The Evil Spirit of Verkhnyaya Gutara" (1986, No 4); passages enclosed in slantlines are printed in italics in source]

[Text] The 18th century is called the age of rationalism, but this is not the rationalism we refer to today when we speak of "moderation and accuracy" or some kind of spiritual aridity and prudence. This was a rationalism which tried with amazing persistence to transcend its rational bounds and which sometimes even took the form of a social utopia. The European Enlightenment itself was utopian in many respects, with its unlimited faith in "nature," in the initial purity of human nature, and in human reason's ability to make all necessary social changes on its own strength. It is understandable that the enlighteners placed their hopes primarily in the law, which was supposed to regulate human relations; in science, which was supposed to teach people; and in pedagogy, which was supposed to raise worthy citizens of the society of Reason, Goodness, and Justice.

Russian sociopedagogical thinking of the 18th century owed a great deal to the fascination with utopias. It took in the didacticism of Montaigne, Fenelon, Locke, Rousseau, and the French Encyclopaedists and it might seem that it did not add anything new, anything of its own. At first, the system it created appears to be a pure compilation of views: Upbringing and education must be based on the conscious assimilation of what is being taught--this had already been said by Montaigne when he protested against the kind of education that produced parrots. The main purpose of pedagogy is not instruction, but education, the development of will, character, and strong moral foundations--this was discussed by Locke, who also spoke out against the rigidity of pedagogy and the brutal treatment of the child, particularly against corporal punishment. Rousseau developed the idea that the child is born morally pure, with a pure heart, and that vices are instilled in the

spirit by outside influences, by the family and society. The Russian pedagogues who will be discussed in this article accepted these views in their entirety. They also accepted all the utopianism of the Tabula Rasa theory and even reinforced it. It might seem that everything was taken from the West, that everything was borrowed. In fact, however, Russian pedagogy of the 18th century had unique features and played a special role in history. I am referring to the sociopedagogical system that was elaborated in the 1760's and is associated with the name of Ivan Ivanovich Petskoy, a pedagogue whose activity, both theoretical and practical, has still not been fully appreciated.

Betskoy was well acquainted with European culture as a result of self-education--he was born abroad (his father, I. Trubetskoy, was held prisoner in Sweden for a long time after the Swedes took Narva in 1700, and this is where his illegitimate son was born and was given part of his father's name, according to the convention of that time)--and because of his extensive travel in the European countries. At that time travel was an undertaking of exceptional importance and part of education. The main purpose of travel was the acquisition of common sense--the traveler learned about life in other countries, their customs, and their laws, took a look at crafts, industry, and the arts in foreign lands, and learned what people there talked about and what they thought (travel was slow and there was time for thorough examination). Travel was regarded as nothing other than a /business/ and this is why the traveler often kept a diary (some of these diaries have become important historical sources). Betskoy was in France at the time of its social growth and spiritual flourishing. The French enlighteners found a broad response in society, especially the intelligentsia, where something like an intellectual craving for one another came into being, and society salons turned into a "school of civilization" where the most brilliant minds gathered. The young Betskoy entered into this atmosphere of seething social thought. We can assume that he visited Madame Geoffrin's salon (sources contain references to his close acquaintance with the hostess of this famous salon), where Encyclopaedists (d'Holbach, d'Alembert, and others), writers, and public spokesmen gathered. Lively conversations with prominent Frenchmen and the spirited discussion of the works of Voltaire, Rousseau, and Diderot as something new, as current events, must have made a tremendous impression on the young Russian noble. It was apparently then that he chose the group of interests that decided his future.

When Betskoy returned to Russia under Peter III, he occupied a strong and prominent position under Catherine II after the coup of 1762. His close contact with the empress was due less to their long acquaintance [1, p 20] than to the similarity of their views. Catherine, a passionate admirer of the Enlightenment, was well-versed in educational theory by that time. Discussions of upbringing, or as we would say today, the sociology of upbringing, were an important part of Catherine's frequent meetings with Betskoy (they met for joint study, talks, and readings). The pedagogical system created during the course of these discussions was the result of their joint efforts (we will not try to determine the authorship in each specific case; a study of their works, especially Catherine's stories, her "Instructions to Prince Saltykov on His Appointment To Raise the Grand Dukes," her educational fables, and so forth, prove that both authors contributed much to the system).



The Russian sociopedagogical utopians--and this is their distinctive feature--decided to implement and carry out a doctrine which they certainly did not regard as a utopia. Completely accepting Rousseau's idea that a child raised in complete isolation from the depraved social environment could grow into an ideal person, perfect in all respects, they decided to act on this idea. It is true that Rousseau skeptically added that a child would have to be put on the moon or at least on a desert island for this kind of isolation. Our enthusiasts believed that this could work in Moscow or St. Petersburg: After all, one was seated autocratically on the throne and the other was one of the country's top statesmen.

An understanding of the vital novelty of their pedagogical system necessitates a review of the state of pedagogy in Russia in the 18th century--the almost complete lack of schools and the dense teachers, who were either parish sextons or private tutors, often from abroad (Elizabeth had already tried in her time to counteract the control of education by foreign teachers, whom even the French referred to as "French scum" abroad). Pedagogy was then based on the certainty that education presupposed brutality (a profound belief shared completely by the public), and pedagogical "theory" was a veritable "hymn to the rod" (there was even a work by this name), which "sharpened the mind" ("Kiss the rod," a textbook of the mid-18th century said). Pedagogical practices were horrifying: Children were kept in a state of agonizing fear and their bodies were deformed by brutal punishments. The children of the gentry were completely under the power of their tutors, savage imposters and former lackeys and coachmen, some of whom were distinguished by unbridled cruelty in their punishments (this is frequently referred to in memoirs). The tender-hearted mothers of these children choked back their tears and did not dare to object, because they shared the belief of their era that children needed punishment and that the most cruel tutors were also the most conscientious and zealous educators.

Catherine and Betskoy were aware of the difficulty of their undertaking. "Surmounting centuries of superstition," Betskoy wrote in his work "On the Upbringing of Young People of Both Genders," "and providing our people with a new kind of education...is a matter requiring incredible effort, but it will be of direct benefit to all posterity" [2, p 668]. This work was also a result of collaboration by Catherine and Betskoy, who stresses that he "took great care to reproduce, word for word," all of the "oral instructions and noble ideas" the empress had given him, and he then goes on to list them. "There can be no complaints about the abilities of the Russians," Catherine remarked. This had been proved by the nobles who were sent abroad by Peter and had "returned with great successes," and by the commoners who had "been admitted to courses of study" and had "also advanced quickly, but had then returned to their earlier ignorance and veritable non-existence even more quickly." It was a characteristic belief of the 18th century that an ignorant person who had not been illuminated by the rays of the Enlightenment was spiritually dead. Catherine's general line of reasoning is clear: Although those who had been sent elsewhere to learn had been able to rise above their environment for some time, this environment devoured them once again upon their return. This meant that decisive measures had to be taken.

"Art has shown us," Catherine continues in Betskoy's narrative, "that reason embellished and enlightened by the sciences is not enough to produce a good and upright citizen; in many cases it is even worse when someone has not been raised to be virtuous from early childhood and virtues have not firmly taken root in his heart" [2, p 669]. Without moral foundations, there can be no success in the sciences or the arts. "It is clear, therefore, that /education/ is the root of all good and evil," and this means that "there is /only one/ (this constant use of italics, with which the authors persistently strive to attract the reader's attention, is quite interesting--O. Ch.) /solution/: to first raise, by means of /education/, what might be called a /new breed/ or /new fathers and mothers/, who could instill their children with the same direct and fundamental educative rules they have learned themselves, and then their children could pass them on to their own children; and so it would progress, from generation to generation, in future centuries" [2, p 669].

Here it is, the main idea and pivotal point of the utopia--the creation of a "new breed" of people.

The utopianism of Catherine and Betskoy is revealed primarily in their belief that preaching and, to an even greater extent, orders or statutes can transform the society, its social structure, and its view of the outside world. "All of this would depend solely on the appropriate foundation and on the precepts conveyed, which should be combined with considerable reflection and care, so that everything will be clearly, thoroughly, and accurately understood" [2, p 671]. According to Betskoy, these were the instructions he received from Catherine. It was precisely in this way--clearly, thoroughly, and accurately--that these pedagogues planned to explain their new views on the education of Russian citizens to the society (or to drum them into people's heads!).

The new pedagogy proclaimed an individual approach to the child, and each new set of regulations stipulated that the course of studies for children should correspond to their abilities, inclinations, and wishes. There was an equally tenacious belief in the need to keep a close watch on children and take note of their abilities (in some establishments records were to be kept of "various natural talents and inclinations" [2, p 749]), and to select the particularly gifted children for individual instruction.

Idleness was thought to be the greatest enemy of youth--the works we are examining had much to say about this. At that time the maxims "Learning is light, and a lack of learning is darkness" or "Laziness is the mother of all vices" were not considered to be banal. On the contrary, given the idleness of the nobility, especially after the publication of the ukase permitting the nobility not to serve in any capacity and to do virtually nothing of social value, they were just short of militant slogans.

But spiritual development was the main aspect of education. The new pedagogy had vehement objections to the ghastly practice of cramming facts into the child's head and endeavored, rather, to awaken his mind. Catherine, who was essentially self-educated, attached tremendous significance to the development of the pupil's initiative. "It is not as necessary to teach children," she wrote in the "Instructions to Prince Saltykov," "as to give them an

inclination, desire, and love for knowledge, so that they will seek to enrich it on their own." There is a definite appeal in all of the works we are examining for the development of a desire to read books (and for the creation of personal libraries for this purpose).

The main theme of the enlighteners' program is constantly stressed (perhaps even as the most imperative condition!): The child must live in an atmosphere of respect; his educators must teach him courtesy, but they are also obligated to treat him courteously. The cultivation of "natural courtesy" in children, regardless of their social status, was considered to be essential and was assigned great importance. The spirits of pupils, the charter of the Art Institute said, must be "instilled with propriety, courtesy, philanthropy, and a sense of honor" [2, p 952]. This was a matter of truly primary importance--the development of a sense of their own dignity in the people of the "new breed."

It is easy to see that the pedagogical system of Catherine and Betskoy corresponded to the spirit of the 18th century, its spiritual energy, the courageous thinking of its best representatives, and their certainty that if an idea is true, just "fixing" it in the mind will make it practicable. This pedagogy also reflected the courageous social hopes which were characteristic of so many members of the nobility in the beginning of Catherine's reign.

The Russian enlighteners began carrying out their program with uncommon professional and practical acumen. Betskoy's plan to establish the Moscow Foundling Home "with a special hospital for indigent mothers-to-be" was drawn up in great detail, and Catherine not only approved the plan but also issued a special manifesto to go with it (there is good reason that all of the pedagogical works we are examining are included in the complete collection of the laws of the Russian empire--they had the force of law). In her manifesto, Catherine reported that she had approved the plan for the foundling home in Moscow, "the ancient capital of the empire"; this home would be built and maintained "by public charity"--that is, by voluntary contributions--the tsarina announced, and she then expressed the hope that the "upright children of the fatherland" would follow her example and that of Paul, the heir to the throne, and would "each, according to his ability, strive to make a charitable contribution for the construction of this home and for the maintenance of this general charitable cause, so that the very next generation can, to the glory of our era, make use of its genuine benefits" [2, p 344]. This state establishment was to remain forever "under the special protection and care of the monarch."

A place was needed for the experiment. Betskoy requested (and, it goes without saying, immediately received) a large piece of property and an estate "called Pomegranate Court, and the Vasilyevskiy Gardens near Moscow River, with all of the attached lands and structures, along with a mill from the Admiralty on the Yauza, and the use of the old wall of the city," as well as the "required number of guards" from the military command [2, p 346]. Soon, however, the experimenters had to deal with what was probably their greatest and most dramatic problem. They had to feed hundreds (and later thousands) of unfortunate and unwanted children. Advance, and official, preparations



were required for the performance of this difficult task. At first it seemed tragically impracticable: Children died by the dozens and even by the hundreds, and there was one year (1767) when almost all of them died. The temporary facilities turned out to be unsuitable, and the number of wet-nurses was woefully inadequate; epidemics broke out. All of this could have been completely discouraging, but Betskoy, who had assumed responsibility for all of the immediate concerns (he was the chief guardian of the home), did not give up. For some time he had to take the undesirable measure of temporarily sending children to rural communities to be raised by peasants (it was also a dangerous measure: The landowners in the district tried to register the home's foundlings as their own serfs). Nevertheless, enthusiasm triumphed (precisely because it was prudent), the death rate began to decline, and it eventually fell below the average (the death rate for children in general was extremely high in the 18th century).

More and more people brought children to the home (they were paid 2 rubles for each child, a substantial sum for the poor of that time). The people who brought the children in could not be asked questions about anything but the child's name and baptism. The children's distinguishing marks were recorded in detail, and their clothes, unless they were in rags, were stored in a special place (in the event that someone would look for them later). More and more women came secretly (they were even allowed to cover their faces) to the "secret maternity hospital," where they were permitted to stay a week before giving birth and two weeks afterward (unless their medical condition required a longer stay). When they went away, they left the children behind. The group of children grew, but so did donations to the home.

Catherine's manifesto and a report presented by Betskoy asked the society, each citizen, to take part in the establishment and growth of the home (Betskoy made a particularly passionate appeal to the "dear reader," whom he asked to imagine the miserable helplessness of the beggar "mother-to-be" and the future of her child, who would be doomed to die [2, p 351]).

The organizers' plans were well founded: The enterprise which was publicized so earnestly by the tsarina aroused keen interest. Nobles felt flattered when they were appointed to the board of trustees or were made guardians. The Russian gentry and rich merchants donated money, food, and clothing to the home. P.A. Demidov, a famous wealthy man, took on much of the cost of building the home. Eventually, the foundling home began to receive contributions (in the form of gifts or bequests) in the same way as the monasteries--as a means of "salvation" (especially after the donors were assured that they would be "remembered in prayers in the churches of this home as benefactors during their lifetime and after their death"), and it was all the more reassuring that the supreme authority not only held benefactors in high regard but even gave them all sorts of privileges. The home's economic affairs were put in order. A plot of land with water-meadows was leased from the Economy Collegium for the raising of livestock, and Catherine immediately gave the home this piece of property as a gift. The governor of Arkhangelsk sent the home 30 cows, paid for with donations. As the home acquired more and more property, stores and flour shops (and even taverns!) were built on this property and leased by the home. It was given the right



to sell donated rural communities, to buy land and buildings, and to manage mills and factories. Later the foundling home was authorized to keep its own estate, loan, and savings accounts, and it thereby became a major banker in addition to a landowner and an owner of mills and factories. It was given a special extraterritorial status, the chief of police could not enter home property without the consent of its administrators, home employees were under the legal jurisdiction of its administrators, etc. [see 3].

A huge architectural complex was erected on the banks of the Moscow River: a building for the children, administrative buildings, churches, and various service establishments and auxiliary facilities. It can still be seen today on the piece of property between Moscow River and Ulitsa Solyanka.

In this way, a material base was established for the attainment of the new pedagogical objectives.

It is easy to see that these pedagogical objectives were subordinate to the social objective of raising people with a new sociopsychological frame of mind and new moral goals (of softening the "brutal and terrible" customs of that time and introducing a new morality). But these goals were not only moral and psychological; there was also an obvious intention to carry out a purely social program.

Russia did not have the social stratum known as the "third estate" in the West--industrialists, manufacturers, merchants, and craftsmen--on whom the government could have relied for support and could thereby have become relatively independent of the nobility. The empress tried to create a "middle class" or a "third rank," and this is what the foundling home was supposed to do (this was probably the reason for its huge dimensions). A "third estate" was to be raised in the literal sense of the term (was there ever anything like this--a nursery for the creation of a social class--anywhere else?).

Betskoy frankly admits in the "General Plan" that the goals of education in the home would be completely different from the goals of the education of the nobility: The home's charges would have to serve the fatherland by working for a living. All of them would be free, and no one would ever be allowed under any circumstances to make serfs or slaves of them. Betskoy realized that this would not be an easy matter and that the "circumstances of their life in the future" would have to be considered (as we can see, the utopia was not only put into practice, but was also to be verified by practice). It stands to reason, he said, that all of these men and women from the home, experts in their trade, could easily support themselves and would have no trouble finding a merchant or manufacturer to employ them, but people are rarely guided by reason, "especially merchants and manufacturers (bearded men blinded by false pride and imaginary integrity)" (Betskoy displays an interesting class prejudice here), and they would probably reject this "new breed." It would be difficult to surmount centuries-old hatred, "stubbornness and envy," the products of a bad upbringing. There was also the frightening possibility that the home's charges, "these new inhabitants," would accept old morals and would be infected, so to speak, with old social diseases. For this reason, it would be important for the home to open its own factories,

where its charges could work and earn enough money to open their own enterprises.

It is interesting that the "experimental material" they chose consisted of people who were not backed up by the power of the nobility--poor noble orphans and indigent nobles in general, abandoned children with no known relatives, and beggar children whose parents could not afford to feed them--these were to become the "new breed of people." There was a sociopedagogical paradox here: The children of the nobility, including the aristocracy, were usually left in the hands of ignorant and often cruel tutors, while the unfortunate foundlings who had been abandoned by their parents, human beings on the lowest rung of the social ladder, were authorized by royal decree to live in an atmosphere of respect and courtesy.

Because the foundling home was conceived as a nursery whose seedlings would be sent to every part of the country, the means of accomplishing this had to be considered. After all, free people would be entering a world based on serfdom, and they would not even have the contacts they would need to exist in this society. When the home's charges, in whom "a fine mind would be combined with an even finer heart," would go out into the world and try to make a place for themselves in it, they would not lose contact with the home (if only by virtue of the fact that they would have to renew their identification cards there once a year). The trustees who lived in all parts of the country would be obligated to give them protection and assistance. Older graduates would then give younger ones support and provide them with "shelter and care." Therefore, according to the plans of the home's founders, its charges would make up a network of closely interrelated "people of the new breed" in society.

The establishment of the Moscow Foundling Home (a branch of it was opened later in St. Petersburg and soon became autonomous) met with a quick response in the country, and high-level administrators (for example, Governor-General Sivers in Novgorod) began opening establishments of this kind in their territories, and the gentry, merchants, and even rich peasants followed their example [1, p 149]. All of this activity was nullified in 1775, when establishments of this kind became subject to public charity orders.

This is how the foundling home, which was established by an alliance of the supreme ruler and a large group of gentry and rich merchants, who united their efforts during the period of social progress in the 1760's, came into being and took a prominent place in society.

The question of the upbringing and education of women was raised and analyzed by Western enlighteners. For example, Fenelon speaks in his work "On the Education of Daughters" about the great role of mothers in the family and the society and says that a woman should be prepared to play this role. The theory that the basis of education was environmental influence, or the force of example, put parents, especially mothers, in the forefront of pedagogy. The West had the famous Saint-Cyr-l'Ecole, founded by Françoise Maintenon, Louis XIV's favorite. This institute served as a model for institutions of this kind in other countries for a long time. Betskoy, who had studied the

St. Cyr experience, applied much of it to the Educational Society of Noble Young Women of the Voskresenskiy Monastery (it was later named the Smolnyy Institute)--the strict isolation of the girls from the outside world, their separation by age (with a different color uniform for each age), etc. The goals of the Russian enlighteners, however, had nothing in common with F. Maintenon's goals (it was a different time, a different kind of character, and a different curriculum). The St. Cyr pupils, who were expected to be part of an exclusive society group after graduation, were primarily taught irreproachable society manners; a spirit of captivity reigned here, and given the nature of Madame Maintenon herself and her gloomy piety, the prevailing atmosphere was one of hypocrisy and excruciating spiritual oppression. This oppression gradually grew more pronounced and the institute's regulations began to resemble the monastic rule. Catherine was striving for something else.

The Voskresenskiy Monastery, B. Rastrelli's marvelous creation where Elizabeth planned to spend her last years, was not finished in her lifetime. Catherine changed the plans during the construction to convert the monastery into an academic institution. More money was released, and the schedule was stepped up (the empress was obviously impatient to begin the experiment); admissions were widely publicized. Catherine ordered copies of the charter to be "sent to all provinces and cities, so that after hearing about the new establishment...any nobleman who wishes can entrust his daughters to this establishment for education from their most tender years" [2, p 742]. In this way, the new pedagogical program was set forth in detail in the charter and was sent to all parts of the country. Applicants were few in number (although there would be no shortage of them a few years later): The newness of the program was frightening, and the need to part with a child for 12 years was equally frightening: Parents were required to make a "pledge of honor" that they "would not demand the return of children on any pretext" [2, p 743]. The initial plan called for the admission of 60 girls (there were to be 200 in the institute in all), and preference was to be given "to daughters of the nobility whose fathers and mothers are less wealthy than others" [ibid.].

Smolnyy not only had a "noble" division, but also included an institute for girls from other social groups, including serfs (on the condition of a release from the landowner), after 1765. The education of non-gentry girls was also part of the program for the creation of a "third estate" in Russia, which was a matter of such great concern to Catherine. These girls were to be trained in crafts, domestic sciences, and the performance of various economic functions, but they also had a much broader--and amazing for the 18th century--course of studies. They also learned "the arts of human life and civic requirements," and this meant "keeping factories, trade, and crafts in a healthy state, learning to establish these and manage them, and understanding the requirements of the aspects of household management directed by their gender." In other words, the pupils of the non-gentry division of the Smolnyy Institute were supposed to become model homemakers and something like administrators in industry and trade (and why not, if the head of state was a woman? This is an astounding curriculum, particularly in view of the fact that women had just recently been confined to towers and their own chambers).

The main thing, however, was that the non-gentry girls were granted the privilege of exceptional personal freedom. The institute charter said that the non-gentry girls would graduate "in their 21st year" with a certificate giving them the same privileges as the students of the Arts Academy. The academy charter said that "everyone, regardless of rank, is strictly forbidden to register these artists, craftsmen, and their posterity as serfs in any manner whatsoever; if anyone should be made a serf through deception, should become a serf voluntarily by agreement, or should marry a serf maiden or widow, this will not make him a slave and will also make his spouse and their children free" [2, p 950]. This was a decisive advance in comparison with the charter of the Moscow Foundling Home, where graduates were forbidden to marry serfs, but if this kind of marriage should take place through deception, they would remain free, and the woman would make her husband a free man. In this way, the educational reform in Russia gave rise to a "new breed" of brides and grooms who made their partners free.

Both divisions of the Smolnyy Institute had the same goal: the development of enlightened people to soften the "brutal and terrible" customs of the day. Whereas the "petty bourgeois" division was supposed to add workers and housewives (and even something like "directors") to the "third estate," the "noble" division was supposed to provide society with intelligent women who would carry culture wherever fate took them. Whatever they did later, whether they raised their own children or other people's, became hostesses of salons, or returned to their own estates, they would introduce an atmosphere of spirituality everywhere (Catherine encouraged social activity by women in general, including literary activity, and it was in her time that women became poets, translators, and dramatists; she had good reason to make Ye.R. Dashkova the head of the two academies).

General educational subjects were taught at Smolnyy (mainly the liberal arts, but there were also the fundamentals of mathematics and "experimental physics": A portrait of one of the Smolnyy girls shows her standing next to an electrical machine); there was intensive training in foreign languages--one for the "petty bourgeois" girls, and four for the gentry; besides this, the pupils were taught to sew and to knit, the "petty bourgeois" girls were taught crafts, and the gentry girls were taught to keep accounts, to negotiate with suppliers, and to manage household expenses. It is interesting that girls in the upper classes were supposed to work with the little girls, so that they could apply this experience to the upbringing of their own children when they grew up. It is difficult to judge the quality of the general education here, but there is reason to believe that it was quite mediocre (there were no competent pedagogues yet), but the instruction in languages and in the arts met high standards. The girls did sculptures and sketches (some of their drawings have come down to us and indicate good training) and organized complicated music programs and ballet performances under the supervision of professional artists. The main form of entertainment at Smolnyy was theater.

The theater in Russia, Catherine's favorite offspring, was directed by Voltaire (from his estate, Ferney, of course), and he was the one who gave the empress advice on dramatic skills and the repertoire. Voltaire's own plays were performed at Smolnyy. It would be difficult to overestimate the



significance of the performance of his plays on the Russian stage--here is where the fresh breezes of the great enlightened ideas blew, here is where the most vital issues of the age were raised! A good example is Voltaire's "Mahomet," which began to be performed in the 1770's, first in Moscow and then in St. Petersburg. One of the most important (what we today would call "sociopsychological") problems was raised in this tragedy--the spiritual tyranny and enslavement of people by the authority of a ruler. The central character in the tragedy is a remarkable person: a ruler who has declared himself a prophet, a man almost deified by his followers, a man with an iron will, a liar, a demagogue, and a provocateur extraordinaire. He demands blind faith from his subjects and arouses fanatical hatred in them; he orders the young hero to kill a popular leader, and the hero is tormented by the realization that he has to kill a good and noble man, but he kills him anyway (and is driven mad by this). Voltaire's tragedy concerns spiritual oppression and liberation from spiritual oppression. The play was not performed at Smolnyy (the girls would not have been able to understand it), but many other of Voltaire's plays were staged here, especially the equally famous "Zaire," about a love which was crushed under the weight of religious fanaticism. The play was a major event in the cultural life of St. Petersburg, it was discussed in the newspapers, and the pupil Levshina in the role of Zaire astounded the audience.

The contemporaries of the Smolnyy girls saw them as the personification of the new educational curriculum that had been publicized so extensively by the government. They were the object of great interest in society. When the first pupils appeared in public for the first time for a walk in the summer gardens, a tremendous crowd gathered to watch them. Novikov himself wrote some lines about them for his journal: "Minds are guided by their good breeding. They set us an example of all the virtues. They will correct ruined hearts and evil practices. We owe Catherine so much for giving them to us." The progressive intelligentsia kept an eye on the new educational curriculum and had great hopes for the pupils of the private academic institutions.

Not all of their contemporaries were delighted with the "convent girls," and many were extremely skeptical of them. They were raised in such a hothouse atmosphere that jokes about them made the rounds in society, saying that the Smolnyy pupils had asked where they could find the trees on which rolls grow. Someone else composed some verses about the "60 hens and utter fools" the "German Ivan Ivanych" had "let loose on the world" (the author of one work of our day even asserted that these verses were the product of some kind of democratic camp, that they came, so to speak, "from the left"--but after all, they could have been composed by any court jester or enemy of new ideas).

But this gives rise to an important question: What was the new pedagogy producing--"hens" or intelligent women?

Before we answer this question, we should take a look at the spiritual characteristics of the woman of that time. She had emerged from the "terem" after being set free by Peter I. The importance of this advance would be difficult to overestimate. But freedom of movement, communication, and

observation did not mean that the woman had actually become part of life, with its variety of interests, social relationships, and realities. Furthermore, old practices were still being upheld deep within different social strata, and even among the people closest to Peter. We have a rare opportunity to take a look into the "terem" of that time, when it was opened and could be observed. Tsarina Praskovya Fedorovna (the wife of Tsar Ivan, Peter's brother and former co-sovereign), a woman wholly devoted to the old ways, was motivated by her fear of Peter and by her desire to please him to make an earnest effort to get used to the new ways and lived in Ismailov with her daughters. F.V. Berkhgolts, the author of an interesting diary (1721-1725), had no trouble getting into Ismailov Palace after he was brought there by one of the inhabitants.

When we hear the word "terem" we conjure up something with a fancy design in our mind (influenced by Vasnetsov, Bilibin, and the entire world of fairy tales), the lovely dwelling of modest beauties, recluses embroidering scenes with silk thread. The "terem" Berkhgolts looked into was nothing like this. He saw slovenly rooms and a multitude of unkempt and sloppily dressed women. Half-naked ladies-in-waiting were sprawled together on a bed in one room. "I was even more surprised," he writes, "when I saw an old, blind, dirty, hideous, and stupid woman, wearing almost nothing but a nightshirt, wandering barefoot through their rooms." Berkhgolts was told that "this creature" was ordered to dance from time to time and that she then "hiked up her smelly rags first in front and then in back" [4, p 301]. This is how the "terem" amused itself. Of course, not every "terem" was like this one, and not all noblewomen were like Tsarina Praskovya and her daughters. Russian culture had accumulated tremendous spiritual wealth, and in the general public (including the nobility) it survived in spite of Peter's reforms, and the world of art (painting and architecture), poetry (legends, tales, and historical tradition) and, finally, the Russian code of ethics that had been centuries in the making--all of this naturally played a part in shaping the female spirit, giving it a moral foundation, and cultivating good taste. Strong negative factors, however, were also at work here: the isolation of families, the absence of vital influences, the limited range of interests (and, consequently, the severe boredom), and the illiteracy that made this limited range even more inescapable.

Whereas men and women had been equally illiterate prior to Peter's reforms, now a gap came into being and gradually grew wider. The education of men was undertaken in earnest (this was also a form of "professional training"--the era demanded experts, engineers, sailors, professional soldiers, and administrators). Girls were taught something at home (there was some elementary instruction in convents and in the rare schools, and later in the equally rare private, and usually foreign, boarding schools), but they were taught to read at best; they were rarely taught to write, and this instruction was given only reluctantly, because the ability to write gave girls opportunities for independence and, consequently, undesirable contacts with life. Education was purely secular. The Russian noblewoman in the capital was well-dressed, elegant, amiable, and spoke French fluently (but was unlikely to read French), but was almost or completely illiterate (and was also gradually losing touch with her own national culture), in contrast to most other noblewomen, who were just as ignorant and illiterate but lacked the Moscow woman's polish.

And then an island sprang up in this sea of uneducated women--the first women's academic institution in Russia, where girls were not only to be taught and cultivated for 12 years, but were also to be turned into "people of the new breed."

What were the results of this undertaking?

We have no opportunity to judge the kind of education and, what is most important, the kind of human qualities the majority of the pupils of the new academic institutions received. This opportunity, and only a partial one, is provided only by the people who became famous in history or were mentioned in memoirs of that time--in short, people who live on in memory. It is obvious that this is not a representative "sample group," and this discussion will necessarily pertain to individual examples, but even they can help us, if not to answer the question, then at least to see all of its complexity.

The first Smolnyy graduating class is particularly interesting in this context. Many of the first Smolnyy girls are mentioned in memoirs. An interesting observation was made by I.M. Dolgorukov, who wrote that in the "small court" (of Crown Prince Paul Petrovich), the "convent girls" (this is what people often called the Smolnyy pupils--O.Ch.) were the first to attract his attention. "Most of the girls I knew were convent girls. After speaking with them, I was fascinated by their good breeding, artlessness, virtuous impulses, and common sense. They were incapable of pretense and cunning; they always spoke frankly and never behaved coquettishly" [5, p 80]. This testimony is all the more valuable because I.M. Dolgorukov was an intelligent, sober, and derisive man who was not inclined to be particularly enthusiastic about anything. His wife, Yevgeniya Dolgorukova (nee Smirnaya), had received an excellent Smolnyy education: "She expressed herself well and did well at school; when she reached the white age (white dresses were worn by the Smolnyy graduating class--O.Ch.), she displayed magnificent talents; she sang and danced beautifully, played the harp, and was particularly gifted in dramatic expression--i.e., declamation" [5, p 82].

It is interesting to take a closer look at Yevgeniya Dolgorukova, and not only for an understanding of her inner self. Perhaps the most interesting thing was her first encounter with the social environment she came from.

Yevgeniya Dolgorukova, the daughter of an impoverished nobleman, almost did not know her immediate family. From the age of 4 she was raised by Grand Duchess Natalya Alekseyevna (Paul's first wife), she entered the Smolnyy Institute, and then lived in the "small court" as a maid of honor in an atmosphere of culture, art, and constant entertainment. She was the center of attention and soon married Prince I.M. Dolgorukov, one of the most enlightened men of his day. At this time the young couple, who had received a brilliant education in the capital, set off for the "parental hermitage," the rural backwoods they saw as "a dark night following a fine clear day." It would seem that the high-society aristocrats had nothing in common with the people at home--after all, Yevgeniya's mother was illiterate and could not even tell time. But we will turn back to Dolgorukov's memoirs. We will

not see a trace of supercilious pomposity or arrogance in them. On the contrary, they are a model of tact and sincere respect for Russian rural traditions. "The old lady was waiting for us on the threshold with bread and salt, she blessed us with an icon, she presented us with a silver tray, and then she recited several proverbs, which I found almost incomprehensible, and my wife understood even less. Rural practices were completely unfamiliar to us, but each person lives according to the customs he grows up with and grows old with" [5, p 81]. This is nothing other than common courtesy and good breeding. Dolgorukov senses his own connection with folk traditions.

Let us take a look at a difficult and complicated problem that is clearly apparent in the context of Dolgorukov's memoirs--the relationship between the common people (including, despite her noble birth, Yevgeniya's mother) and the emerging noble intelligentsia. Although the new generation of gentry had not lost touch with national sources of culture yet (this is attested to by Dolgorukov's own excellent command of the Russian language), there is a distinct watershed between the noble intelligentsia and the illiterate rural public. "Her (Yevgeniya's mother's--O.Ch.) words were clever and even educative, but we did not understand this yet. We were both so young and so accustomed to the sterility of society conversations that not one of the sensible country phrases could influence our thinking" [5, p 124]. The wise Dolgorukov realized that when he assimilated new cultural values, he was also losing something: He had grown accustomed to wordly chatter but could not understand the "proverbs" of the rural inhabitant and could no longer hear all of the "clever," educative, useful, and sensible things she had to say.

The gap between cultural levels was too great, and conversation was impossible. This sense of the gap, the distance, and even the abyss between the old provincial nobility and the noble intelligentsia is particularly important for an understanding of the social results of the new educational system.

Yelizaveta Rubanovskaya was a member of the first Smolnyy graduating class who was awarded the gold medal. Unfortunately, little is known about her life. But it was she, not Radishchev's wife, but his sister-in-law, his wife's sister, who followed him, a man convicted of crimes against the state, to Siberia in that time of ignorance, long before the era when the wives of the Decembrists followed their husbands, arousing the anger of the authorities and the delight of progressive circles. In Siberia Rubanovskaya married Radishchev, bore him three children, and was his friend and loyal helpmate. When Paul ordered Radishchev's return, the family set off on the journey, but Yelizaveta Vasilyevna fell ill and died in Tobolsk.

We can assume that the results of the new educational system were not what the ideologists of "enlightened despotism" expected. The ideas of the Enlightenment, which the empress preached at the start of her reign, contained the seeds of social criticism and political opposition. When they were assimilated by the best people of that era, they played a definite role in shaping the intelligentsia. Yes, the Smolnyy girls were brought up to be loyal subjects, but this apparently did not have a strong effect on their minds if one of the best pupils of the Smolnyy Institute, under the patronage of the monarch (and, what is more, a member of her favorite graduating class,



the first), followed a criminal to Siberia, a man the empress described as a rebel worse than Pugachev.

As we know, during his years of exile Radishchev was given ready assistance by his friend and coworker A.R. Vorontsov, but there was also another person who played a prominent and productive role in the fate of Radishchev and his wife. This was Glafira Alymova-Rzhevskaya, a friend of Rubanovskaya. "Of all my Smolnyy relationships," Alymova-Rzhevskaya wrote, "only my friendship with Mlle. Rubanovskaya aroused strong feelings. These feelings reached the point of absolute devotion on both sides. When she died, I had a chance to help her family, her children, and in this way I paid a sacred debt, paying for her friendship, which had not required the slightest sacrifice on my part up to that time. A skilled pen could write an entire book about her virtues, her misfortunes, and her spiritual strength, which would set an example for many" [6, pp 13-14]. Rzhevskaya not only did not break off relations with her friend (we should recall the earlier days, especially the days of the palace coups in the middle of the century, when there was a dead zone of betrayal and fear surrounding those who were in disfavor), she sent packages and letters to Siberia, and she worried about Radishchev's oldest sons (whom he did not take with him when he was exiled). "The poor children are here," Rzhevskaya wrote to Vorontsov. "I treat them as if they were my own and I see them often. They are extremely handsome and well bred.... Their grievous situation is so pathetic to any sensitive person, that the words of their unfortunate father, who entrusted them to me in his last letter, are breaking my heart. What torments me the most is the knowledge that I cannot devote all of my energy to them" [7, p 452]. When Rubanovskaya died, Rzhevskaya took care of her children.

No, the Smolnyy pupils during that initial period of the institute's existence were certainly not the "hens" they were said to be. Conceived as "a new breed of people," they personified (at least those we have been able to examine more closely) the progressive culture of the era and the features of genuine intelligence. This was true of Nelidova, who was able to keep Paul's savage temper in check for so long; it was true of Yevgeniya Dolgorukova, who died so young and was the delight of her family and of a large group of friends; it was true of Rubanovskaya, who followed Radishchev to Siberia; and it was true of Alymova-Rzhevskaya, who was such a loyal friend in their years of trouble.

The Russian sociopedagogical utopia was never realized. The "new breed of people," as the empress thought of it, turned out to be a myth. And could things have gone otherwise? By pursuing a rigid policy on serfdom, Catherine departed from the ideals she had tried to introduce at the start of her reign. She abandoned Smolnyy and she forgot Betskoy, who lingered on for years before he died, old, blind, and alone. The privilege granted to the non-gentry Smolnyy graduates, of making their serf husbands free men, also turned out to be short-lived (in any case, the archives of the board of trustees contain complaints from pupils that they had been virtually deprived of this privilege [8, p 204]).

There is nothing surprising about the fact that the utopia was not realized. What is surprising is that many of its elements did materialize. Reflecting

this age of numerous social conflicts with rare clarity, the pedagogical system of Catherine and Betskoy produced distinctive results, some of which were unexpected by "enlightened despotism." It gave rise to a new type of personality, distinguished by unprecedented self-awareness. It was not completely free yet, but it already had a chance to let reason pass judgment on the actions of the powers that be and, what is particularly important, to have its own opinions and its own dignity and integrity. Are these not the features of genuine intelligence?

It is difficult to judge how much the educational establishments contributed to this, but there is no doubt that the sociopedagogical program of the Russian enlighteners promoted the vigorous accumulation of creative energy and social experience and the maturation of the progressive moral outlook of new generations of the noble intelligentsia (the intellectual ferment and constant moral work among the common people were revealed by recent historical investigations). The progressive people of Catherine's age did not act on their ideological and moral inquiries--their minds were only awakened--but their children were among those who stood on Senate Square on 14 December 1825. The 18th century laid the foundation for the great 19th century.

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## ROLE OF LABOR COLLECTIVES IN RESOLUTION OF PROBLEMS IN SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 2, Mar-Apr 87 (signed to press 17 Mar 87) pp 135-137

[Report by A.K. Meshcherkin]

[Text] An all-union applied science conference on "The Augmentation of the Role of Labor Collectives in the Resolution of Problems in Social and Economic Development in Line With the Decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the Objectives of Trade Unions" was held in Moscow. The conference was attended by scientists and trade union personnel from 80 cities in our country. An introductory speech was presented by AUCCTU Secretary K. Turysov.

Academician A.I. Anchishkin, director of the Institute of the Economics and Forecasting of Scientific and Technical Progress of the USSR Academy of Sciences, discussed social problems in the use of labor resources at a time of stepped-up national development. The present situation, the speaker said, will necessitate the transfer of around 3 million or 4 million people from existing production units to new spheres of labor. The potential for this exists. For example, the labor force in Moscow has been augmented mainly by previously part-time workers and the increase in scientific personnel has been equivalent to the natural population increase. We must learn to find labor reserves locally, despite the fact that this could be quite painful from the social and psychological standpoints. We must stop the artificial equalization of the wages of creatively gifted and efficiently working innovators, rationalizers, and inventors with the earnings of those who do a mediocre job. Why are we afraid to pay innovators more than 5 percent of the economic impact of their proposals? This kind of economizing is highly uneconomical because it inhibits scientific and technical progress. Serious problems must be solved in the training, retraining, and advanced training of personnel. In view of the difficulty of changing the skills and attitudes of middle-aged people, we should concentrate on the training of personnel through the system of vocational and technical institutes.

Professor S.I. Shkurko, doctor of economic sciences and director of the AUCCTU Scientific Center, spoke of the need to expand the boundaries of the economic autonomy of enterprises considerably. The Act on Labor Collectives, he said, offers workers and employees broad opportunities for participation in the

management of production, but the results of a representative sociological analysis indicated that this participation is still negligible. The general meeting is still being conducted in the same old way. This means that the legal foundation exists, but the opportunities it has created are not being utilized. Why not? Labor collectives have no economic interest in the management of production. This kind of interest is only created by full economic accountability. It is already completely obvious that the improvement of the economic mechanism from the top down should be accompanied by increased initiative from the bottom up. In connection with this, under the new conditions of economic management it will be particularly important to keep labor better informed of all aspects of enterprise operations.

The economic councils of labor collectives (STK's), which came into being just recently, represent one form of participation by labor in the management of production. The work of STK's in the Kriogenmash Scientific Production Association and in Trust No 18 of the Moscow Oblast Agricultural Construction Administration has demonstrated their substantial economic and social impact, but it has also raised a number of questions about the respective functions and powers of the STK's, the general meeting, and the trade union committees of enterprises and associations. In the opinion of S.I. Shkurko, the general meeting (or conference) should make decisions on major issues concerning the entire enterprise and all personnel, and the STK should make decisions on matters pertaining to individual subdivisions or groups of personnel.

Hero of Socialist Labor V.P. Serikov, chairman of the council of brigade leaders of the Central Committee of the Construction and Construction Materials Industry Workers Trade Union, said that violations of the Act on Labor Collectives by administrators occur because workers do not know enough about the act. Decisions on the appointment of brigade leaders, the hiring of new members, and the transfer of personnel are made without the participation of the brigade. The administration sometimes violates labor legislation by obligating workers to work on their days off. Many phony brigades are formed, V.P. Serikov went on to say, for the sake of statistics and a "fine" report. Contracts are negotiated for specific stages of the work instead of for the final product, and this complicates quality control. Job orders are still being issued for some types of work. The brigade contract is often initiated by office personnel rather than by the workers. Sometimes the workers do not even know that they are working on a contract, do not understand it, and are afraid of it. Interest in the brigade contract must be stimulated so that each worker will strive for this kind of contract. Our council, V.P. Serikov said, receives around 14,000 letters a year. They contain ideas, opinions, and complaints. The State Committee for Labor and Social Problems should set up an agency to supervise the analysis and implementation of the laboring public's suggestions. The creation of an all-union council of brigade leaders should be considered. The brigade's right of socialist enterprise should also be legalized by assigning it the status of a primary state cell.

Professor A.K. Orlov, doctor of economic sciences and director of the Chelyabinsk Division of the Higher School of the Trade Union Movement imeni N.M. Shvernika, analyzed forms of participation by labor in management and self-management. There is the assumption, he said, that incentives are the



best way of encouraging socioeconomic activity. In my opinion, this is not true. Incentives are secondary: A sense of responsibility is the main thing. Only this will give a person a proprietary sense, and the real proprietor does not avoid work, steal, or shirk his work. How can this proprietary sense be developed? Labor collectives should be the owners of the means of production, not through economic appropriation, but through possession, distribution, and use. As a result, they will become involved in management as well as production. Only this can engender a responsible attitude toward public property. Trade unions will play a more important role if they take responsibility for the work of labor collective councils, for the "weak" points of collectives (for example, the revision of output norms), the determination of the best ways of stimulating the human factor, the organization of socialist competition, the development of the socioconsumer infrastructure, rationalization and invention. Socialist competition cannot be effective as long as only 5 percent of the economic incentive fund is distributed to the winners.

Difficulties in the enforcement of the act, Chairman V.V. Tkachenko of the Moldavian Republic Committee of Machine Building and Instrument Building Workers Trade Unions said, are more likely to arise at the highest level of management than at the enterprise level. The ministries do not consider the opinion of labor collectives, especially in matters of planning, and sometimes force them to produce unnecessary goods.

The speech by nationally acclaimed rural construction organizer N.I. Travkin aroused great interest. He began with the statement that the proprietor is the person who takes care of management. For this reason, the formation of the STK's is of tremendous significance.

In our Trust No 18, the speaker went on to say, the STK's initial functions were the distribution of wages to contracted collectives and the reinforcement of labor discipline. The regular and permanent members of the STK were representatives of the "quadrangle," and the replaceable portion of the membership consisted of engineering and technical personnel, employees, and workers. Furthermore, the latter make up at least 60 percent of the total membership and are re-elected twice a year, so that each worker has a chance to undergo training in economic management and administration. The STK's functions were gradually expanded, extending to new spheres of collective operations (competition, planning, social affairs, etc.). One of the managers or chief specialists presented a report at the monthly meeting. If his work was considered to be unsatisfactory, the meeting could investigate his professional competence. The atmosphere of complete openness excludes the possibility of complaints and objections to STK decisions. These decisions can be abrogated only by a general meeting of the labor collective.

The brigade form of labor organization and incentives was the subject of a report by L.A. Grigoryeva, senior research associate at the Leningrad State University imeni A.A. Zhdanov Institute of Specific Sociological Research. The results of extensive studies at industrial enterprises in Leningrad and Petrozavodsk refute the skeptical statements of some scientists and practical workers. The introduction of the brigade form of labor has enhanced labor productivity by 40 percent at some enterprises (with a rise of only 30 percent

attributed to technical improvements). Social indicators (discipline, personnel turnover, and the combination of professions) are 1.5-2 times more optimal in the brigades of the new type. Many social problems are resolved more successfully. But simply uniting workers in a brigade will not necessarily produce an economic and social impact. Existing brigades can be divided into three groups in terms of their quality: those with a low, average, or high level of development. Only the associations of the third type are truly efficient and this is why an overemphasis on quantity profanes a useful innovation. In the opinion of the speaker, the contracted, economically accountable brigade is the most promising type. The awareness of sharing in the possession of the means of production can have a tremendous production and social impact. The release of manpower in brigades of the third type is more than triple the average. And this, in the opinion of the workers themselves, is not the maximum. The instability of the wage fund, which is constantly reduced in connection with the reduced number of workers, is the stumbling-block here. This frequently leads to the concealment of reserves. L.A. Grigoryeva proposed that stable wage funds be established for brigades for 5, 10, or more years.

Chairman B.I. Komarov of the Moscow obkom of the Metallurgical Industry Workers Trade Union told how the powers of the act are used by metallurgical enterprises in the Moscow suburbs. The practice of issuing the conditions of socialist competition "from above" has been abandoned here. Now these decisions are made at general meetings of brigades and shops. In other words, the workers themselves have taken the initiative. It is only after this that the trade union committee and administration inform the trade union obkom of the results. Following the example of the Podolsk Chemical and Metallurgical Plant, they sum up the results monthly instead of quarterly and publicize them. The result at the Elektrostal Plant, for example, has been the sharp reduction of different types of socialist competition and larger financial awards for the winners. The sums are still negligible (4-7 percent of the incentive fund), however, and this is still the main cause of the low effectiveness of labor competition. Chairman P.S. Penkov of the trade union committee of the Tomskneft Production Association also feels that awards for socialist competition should represent 30-40 percent of incentive funds and that this could be achieved with a commensurate decrease in regular bonuses.

The role of labor collectives in the resolution of the housing problem was discussed by G.P. Makarov, senior research associate from the AUCCTU Scientific Center. Over 70 percent of new state housing is built in line with enterprise plans, and enterprises now manage 60 percent of all available housing in the country. Labor collectives take part in drawing up plans for the improvement of the housing conditions of personnel and monitor their fulfillment, but the procedures of this participation have still not been precisely defined.

At the end of the conference participants requested the presidium to prepare recommendations summarizing the results of the conference.

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## PUBLIC EDUCATION AND MOBILITY

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 2, Mar-Apr 87 (signed to press 17 Mar 87) pp 137-138

[Report by N.V. Andrushchak]

[Text] In October 1985 a regular session of the working group on "Education and Mobility" of the Third Problems Commission for Multilateral Cooperation by the Academies of Sciences of Socialist Countries on "Social Processes in the Socialist Society" was held in the ISI [Institute of Sociological Research] of the USSR Academy of Sciences (it was coordinated by the Sociology Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences).

The session was called to order by V.A. Mansurov, doctor of philosophical sciences and deputy director of the ISI, USSR Academy of Sciences, and K. Doktor, chairman of the third problems commission and director of the Philosophy and Sociology Institute of the Polish Academy of Sciences. In line with the plan for multilateral cooperation during the 1986-1990 period, the discussion focused on organizational matters: the status of scientific research into education and social mobility, forms of cooperation and the plans of the working group up to 1990, and the preparation of a collective monograph.

Professor F.R. Filippov, doctor of philosophical sciences, presented a report on "The Restructuring of the Educational System in the USSR and Its Social Significance." He described the social functions of the educational system in connection with the reform of general and vocational education. During the discussion Polish scientists mentioned that educational issues had not been studied sufficiently in Poland, particularly the issues connected with the need to reorganize the educational system in the country. In particular, W. Adamski (Poland) said that everyone acknowledges the need for reform but no one knows the directions it should take. Analyzing the social aspects of the educational situation in the GDR, I. Steiner mentioned the extremely high prestige of worker professions and the high wages of workers (75 percent of the students completing the 10th grade begin their professional education in plant schools, 10 percent enroll in VUZ's, and 15 percent enroll in secondary specialized academic institutions). There is no question that the main reason is the well-organized vocational guidance that begins in the 6th grade, as well as the desire of young men and women to uphold family traditions and maintain professional continuity.

Some experience in the study of social and educational mobility has also been accumulated in Czechoslovakia, where, as A. Mateovski reported, studies of this kind have been conducted twice. The latest, conducted in 1984 by the Philosophy and Sociology Institute of the Czech and Slovak Academy of Sciences, revealed several new trends. The study served as the basis for a forecast of the educational situation in the country. The members of the younger generation will have a lower educational level than their parents. This is due to the higher percentage of youths enrolling in vocational institutes and the rise in the birthrate in recent years (although it is now declining).

The problems of the devaluation of technical education and personnel training, including the need to stabilize professional choices in accordance with specialized labor training, are more acute in Bulgaria, B. Yermenov said. Unfortunately, young people regard vocational education only as preparation for a higher education. The study of these problems and the elaboration of practical recommendations will be extremely difficult: To date, there is no scientific group studying educational sociology. Some observations, however, can nevertheless be made: The very principles of studies of education must be changed radically, so that these studies are based on qualitative evaluations rather than on formal criteria of effectiveness.

Social mobility has been a matter of constant interest to Hungarian sociologists for a long time, I. Hrubos said. Although the latest study (1983) did not reveal any tendency toward decline, the very nature of mobility has changed. For example, as far as higher education is concerned, the ambitions of young people are not very strong, and the new members of the intelligentsia are mainly women whose parents were members of the intelligentsia. This indicates a tendency toward the self-reproduction of this group, particularly in the case of women. Among men the prestige of intellectual labor is constantly declining, and this is probably due to the low wages, although this is far from the main reason for the decline. The fact is that the very system of education forces the young person to choose between secondary school or vocational school. Young people can either have a trade they have mastered (after vocational school) or go on for a higher education (after secondary school). But after all, it is no secret that the wishes of people and the possibility of the society do not always coincide, and the students who enroll in secondary school therefore take the risk of ending up without a specialty.

A follow-up analysis of the data, a poll of experts to learn their views on the future development of the educational system, and the exchange of national reports are to be conducted in line with a single program (to be drafted by the Czechoslovak side).

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## INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM OF RESEARCHERS OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE

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[Report on international symposium in Berlin in December 1986]

[Text] An international science symposium, timed to coincide with the 35th anniversary of the Academy of Social Sciences of the SED Central Committee, was held in Berlin in December 1986. The symposium was organized by the Problems Commission for Multilateral Cooperation by the Academies of Sciences in Socialist Countries and the working group on "The Dynamics of the Social Structure." Director R. Weidig of the Institute of Marxist-Leninist Sociology (GDR) called the session to order and stressed that sociologists in the socialist countries who study the social structure have had to deal with much more complex topics than in the past as a result of the intensification of scientific and technical progress. This obligates them to use accumulated experience in cooperation for further advancement in the interpretation of more tenacious and complex tendencies.

Speakers discussed some analytical aspects of the study of the social structure of the socialist society and described the results of research conducted in recent years. M. Letsch (GDR) directed attention to the little-studied positive aspects of social distinctions in the socialist society, particularly those which cannot be called "remnants," but are inherent in the socialist society and promote its development and consolidation. It is known, for example, that the "axis" of social differentiation is shifting from the sphere of socialist property relations to more complex intraclass and extra-class distinctions. The correlation of levels of labor skills is changing, and the term "skilled worker" has different meanings in different fields of production, and this must be taken into account in studies of the structure of the working class.

A significant but controversial theory of the social structure of socialist society was proposed by T. Kolosi (Hungary). In his opinion, interclass distinctions have virtually disappeared in the Hungarian society, but there is a new structure of differentiation requiring a new approach for its explanation. Market relations, affecting the "second economy" more than state property, have acquired greater importance. The combination of differences between classes and strata can be depicted in the form of an

L-shaped model, in which the groups connected with state, cooperative, or individual ownership are located on the horizontal (short) axis, and groups differing in terms of the overall features of their standard of living as a result of the restratification of society are located on the vertical (long) axis.

The rapid eradication of social differences between workers and peasant members of cooperatives in Bulgaria was mentioned by K. Dimitrov (Bulgaria). However, he stressed, it would be wrong to exaggerate the increasing homogeneity of the society and to lose sight of the differences between the groups and strata making it up. It will be important to compare the speed of their convergence in terms of different indicators--economic, political, and cultural--and to study the dual social role of private farms, particularly their effect on the development of the society and on the worker himself.

The many years of experience in studying the social structure in Poland, L. Bieskid (Poland) said, cannot be applied automatically to the current situation. It is influenced greatly by the "shadow economy," by speculation, and by other illegal means of making money. The differentiation of the public standard of living is continuing, and according to the latest public opinion polls the main factors involved in this process are the level of education, the place of residence, and the age of respondents and the number of family members. Small families (up to three people) usually have better opportunities for greater prosperity, and this is why state aid to large families is so important. New studies of the dynamics of the social structure should give the state the information it needs for the resolution of complex social problems.

Studies of the social structure, A. Matejovsky (CSSR) said, lay the foundation for a truly scientific social policy and the attainment of the main goals of socialism. These studies should reveal the dialectics of objective and subjective factors in the development of social class relations. With a view to the interests of the working class as the leading force in the socialist society, it will be necessary to concentrate more on forecasts of the social structure, not for the purpose of painting utopian pictures of the future, but for the analysis of real problems. It is obvious that today's researchers should concentrate less on the social composition of the population and more on changes in the lifestyle of social groups. The situation with regard to education is also different: The younger generation could be less educated than older ones. J. Kosta (CSSR) cited extensive data on changes in the social structure of the Slovak Socialist Republic and noted the relative stabilization of the professional and sectorial composition of the labor force.

The new approaches to the study of the social structure of Soviet society, in line with the strategy elaborated at the 27th CPSU Congress, were discussed in a report by F.R. Filippov (USSR). The primitive and simplistic approaches to the study of social class relations must be rejected, and the Marxist-Leninist principles of their class analysis must be observed consistently. It will be important to thoroughly analyze the factors securing the performance of the vanguard functions of the working class, reveal the social role of cooperative ownership and the differentiating effects of the nature of labor and conditions of distribution, and study trends in the social, intersectorial, and

professional mobility of labor. The acceleration of socioeconomic progress will increase the need for the enhancement of the social effectiveness of education on all of its levels. The idea of a unified system of continuous education requires detailed sociological investigation.

Creative cooperation by sociologists from the socialist countries is acquiring special importance under these conditions. Participants in the symposium approved the working group's plan of action up to 1990, stipulating the need for several analytical discussions and the preparation and publication of collective works.

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## EFFICIENT USE OF PUBLIC CONSUMPTION FUNDS

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[Report by V.M. Rutgayzer]

[Text] The distribution of public consumption funds (PCF) requires considerable modernization. The conservative conditions of their formation and use evoke public dissatisfaction with payments, benefits and, in particular, free services. This was the main topic of discussion at a conference of specialists from the research establishments of planning agencies in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, the USSR, and the CSSR in fall 1986 in Sofia.

The results of a sociological study of satisfaction with PCF were cited in a report by the Czechoslovak delegation. Less than a third of the respondents agreed that the PCF played an important role in securing their well-being. This survey, according to O. Sobeka and A. Zatkalikova (CSSR), proved conclusively that the interests of certain segments of the population are not always taken into account when the public resources allocated for the development of the PCF are used.

In the countries represented at the conference, wages have been less significant in the overall system of distribution in the last 15 or 20 years because of a proportional increase in the PCF. This decreasing significance is particularly evident within the context of forms of distribution closely related to the PCF and encompassing various kinds of state subsidies on the prices of retail goods and paid services and other privileges. The process has been particularly intensive in the case of the worker's income. In Bulgaria, for example, the correlation of wages to PCF payments and benefits changed from 77.3:22.7 in 1980 to 75.2:24.8 in 1985. The change was even more significant in the case of the worker's income: from 73.6:26.4 in 1980 to 68.5:31.5 in 1985. All of this, as Bulgarian specialists Ts. Stoykov and E. Maslarova demonstrated, is reducing the effectiveness of distribution according to labor. It will be impossible to completely surmount negative tendencies by reducing PCF and transferring the remaining resources into the system of distribution according to labor. This is an extremely limited way of enhancing the role of wages in the overall system of distribution.

Speakers at the conference stressed the need to allocate more resources for total wages by eliminating retail price subsidies. In their opinion, these



subsidies are the least effective way of distributing goods and services because they depend less on labor and demand than on public purchasing power. This method of acquiring goods is essentially unrelated to distribution according to labor in the socialist society. The quicker growth of retail price subsidies in comparison to total wages is diminishing the social significance of the latter, and this will eventually diminish labor's prestige as the basis of public welfare. This is why retail price subsidies should be limited to "socially relevant" goods and services (such as medicine, some children's goods, etc.).

In the majority of socialist countries the subsidies on retail prices of goods and services are taken into account only on a limited scale: For example, only part of the cost of maintaining state housing uncovered by apartment rent is calculated in Hungary and the USSR. As for other types of subsidies, they would seem to be outside the framework of PCF distribution.

An analysis of the general conditions of distribution, however, requires the disclosure of the place and role of resources connected with the subsidization of retail goods and services. The practice of statisticians and planners in the GDR, who include all retail price subsidies as PCF, warrants consideration. According to speakers at the conference, the integral approach to the calculation of all forms of the acquisition of goods offers extensive opportunities to manage the process of distribution as a whole. Even if retail price subsidies on goods and services are not included in the PCF, they should nevertheless be taken into account in the distribution of vital necessities. A report by V.M. Rutgayzer (USSR) suggested the use of a new gauge of public welfare for this purpose--total goods and services distributed. This is the first step toward the better calculation of PCF and income from wages. It will consist in transcending the bounds of the correlation of PCF and wages. It will require an integral estimate of total public resources connected with the distribution of consumer comforts: They are not confined to wages and PCF. The inclusion of retail price subsidies and turnover tax in the system of indicators of public welfare will have to be reconsidered. Since the latter tax is an excise tax (that is, a means of income redistribution), it should be excluded from the resources securing public well-being. The turnover tax should actually be deducted from the total quantity of these resources. This was demonstrated, in particular, by the drop in alcoholic beverage sales in the USSR, which was accompanied by a sharp decrease in the turnover tax collected and a corresponding increase in public purchasing power. The population is spending these sums on material goods and services.

The second problem is connected with the inclusion of vacation pay in the PCF. Two approaches were examined at the conference. One consists in excluding vacation pay from the PCF. The main argument in favor of this solution is the following. The annual vacation is one of the conditions for the reproduction of the labor force throughout the year. For this reason, its guaranteed reproduction cannot be related only to monthly wages. This requires the calculation of annual wages, and these should include vacation pay. Naturally, with this approach vacation pay should be excluded from the PCF.

The second approach consists in excluding the vacation pay of people employed in education, public health, culture, sports, tourism, and so forth from the PCF. Vacation pay is part of the overhead costs of services in these fields (free services). Besides this, vacation pay is included in the total wage fund in these fields. Consequently, the vacation pay of service employees is calculated twice in the PCF: once in the value of the free services and once again in PCF payments for vacations.

Two opposite points of view were expressed at the conference with regard to decentralized sources of PCF. The first was set forth by Bulgarian specialists: These sources are an important condition of increasing social significance in the satisfaction of the collective needs of the population (in the place of employment). In connection with this, they not only have a purely social purpose but are also an element of the system of economic management and financial incentives. The second point of view was stated by specialists from Czechoslovakia. In their opinion, decentralized sources of PCF are an obsolete and ineffective method of distributing goods and services in the socialist society. There are economic and social reasons for their integration within the system of statewide PCF (for example, the recreational centers belonging to enterprises are used only one-fourth or one-third as much as facilities accessible to the general public). Furthermore, the social reasons are growing more important because the present system for the use of decentralized sources of PCF is intensifying the unjustified differentiation of the consumption of different goods and services by the population of the CSSR and is violating the principles of social justice in the overall system of distribution. The Czechoslovak specialists did not, however, suggest the complete elimination of decentralized sources of PCF. In their opinion, their competition with centralized sources should be stopped, because this competition can put some segments of the population in an inferior position when it comes to acquiring goods and services that should be provided through centralized sources of PCF in principle.

This approach, as P. Ondracka (CSSR) demonstrated, will create the necessary conditions for the "separation" of centralized and differentiated sources of PCF. The purpose of the centralized use of PCF is the satisfaction of the citizen's social needs, whereas the decentralized sources should satisfy needs connected with the more efficient use of manpower. Now this separation does not exist, and the two systems are displaying parallel development. This is the reason for the low effectiveness of services provided by decentralized sources and for their socially unjustified differentiation in various departments and enterprises.

The Czechoslovak specialists believe that the time has come to unite most of the social development resources of enterprises and associations under the jurisdiction of territorial administrative bodies. Enterprise participation in the formation of local social development resources can be organized in the form of payment for labor resources (standard deductions for social undertakings depending on the number of personnel). This would also promote the more economical use of manpower at enterprises.

The remaining portion of social development resources at enterprises could be used to improve working conditions, to compensate for unfavorable features of

these conditions, and to finance advanced personnel training. The Czechoslovak specialists also believe that there should be no departmental kindergartens and nurseries. In their opinion, enterprise resources should be used for the maintenance of recreational and cultural facilities. Centralized sources of PCF can secure their more economically effective and socially justifiable development.

Speakers directed special attention to the connection between social security and social assistance on the one hand and the overall situation with regard to public welfare on the other. The following methods of improving this sphere of PCF were suggested. One consists in changing the nominal rate of monetary payments from PCF depending on the general rise in consumer prices. This was suggested by Czechoslovak specialists. The system used in Poland since 1986 for the recalculation of pensions depending on the rise in consumer prices was discussed by I. Zukowska (Poland).

Cost of living adjustments in pensions were discussed by D. Yenei and G. Ball (Hungary). Hungary has some experience in this. In the last 10 years pensions there have been raised at a rate of around 100 forints a year, but this has secured the real value of only the lowest pensions (below 1,500 forints a month). The real value of the rest has declined by around 30 percent in the last 5 years, especially in the case of high pensions. By a decision enacted in 1986, pensions will be subject to a regular annual increase of at least 2 percent. In the case of pensions for people over 70 and the disabled, the annual increase should be tied to the change in retail prices. All segments of the population suffer the unfavorable effects of rising consumer prices, but they are usually able to compensate for these losses (by performing additional work or by participating in various types of small-scale enterprise). The elderly and disabled do not have these opportunities. It is no coincidence that around half of the funds allocated for PCF monetary payments will be used to maintain the real value of pensions for the elderly and disabled in Hungary in 1986-1990.

In all of the countries represented at the conference the size of the average pension in relation to wages has decreased. For example, the average pension in Czechoslovakia was equivalent to 59 percent of the average wage in 1975 and 52 percent in 1985, and the highest pension was equivalent to only 34 percent of the highest wage in 1975 and 27 percent in 1985. Besides this, people who retired long ago have smaller pensions than people who retired in recent years. All of this is diminishing the stimulating effect of the system of pension security, especially among highly skilled workers.

An increase in the maximum pension amount, the regular elevation of older pensions to the level of new ones, and broader opportunities to increase pensions by means of larger voluntary contributions from wages prior to retirement are planned in the majority of countries.

A decision was made at the conference to summarize the most important methods of improving the planning of PCF in a joint report, which will then be submitted to planning agencies in the socialist countries.

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## ENHANCING THE QUALITY OF LABOR POTENTIAL

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 2, Mar-Apr 87 (signed to press 17 Mar 87) pp 141-143

[Report by V.M. Lupandin]

[Text] The problem of the quality of labor potential has aroused the interest of many specialists. The acceleration of scientific and technical progress, the intensification of production, and the increasing intellectualization of labor are making higher demands on the worker's education, intellectual development, and creative initiative. Negative trends, however, have been noted in recent years in the qualitative composition of labor resources in connection with alcohol abuse and alcoholism, the increased number of mentally retarded people, and the increase in illnesses caused by environmental pollution. Until recently discussions of such acute problems as the qualitative composition of the population, alcoholism, and mental retardation were considered to be "in bad taste." The departments studying these vitally important issues concealed the unfavorable trends of recent years from the public and asserted that the widespread mental retardation among children in the USSR, for example, was only a fraction of recorded indicators for developed countries, that the alcoholism of a father had no effect on his offspring, and so forth.

For the first time in many years all of these urgent problems were discussed in an atmosphere of complete openness at an extended session of the academic councils of the ISI [Institute of Sociological Research], USSR Academy of Sciences, the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Social Hygiene and Public Health Organization imeni N.A. Semashko of the USSR Ministry of Health, the Lvov division of the Economics Institute of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences, and the social ecology section of the Moscow branch of the Soviet Sociological Association. The session, which took place in December 1986, was held to discuss the program for "The Enhancement of the Quality of Labor Potential in Lvov Oblast," which was drawn up by the Lvov obkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, the Lvov division of the Economics Institute of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences, and the Family Sociology Department of the ISI, USSR Academy of Sciences.

There is no need to discuss the program in detail: Its content, purpose, and objectives have already been reported in the press [1]. The program was



commended by USSR Gosplan, the State Committee of the USSR for Labor and Social Problems, the AUCCTU, and the Presidium of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences, its basic premises were employed in the republic (Ukrainian SSR) "Labor" program, and it became part of the plan for the socioeconomic development of Lvov Oblast in 1986-1990. All of this gave speakers a chance to discuss questions of theory and procedure, the scientific bases of the program, and the prospects for the development of documents of this kind in other oblasts and in the country as a whole.

Doctor of Philosophical Sciences A.G. Kharchev recalled in his report that a discussion of the increase in mental retardation as a result of alcoholism and the danger of unjustifiably and deliberately understated estimates of the number of mentally retarded in the population was initiated 10 years ago in the presidium of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences by the ISI Family Sociology Department he heads and by the Genetics Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the Moscow Scientific Research Institute of Psychiatry. The existing faulty practice of understating negative indicators, the speaker said, is inhibiting scientific and technical progress. The presidium of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences adopted a decree on more extensive scientific research into the epidemiology of mental retardation, but the departmental position on the matter conflicted in many respects with the opinion of scientists. As a result, the dangerous tendency toward an increase in pathological abnormalities in infants is not being counteracted effectively. The lack of programs for the rehabilitation of the mentally retarded keeps them from getting the appropriate vocational guidance and from taking part in national production. As a rule, they become a burden on society. The timely disclosure of these individuals and effective social assistance could have involved them in the labor process by now. The long-overdue resolution of this problem will necessitate scientific investigation within the framework of the unionwide program of special measures to enhance the quality of labor potential. In the United States the struggle against mental retardation has been going on since 1961, and 121,000 specialists--physicians, psychologists, sociologists, and jurists--are working in the field of mental health. Programs to enhance the qualitative composition of the population and, above all, of labor potential are being carried out in 80 countries in the world. Decisions such as the refusal to institute voluntary premarital medical examinations and the concealment of the problems of mental retardation, alcoholism, and drug addiction for so many years seem particularly odd against this background.

In his report, Professor V.K. Ovcharov, director of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Social Hygiene and Public Health Organization imeni N.A. Semashko of the USSR Ministry of Health, stressed that public health statistics have reflected increasing territorial differences in the last two decades. These differences, which are connected with an improper lifestyle, the spread of bad habits, and the increasing effect of subjective factors on morbidity, are tenfold in the case of some diseases. The causes of these differences will be studied within the framework of the institute program of public health research in connection with the 1989 census.

Demographic factors were also mentioned among the causes of growing negative tendencies in the qualitative composition of labor resources. Deputy director

M.I. Dolishniy of the Economics Institute of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences, the head of the Lvov division of the institute, illustrated this with figures from Lvov Oblast, where there has been a decrease of 32.8 percent in the birthrate and of 10 percent in the marriage rate in the last 25 years, while the number of divorces has increased 2.5-fold, with young couples accounting for 40 percent of the total. These trends are having an adverse effect on the physical development and health of children and are diminishing the intellectual and creative potential of future generations. Studies conducted in Lvov Oblast revealed the inadequate development of overall ability in 12-18 percent of all upperclassmen and emotional disorders in 8-13 percent.

The ability of negative changes in the environment to compound these unfavorable social factors was discussed in the reports by Doctor of Medical Sciences D.K. Sokolov, head of the Public Health Assessment and Forecasting Department of the Scientific Research Institute of General and Communal Hygiene imeni A.N. Sysin of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences, and Candidate of Medical Sciences G.F. Grigoryev, chief physician at the Kanashskiy Rayon Hospital. Many of the chemical pollutants in the cities, especially vehicle exhaust, have an adverse effect on the reproduction function of the human being and lead to an increase in congenital defects. Around 38 out of every 100 cases of inadequate physical development in teenagers are connected with negative environmental factors. Grigoryev cited figures from the Chuvash ASSR to prove that the extensive use of toxic chemicals (pesticides) in agriculture in the last 20 years has been accompanied by a higher rate of disease and congenital abnormalities.

Doctor of Medical Sciences V.M. Lupandin concentrated in his report on the prospects for the unionwide program to enhance the quality of labor potential and set forth the main theoretical and methodological principles of its development. The qualitative aspect, he stressed, must be taken into account in discussions of population growth. Human communities have different social and demographic patterns, and the changes in these in the last 20 years have been so great that they could be called revolutionary. There have been conflicting trends in some communities, and this is why the current practice of the use of invalid informational averages on the level of the administrative and economic region and oblast is not only absurd from the scientific standpoint but is also dangerous, because it leads to errors in economic planning and reduces the effectiveness of all social policy. The practice of the separate modeling of ecological, social, economic, and demographic processes also complicates the management of the society's development.

The special comprehensive program to enhance the quality of labor potential is an attempt to model social, ecological, and demographic processes as an indissoluble entity. The organizational work on the program will begin with the redistribution of all existing information on a new family-community or socioecological basis, which was developed by researchers in family sociology and human ecology. It is completely obvious that this program must be interdisciplinary and include a broad range of measures to strengthen the family, improve the environment, and mobilize the human factor in the acceleration of socioeconomic development. Program measures and recommendations should take the social and ecobiological mechanisms of the reproduction and creation of

labor potential into account. This will require fundamentally different methods and approaches, new organizational forms, the coordination of various research programs, and cooperation by various departments. The first steps in this direction were the session described in this report and the organization of a "Social Ecology" section in the Moscow branch of the Soviet Sociological Association, with sociologists, economists, medical experts, geneticists, virologists, and other scientists among its members.

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## PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET-FINNISH COOPERATION

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 2, Mar-Apr 87 (signed to press 17 Mar 87) pp 143-144

[Report on symposium in Suzdal]

[Text] A symposium was held in Suzdal to discuss the results of joint activity by Soviet and Finnish sociologists within the framework of the program of long-range cooperation between the academies of sciences of the USSR and Finland. This activity encompasses several fields in the humanities and takes various forms. In the field of sociology, joint comparative studies have proved to be particularly effective. They now deal with subject matter of mutual interest and are conducted according to common programs.

The results of two such projects were discussed in detail at the meeting: "Tendencies Toward Changes in the Family in the USSR and Finland" and "The Family as a Factor in Alcoholism Prevention." The first studied relations between men and women and between parents and children and the effects of the technological revolution, urbanization, and the professional careers of women on these relations. Statistics and questionnaires distributed according to a common set of procedures in Moscow, Tallin, and Helsinki served as the empirical base. An analysis indicated that the prevailing tendencies in the development of the modern family are comparatively independent of the socioeconomic system. Therefore, there should be more emphasis on general human values--which are known to coincide with the class interests of the laboring public--in the indoctrination of youth.

Working on the second project, Soviet sociologists conducted an in-depth study of the many years of Finnish experience in combating alcoholism, especially the activity of the ALKO firm. Besides this, a sufficiently representative survey of families in Moscow, Lvov and Helsinki was conducted (also according to a single set of procedures). The abovementioned firm is the most active promoter of antialcohol policy in the country. The organization uses profits from alcoholic beverage production mainly for extensive publicity warning against alcohol consumption and for studies of public attitudes toward alcohol. It is interesting that the ALKO research center is the co-executor of the project on the Finnish side. Plans call for the publication of a collective Soviet-Finnish monograph on the results of the project.



The discussion indicated that more intensive cooperation and productive investigations are also characteristic of other fields of research. Above all, this applies to studies of the social structure, time schedules, the social aspects of labor, science, and demographic development. During the discussion of cooperation in the present and future, the need to heighten the practical value of projects, to improve the quality of procedural tools, to clarify the indicators to be used in the collection and generalization of empirical information, and to choose topics for further joint study was discussed at length. The most pertinent topics mentioned included the social problems of public health care, the indoctrination of youth, and the development of cooperative forms of consumer service. The Finnish scientists underscored the importance of cooperation in enriching the theoretical content of the science of sociology and its methodology.

Finnish scientist T. Kjöppi's report on the role of cooperatives in national affairs aroused great interest. Cooperative ownership is just as widespread here as private and public ownership. Today there are around 2,000 such associations in the country. In recent years their number decreased slightly, but there was an increase in the number of their members (over 2 million) and in the scales of their activity. Cooperative associations have the most diverse structures and operate in rural communities and cities. They are competing successfully with private enterprises in industry, but they have been particularly successful in trade and consumer services. Although their share of gross national income is not great (8 percent at the end of the 1970's), it is sizeable in some sectors: 49 percent in the food industry, 41 percent in trade, and 23 percent in banking. They account for a particularly high percentage of food production and sales. At the beginning of the 1980's these associations supplied the market with 97 percent of the milk, 90 percent of the meat, 70 percent of the grain, and 60 percent of the eggs. The role of cooperatives in national life can be judged from the fact that their annual income exceeds the state budget. Finnish sociologists also underscore the social significance of cooperatives. In the opinion of scientists, they secure the principles of social justice and simultaneously stimulate personal initiative, responsibility, and conscientious labor.

Obviously, there are significant differences in, first of all, the nature of the social processes studied by Soviet and Finnish sociologists and, second, the forms of contact between science and practice and the very organization of sociological research. All of this creates definite difficulties in joint work and affects its speed and results. The mutual desire to continue and expand cooperation and the certainty that it is effective and beneficial for both countries, however, creates an atmosphere of responsibility and goodwill that helps to surmount--through concerted effort--these difficulties and attain set goals. The symposium in Suzdal also took place in this kind of atmosphere. Its scientific results were highly commended by the Finnish and Soviet sides.

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#### CHRONICLE

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 2, Mar-Apr 87 (signed to press 17 Mar 87) p 144

[Report by O.B. Bozhkov (Leningrad)]

[Text] A primary organization of the Soviet Sociological Association was formed at the Institute of Socioeconomic Problems of the USSR Academy of Sciences (Leningrad) in December 1986. Institute researchers noted that the institute had been less active in recent years in the field of sociology and that the situation would have to be corrected. The bureau of the SSA primary organization (Chairman V.B. Golofast, Deputy Chairman I.I. Travin, and Secretary G.V. Yermicheva) approved an operational plan for the first 6 months of 1987.

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## NEEDS, INTERESTS, VALUES

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 2, Mar-Apr 87 (signed to press 17 Mar 87) pp 145-148

[Review by Ye.A. Ambartsumov of book "Potrebnosti. Interesy. Tsennosti" by A.G. Zdravomyslov, Moscow, Politizdat, 1986, 223 pages; passages enclosed in slantlines are printed in italics in source]

[Text] How can the declining interest of laborers in the results of their labor and the widening gap between social needs and real development, between the interests of different social groups, and between official and actual values be surmounted? This is the subject of a monographic study by A.G. Zdravomyslov, who has been working steadily, for more than two decades now, on one of the most complex topics in our social sciences. The pointedly critical tone of the book and the analysis of conflicts and problems rather than of successes might have seemed inappropriate just a short time ago, but today this approach is extremely pertinent.

The author essentially continues the elaboration of the Marxist theory of interests, relating the fundamental ideas of the classics with the current problems and objectives of real socialism.

Historical materialism, scientific communism, ethics, axiology, social psychology, and political science--these are the sciences with "departmental" claims to A.G. Zdravomyslov's book. But the most valid claim, of course, could be made by sociology, because the author wanted to clarify the social meaning of needs, interests, and values, discuss their role as a connecting link between the society and the individual, and reveal and enhance the existing mechanisms of interaction by the social environment and the individual.

Another of the monograph's strong points deserves mention--the author's dialectical approach to these concepts and his refusal to force them into a preconceived pattern. A.G. Zdravomyslov correctly refutes, for example, "the categorical separation of needs into /reasonable/ and /unreasonable/" (p 57) and avoids the practice of drawing rigid distinctions between the terms in question because he believes that they "blend in" with one another, reflecting reality rather than oversimplifying it. Here is what he says about the relationship between needs and interests: "These terms are closely

related and interconnected: A need in one context could be a goal in another, and in some cases needs, interests, and goals can coincide completely" (p 85). At the same time, the author accurately discerns the differences between these terms: "The need focuses primarily on the means of its satisfaction.... Interests are quite closely related to distributive relations in the society because they are aimed either at changing or reinforcing existing relations.... Interests...can signify the denial or rejection of conditions perceived to be improper or inappropriate" (pp 74-75).

A.G. Zdravomyslov has much to say about the dynamism of needs and interests, directing attention to the dramatically heightened interest in environmental protection and to the emergence of the "needs for mobility, communication, education, information" and other necessities that are just as vital to modern man as food, shelter, and clothing (p 21). The author also makes the accurate observation that "tradition can be just as strong a stimulus as the love of innovation" (pp 35-36). In other words, there is nothing automatic about the development and satisfaction of needs and interests. The complexity of the task of measuring needs "gives rise to the temptation to equate the current level of consumption with the real needs of people. This can cause researchers to ignore important changes in the total system of needs as a result of the emergence of new needs" (p 52). For this reason, "in the socialist society it would be wrong to take any kind of action against this objective process (the growth and ordering of needs--Ye.A.): for example, to decide against the production of new consumer goods or the introduction of new goods and services for the sake of social equality. This policy would be tantamount to unwarranted wage leveling and the renunciation of progress" (p 55).

In general, A.G. Zdravomyslov wants the development of the socialist economy to be geared to the satisfaction of needs. This makes his statement that, in the socialist society, demand "cannot be satisfied immediately, because the production base cannot keep up with the development of effective demand" (p 54) all the more puzzling. After all, the shortages which have regrettably become the shadow of real socialism in several countries are precisely the result of an emphasis on a priori goals instead of the interests of consumers, and the other side of the coin is the surplus of goods not needed by the society. And the only corroboration of society's needs for products is the choice made by the same consumers. In other words, socialist planning, which uses the market mechanism, is the method of satisfying effective demand and the needs and interests of citizens. The author is well aware of this, but he prefers not to belabor the point.

Researchers of needs and interests have constant arguments about whether they are objective or subjective. A.G. Zdravomyslov refuses, and rightfully so, to make this kind of simple choice, dialectically underscoring the interconnection of subjective and objective elements in the nature of interests. Although "the subject's intentions are influenced by his objective state," the "subjective element of interests consists in the very...perception of his own social status and in the acuteness or dullness of his social senses. The subjective side of the matter is revealed more fully in the entire group of ideological motives--both the conscious, rational, and carefully considered



ones and the vague, indistinct, and unconscious ones. The latter can also be motives for action, and are sometimes quite strong although they remain 'unconscious' on the theoretical or ideological level" (p 88).

It is in subjectivity that the author accurately discerns the great dynamic potential that can and must be used for progressive purposes. In addition, he says that people "must have goals and objectives commensurate with reality and must realize that reality, including the vital necessities of the laboring public, is something important and fundamental and that its development is governed by objective laws unaffected by the intentions of goal-setting agencies" (p 70). On the other hand, there is also the "competitive motive and the desire to acquire the things that all or most people want" (p 35).

In an equally logical and dialectical manner, the author refuses to see an absolute contrast between genuine and false interests, stressing that "even an action in someone else's interest is based on some aspect of one's own interest" (p 89). After all, the very idea of unconscious and false interests presupposes some kind of supreme authority with a monopoly on the knowledge and understanding of the interests of subordinate social forces delegating this awareness to the authority. This is an absolutely undemocratic idea and is refuted by the author's line of reasoning.

A.G. Zdravomyslov presents a balanced account of the relationship between public and personal interests. The author notes that they "objectively coincide" in the socialist society (although it would have been more accurate to say that socialism contains all of the necessary conditions for this) but he does not ignore the real conflicts between them, especially when group interests come into play. But he does not immediately repudiate the latter either, seeing the benefits of their overt confrontation in the form of "the struggle of ideas developing on the basis of the methods of socialist democracy" (p 101).

Collectivization is another aspect of the problem. A.G. Zdravomyslov is well aware that "premature collectivization leads to formal socialism, to the bureaucratization of social relations, to the diminished interest of the masses or of some social groups in the growth and development of national production, and, consequently, to slower socialist development" (p 127). It is true that he immediately adds, as if he is afraid of being accused of "leaning" too far in the opposite direction: "Delays in the resolution of major problems in the further collectivization of production and labor lead to the birth of private interests, to alienation and departmental parochialism, and to undesirable effects of a social and economic nature" (ibid.). But after all, under the conditions of real socialism these "undesirable effects" are caused precisely by statist-centralist biases, which could hardly be described as "premature collectivization." They reinforce the departmental parochialism and bureaucratism that reflect the "private interests" that are so dangerous today. Incidentally, the author himself pointedly and accurately criticizes overcentralization and the illusory hopes for the effective accounting of all intersectorial and intrasectorial transactions by a single agency (p 124).

We could argue with the author's comparison and contrast of Marxism to the utilitarian view of the social interest as the sum of individual interests. Marx' critical attitude toward J. Bentham is no secret. Bentham's premise, however, is cited in a positive context in "The Holy Family" [1, p 148], reflecting the "system of the /correctly perceived interest/" [1, p 146]. At the same time, the author could be criticized for his too brief and "obscure" discussion of common human interests, the priority of which is obvious today.

The author's discussion of the role of financial incentives is accurate. He does not analyze it with the arrogant scorn of the dogmatist but, rather, pinpoints the "deeply ingrained sense of justice" as "their moral foundation" (p 119). In other words, financial incentives are socialist by their very nature, and any discussion of them today as the "birthmark of capitalism" is an indication of narrowmindedness and a lack of understanding and knowledge about life. But the differentiation of wages on any other basis than the labor contribution of workers (in other words, according to position), with reliance on personal and group contacts and protectionism (he should have also mentioned privileged forms of consumption), signifies that "financial incentives have come into conflict with the socialist system of values" (p 205).

An equally instructive conclusion is the following: "At a certain level of the satisfaction of the individual's physical needs...there is an important turning point--needs and interests of a social nature gain precedence. Finding this turning point is an exceptionally important and crucial matter: After all, after this point has been reached on a mass scale, the earlier points of reference in practical policy are obsolete and do not meet new requirements" (p 71). Our society is now living through this kind of period, and this is the reason for the perceptible thirst for self-expression, for new forms of communication, and for civic action, which are frequently opposed by obdurate organizational structures. Our leadership has a keen sense of this conflict that is threatening to undermine social ties. This is the reason for the appeals for openness and the intention to encourage variety in the development of socialism. Nevertheless, excessive regulation, which is a method of the self-assertion of the selfsame bureaucratic structures, can still gain the upper hand at times. A negative role is also played by the fact that "far from all people, however subjectively upright they might be, can pass the test of bearing the heavy burden of responsibility for others for a long time, a test of their authority, respect, and honor" (p 210).

This is why A.G. Zdravomyslov analyzes the antisocial interests of the bureaucracy in his examination of political interests, quite justifiably seeing the bureaucracy's self-contained nature and egotistical actions as the causes of crisis-related phenomena. But we cannot agree with the author when he blames bureaucratism on the insufficient development of the economy and thereby absolves excessive centralization. The bureaucracy can also feed successfully on the developed economy and on scientific and technical progress if it manages to put them under its control. The bureaucracy is a dangerous enemy with considerable strength, and it is therefore too early to say that "the democratization of public life is becoming irreversible" (p 140). This kind of irreversibility should be our immediate objective, because anything else leads to complacency and deals a trump card to that bureaucracy, which is skilled at adapting to changing conditions.

Here the author's declaration of reliance on automatic social mechanisms, which he refutes in other parts of the monograph, is also reflected in the false postulate that "each of the mass organizations of the laboring public represents the interests of the corresponding groups of laborers" (pp 140-141). It should, but this is not always the case. One example is the trade unions in pre-crisis Poland, which exercised their representation formally and thereby lost the trust of the laboring public.

In the beginning of his analysis of values in the last part of the book, the author describes them as interests /that have been set apart during the course of the development of history itself as a result of division of labor in the sphere of spiritual production/. But the objects of these distinctive interests, the objects of human aspirations in this case, are represented by some kind of spiritual content, consisting of a particular combination of feelings and thoughts embodied in models of the beautiful, the true, the good, and the noble (p 166). The author cites a remark by N.Z. Chavchavadze from the well-known work "Kultura i tsennosti" [Culture and Values]: "Activity dictated wholly and completely by needs cannot be free or give rise to new values of creativity. As long as man is governed by his needs, there can be no talk of freedom. He must liberate himself from the power of these needs to some extent, cease to submit to them, and rise above them.... Individual freedom is always a case of liberation from the power of the lowest values, the choice of the highest values, and a struggle to act in accordance with them" (p 161). But A.G. Zdravomyslov goes even further, pointing out the danger of the ideal values that can "blind the individual and cause him to strive for the quickest possible realization of the ideal, with no regard for his actual surroundings" (p 151). "Orientation toward only the ideal and the future frequently leads to the distortion of reality...in which the actual development of relations is forced into an ideal pattern, because it gives rise to constant efforts to bring this ideal closer, often with no regard for real conflicts, negative developments, and the undesirable implications of the actions taken" (p 153). In an examination of the means of attaining an ideal, the author says that their choice "has a considerable, essentially decisive, effect on the very interpretation of the goal and on the nature of its attainment" (p 155).

This alone attests to the author's organic nonacceptance of pseudocommunist utopias.

While A.G. Zdravomyslov was studying values, he also disclosed such fundamental phenomena as the system of values and the structure of needs, providing a key to social and culturological analysis. It is here that the author's narrative becomes picturesque and even dramatic (the passages dealing with culture and art are a perfect example), and the book acquires the features of a philosophical essay. He fails, however, to discuss some relevant issues, such as the contradiction between the official and actual prevailing systems of values and the tendency of the "elite's" social behavior to serve as a standard. It is in these, and not in the "tenacity" of the habit of accumulation or the institution of inheritance (p 195), that the roots of social egoism, the consumer mentality, and other negative phenomena can be found.

The author's analysis of the motives for labor is somewhat cut and dried. Is there any point in arranging them in order: financial incentives (motive No 1), interest in the content of work (No 2), collectivist aims (No 3), and so forth? After all, this kind of rigid distinction is incompatible with the very spirit of the book. Even in this section, however, the author eventually takes a realistic approach, especially when he directs attention to the "declining prestige of skilled labor and diminished responsibility of the production organizer" (p 207), which we have just recently begun counteracting.

In the foreword the author declares the importance of directing needs, interests, and values, justifiably warning against arbitrary, subjectivist attempts at the "quick transformation of the structure of social and personal needs" (p 10). He fails, however, to analyze the successful results of this kind of social guidance, although they are indicated by domestic experience and by the practices of other socialist countries.

In my opinion, A.G. Zdravomyslov's monograph deserves the attention it has been given by Soviet sociologists.

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## THE COLLECTIVE, COMPETITION, THE INDIVIDUAL

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 2, Mar-Apr 87 (signed to press 17 Mar 87) pp 149-150

[Review by V.F. Sbytov of book "Kollektiv. Sorevnovaniye. Lichnost. Sotsialno-ekonomicheskiye problemy trudovoy i tvorcheskoy aktivnosti" [The Collective. Competition. The Individual. The Socioeconomic Problems of Labor and Creativity] by R.Kh. Simonyan, Moscow, Sovetskaya Rossiya, 1986, 176 pages]

[Text] The complex and diverse processes occurring within the depths of socialist national production have not been studied sufficiently by scientists yet. In this connection, R.Kh. Simonyan's monographic study of the search for more effective ways of mobilizing the human factor in production is of great theoretical and practical interest. In the first place, the author concentrates on social processes developing at the "lowest" levels of the economy. In the second place, he examines labor and creativity as the result of the dialectical interaction of the collective and the individual. In the third place, this is the first analysis of the additional means of enhancing labor productivity that are made possible by the collectivist nature of socialist production. In the fourth place, he proves conclusively that the style of management is becoming the most important condition for the realization of the creative potential of the individual under the conditions of the greater emphasis on the complete observance of the principles of social justice, especially the struggle against wage leveling and various forms of social parasitism. Finally, the study includes a broad social overview of the complex mechanism of the collective's interaction with the individual.

The materials of the 27th CPSU Congress stress that the industrious nature and talent of the Soviet people are the decisive conditions in the acceleration of socioeconomic development. "Everything will depend on the skillful organization and accurate direction of this great force. Here it would be difficult to overestimate the role of socialist competition" [1, pp 43-44].

The very purpose of this work is of interest--the author wanted to describe the individual, the labor collective, and competition as a single entity.

As the author correctly points out, this subject matter is usually viewed through the prism of economic concepts. "This is one of the reasons that the

constructive potential of our society has not been used in its entirety. The purely economic, oversimplified, 'wasteful' approach to the human being leaves much of the public wealth embodied in the creative potential of the individual outside the framework of the economic mechanism" (p 5). The study begins with a description of the labor collective, which, in the author's opinion, can be examined, first, as a production-technological entity in the system for the social division of labor; second, as the production link through which the individual is included in the economic relations of the society; third, as a level of production management; fourth, as an element of the society's political system; fifth, as a living cell of the social organism of society--the social environment of the individual.

The 27th party congress' announced intention to expand the rights of the collectives of associations and enterprises and the scales of their independence, heighten their responsibility for the results of work, and reinforce the role of economic accountability in the productive activity of people necessitates precise and sound answers to the questions of how this responsibility is to be heightened and to what degree the scales of the collective's autonomy are to be expanded.

The author sees the increasing significance of the primary collective as an indication of "the heightened role of the social environment in which the process of the direct combination of the interests and needs of the individual and the collective with statewide interests and needs takes place" (p 41). Furthermore, the author defines this environment as the total group of material, technical, organizational, ecological, and other conditions.

In a separate chapter on various methods of organizing competition, the author says that the main thing now is the objective and timely assessment of results. Competition is the only form of distribution according to labor that can become a more powerful weapon in the fight against wage leveling. The author associates this problem with another extremely relevant matter--the attitude toward talent in the collective. "History teaches us," Simonyan writes, "that talent does not necessarily have to be destroyed to be ruined; sometimes it is enough to stop protecting it" (p 175). What we need in addition to diligence and industry are new ideas, bold designs, and extraordinary approaches and decisions, and this is why talented people must be given special protection, the author says. The barracks type of collective in which the personality is stifled is alien to socialism. Of course, the variety of personality types is not only a source of the creative potential of the collective, but also of difficulties for the manager, especially if he has not mastered a modern style of management. But "socialism needs this kind of variety, viewing it as a necessary condition for the continued growth of creativity, initiative, and the competition of minds and talents, without which the socialist way of life is unthinkable and advancement is absolutely inconceivable" [1, p 51].

The connection between competition and planning is also examined in the monograph, and the author recommends ways of improving the planning of social development.

Unfortunately, the many issues discussed in the book and the multitude of interesting theoretical generalizations sometimes have a negative effect. For example, the detailed analysis of the subject matter is gradually replaced by a somewhat oversimplified exposition of views, and all of this turns into glib patter in the final section. The author could have avoided this by limiting the range of topics.

Some of the author's statements are debatable. For example, he asserts that the danger of formalized competition is connected only with the highest levels of production management and that it allegedly poses virtually no threat to competition between brigades. Unfortunately, there is evidence to the contrary. The author's ideas about the management of competition are also controversial. He believes that "whereas economic methods of management concern material interests and rely on economic incentives, sociopsychological methods are expected to influence spiritual interests" (p 116). Could we really say that the undeserved loss of a bonus, for example, does not have an impact on the individual's spiritual sphere in addition to causing purely economic injuries? The contrasting of wages to financial awards for competition also seems inappropriate (p 137). R.Kh. Simonyan has been known for a long time as the author of interesting works on the social management and planning of the labor collective. We are certain that his new book will also be of interest to the reader.

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## PARTY AND PUBLIC OPINION

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[Review by S.F. Khitrova of book "Partiyata i obshchestvennoto mneniye" by R. Rachkov, Sofia, Partizdat, 1985, 235 pages]

[Text] The history of recent decades has taught us several hard lessons about the serious consequences of weaker party contact with the masses. The communist and workers parties of the countries of the socialist community, including Bulgaria, are constantly seeking effective forms of politico-organizational activity. The analysis and molding of public opinion are playing an increasingly important role in this activity. Why is this becoming one of the main channels for the determination of public feelings and wishes and a strong factor of social control? In this new book an attempt is made to answer these questions.

According to the author, the procedural key to the analysis of this topic is the assumption that the importance of the subjective factor is increasing in the socialist society and that the communist party and public opinion must be viewed as elements of this factor. This seems to be a productive approach from the analytical and practical standpoints because, in the first place, it focuses attention on the need to use public opinion in the practice of management and, in the second place, it clearly defines the goal of the heightened political awareness, social maturity, and enthusiasm of the masses.

What is the reason for this great interest in public opinion? In contrast to other elements of the mass consciousness, the latter usually focuses on the most vital issues, attaches genuine social importance to events, and occasionally brings minor incidents and problems to the attention of many people (furthermore, they often misinterpret certain incidents). In addition, it still performs some essential daily functions. Instead of using the system of classification commonly employed in Soviet literature, the author defines most of these functions as regulative, cognitive, supervisory, advisory, directive, analytical, prognostic, informational, and educational (pp 136-139). All of this substantiates the need for the extensive and thorough use of public opinion in party activity.

The means and goals of work with public opinion are analyzed in depth in the book. The primary aim is to give the latter the ability and potential to



form and express competent judgments and assessments. Only then can public opinion be an effective means of solving socioeconomic problems and mobilizing people for action.

What are the mechanics of these processes? The author avoids the simplistic and biased descriptions of the molding of public opinion either as the mechanical cultivation of certain ideas or as the purely spontaneous and uncontrolled spread of beliefs. R. Rachkov chooses a path that has rarely been explored in Bulgarian or Soviet literature: He analyzes the problem from the standpoint of the relationship between party and public opinion. The reinforcement of the party's vanguard role does not mean that one will be dissolved in the other. The opinion of communists as a "discerning political (or class)...attitude toward the facts, events and processes of social reality" is always more mature, profound, and competent; it is the "natural center, true nucleus, and main trend in the development of public opinion" (pp 100-101). The party point of view, however, is not an automatic guide. Party decisions, ideas, and statements publicized by the mass media are an important factor influencing public opinion. The attainment of current goals, the author stresses, will be secured when the opinion of the primary party organization is highly respected in labor collectives and other social groups. It should be a point of departure for personal judgments and actions. The successful performance of this function necessitates the constant analysis of public experience. The author makes a statement of analytical and practical importance in this context: Party and public opinion represent an inexhaustible reserve for the development and improvement of intraparty democracy and must be relied upon for effective social control on all levels.

Several other important topics are also discussed in the work: the procedural interpretation of the "public opinion" phenomenon, the organizational principles of its analysis, molding, and forecasting, and the experience accumulated in this work in Bulgaria.

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